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Abstract 
Evaluations of internal audit effectiveness (IAE) have consistently shown the 
significant role played by internal auditing (IA) activities in helping organisations to 
achieve their goals. However, IA practitioners continue to debate about IAE along with 
the literature showing that internal audit function (IAF) is not always effective. This 
dilemma spawns the current study with acumen that examiners of IAF and 
organisational practices seem to have underestimated the impact of the institutional 
influence on organisational setting and their effect on IA performance. Yet, this 
approach creates gaps that prevent the real-life experiences of internal auditors from 
being captured. The present study aimed at understanding IAE through the lens of 
stakeholders’ perceptions of IAF and the factors that influence IAE in the public sector 
institutional setting. The literature shows that the institutional environment is 
dominated by isomorphic pressures and complexities that are generated by relational 
and interactional requirements. This does not change the essence of the IA profession, 
but factors behind the variations within the organisational circumstances cannot be 
understood without a clear appreciative of the institutional environment.  
The process of organisational response to institutional requirements generates 
challenges that threaten the consistency of the organisation’s circumstances and the 
identity of IAF. This study examined multiple cases in the public institutional 
environment of Rwanda to understand IAE in public sector organisations (PSOs). 
Examining stakeholders’ perceptions of IA performance in multiple cases shows that 
there are variations in IAE in PSOs. Findings of the study show that understanding 
IAE in PSOs could not underestimate the influence of the institutional requirements 
that determine the trend of organisational circumstances to remain relevant within the 
institutional setting. There is significant contribution made by IAF when organisations 
desire to achieve their goals. The organisational significance to the public sector 
setting and steadiness of the IA uniqueness are displayed to help in employing 
strategies that facilitate IAF to achieve its objectives hence perceived as effective. 
While institutional requirements push organisations to remain relevant to the 
institutional norms, IAF aims to meet stakeholders’ expectations and effectively 
safeguards its identity which this study designates as achieving effectiveness. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Internal auditing (IA), which has its roots in accounting (Reynolds 2000; Reynolds & 
Francis 2000) and linked to the economic, political, social and cultural realities of the 
context in which organisations function (Toms 2005), operates principally to help 
organisations to achieve their goals, of providing social services to the public 
(Vijayakumar & Nagaraja 2012) in the public sector institutional setting. Regulatory 
requirements within the public-sector setting indicate that there is growing recognition 
of IA, which is often reflected in a mandatory requirement to establish an IA activity 
(Stick, Bouckaert & Scheers 2005). However, the public is a broad concept in which 
the economy, politics and social relations are embedded (Holzman 2012). Political and 
social patterns therefore, create an economic system through which resources and 
goods are allocated to individuals through organisational values and institutional 
regulations (Polanyi 2001). The operationalisation of such goals through public sector 
organisations (PSOs) in a modern world economy is a fundamental part of society 
(Dequech 2007; Nippel 2005). As such, the link between organisations and the 
institutional setting govern legal and resource provisions for organisations (Baum & 
Oliver 1992; Meyer & Scott 1983; Tolbert 1985; Zucker 1987). Hence, this link 
exhibits a form of interrelation and dependence to follow the prescribed legitimate 
norms in the sector in which they are embedded, thereby exhibiting continuity 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Frumkin, Frank & Jackson 2004; Meyer & Rowan 1977; 
Mihret 2010).   
PSOs therefore strive to achieve national objectives within embedded social links 
(Polanyi & Polanyi 2001; Vijayakumar & Nagaraja 2012). These social links, which 
determine legal and resource provisions (Baum & Oliver 1992; Meyer & Scott 1983; 
Tolbert 1985; Zucker 1987), influence functions and result in challenges caused by 
institutional uncertainties (Bertels & Lawrence 2016; Greenwood et al. 2011; 
Thornton 2004). The governance of PSOs emphasises the need for improved 
accountability, which is achieved, inter-alia, through IA activities (Normanton 1966; 
Sterck, Bouckaert & Scheers 2005). The IA role therefore, is to ensure that PSOs 
operate within the budgetary provisions, expenditures comply with the set instructions 
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and procedures and IAF provides assurance that these organisations possess effective 
systems for managing and accounting for the assets that belong to these organisations. 
An independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value 
and improve an organization’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish its 
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve 
the effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes (The IIA 
2017). 
This definition demonstrates the fundamental purpose, nature and scope of IA and why 
it has received the recognition and attention of regulators in PSOs. This notion has led 
to the belief that IAF is a value-adding tool towards modern organisational goals, 
which is supported by the IA literature. For instance, Dittenhofer (2001) uses value 
addition as a characteristic of, and evidence for, internal audit effectiveness (IAE). 
Dittenhofer’s perception is influenced by the IA definition, which states that an 
effective IAF helps organisations to achieve their objectives. Al-Twaijry, Brierley and 
Gwilliam (2003), Bou-Raad (2000) and Yee et al. (2008) supplement Dittenhofer’s 
suggestion that an effective IAF improves organisations’ operations. 
Ussahawanitchakit and Intakhan (2011) agree, stating that a program is effective if its 
outcome aligns with its objectives. However, the arrangement of PSOs’ objectives 
varies, and the arrangements can be affected. In turn, the arrangements can affect 
affiliated departments’ activities because of organisational responses to the pressures 
created by institutional uncertainties. For instance, Uddin and Hopper (2001) and 
Wickramasinghe and Hopper (2005) argue that country-specific dynamics influence 
accounting. This argument is based on the perception that public is a social setting 
with a broad concept in which economy, politics, religion and social relations are 
embedded (Polanyi 2001). 
The literature on IA also notes that there are factors that influence IA activities at the 
government (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & Gwilliam 2003; Yee et al. 2008) and organisation 
levels (Arena, Arnaboldi & Azzone 2006; Mihret & Woldeyohannis 2008; Mihret, 
James & Mula 2010). Stewart and Subramaniam (2010) consider IAF a cornerstone of 
corporate governance, but they contend that differences in national culture influence 
corporate governance mechanisms. This argument is similarly repeated by Zain and 
Subramaniam (2007), who single out the component of communication and argue that 
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national culture can influence the way in which IAF communicates about senior 
management to the board of directors. However, research has shown that only an 
effective IAF can serve a value-adding role in modern organisational goals. 
Value addition to organisational goals is achieved by establishing appropriate 
mechanisms for achieving IAE (Lenz & Hahn 2015). An effective IAF can be useful 
in PSOs as a corporate governance monitoring tool. Prior studies have considered IAE 
in various economies. Nevertheless, there is no unanimously agreed framework for 
understanding IAE (Endaya & Hanefah 2013). IAE remains a neglected area of 
research, and it has never been studied in some economies. The IA profession and the 
nature of its activities need to be explored further (Gendron & Bédard 2006; Roussy 
2014). Researchers have called for further studies on IAE to determine its progress in 
varying aspects (Endaya & Hanefah 2013; Roussy 2014). In recognition of such 
contextual effects, Ruud (2003) advocates for researchers to examine national 
differences in the role of IA, while others (e.g., Anderson 2003) call for researchers to 
ascertain the organisational traits that influence IA activities. Given that PSOs are 
consistently dependent on social links for legal and resource provisions (Polanyi & 
Polanyi 2001; Vijayakumar & Nagaraja 2012), an understanding of IAE can be 
achieved by exploring the direct and indirect effects of social links from the 
institutional setting. This why this study employed the stakeholders’ lenses to examine 
their perception towards IAF in PSOs. 
1.2 Overview of the IAF Literature 
Since the nineteenth century, firms have become larger and more geographically 
dispersed, and there is therefore limited managerial ability to monitor all operations. 
As a result, IA was initiated as a monitoring function in addition to management 
supervision and controlling functions (Swinkels 2012). The development of IA as a 
profession began with the establishment of the IIA in 1941. This led to the 
establishment of the IAF as a unique function within organisations (Subramaniam et 
al. 2011a, 2011b). The uniqueness of the IAF is evident in the literature, which shows 
that IA is a value-adding function in modern organisations (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & 
Gwilliam 2003; Bou-Raad 2000; Roth 2000; Ruud 2003). Al-Twaijry, Brierley and 
Gwilliam (2004) argue that the value addition of IAF is demonstrated by the extent to 
which organisations achieve their goals. 
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1.3 Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study 
This study examines how IA achieves stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE given the 
institutional environment of the public sector. IAF has consistently emerged as a 
powerful force in the internal control systems, risk management and corporate 
governance of an organisation (Hermanson & Rittenberg 2003; Hermanson, 
Ivancevich & Ivancevich 2008; Subramaniam et al. 2011b). The literature confirms 
this argument by demonstrating IA’s involvement in reviewing and monitoring 
operations of the organisation. Hence, playing a key role in monitoring organisations’ 
risk profile and determining areas that require intervention for risk management 
purposes (Goodwin 2004; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2006). For instance, there has 
been a change in the IA approach from a compliance type of system to a risk-based 
approach to enhance the transformation of risk management mechanisms in the arena 
(Spira & Page 2003). Such reforms in the profession are sought to ensure that its 
involvement in the controls, risk management and corporate governance practices of 
an organisation becomes significant and evident through value addition (Mihret & 
Zemenu Woldeyohannis 2008) and enhancing its effectiveness (Lenz & Hahn 2015; 
Mihret & Grant 2015; Roussy 2014; Saidin 2013). The literature also shows that an 
effective IAF as a risk management and corporate governance mechanism can improve 
organisations’ operations (Claessens & Yurtoglu 2013; Spira & Page 2003). This 
response has drawn the attention of many to the call for IAF review, to exhibit its 
effectiveness and value proposition in an organisation (Lenz & Hahn 2015). 
Several studies have investigated and evaluated aspects of IAF and its effectiveness of 
different economies. For example, Mihret and Yismaw (2007) studied IAE, and Mihret 
and Woldeyohannis (2008) studied the value-added role of IA in the Ethiopian public 
sector. Other researchers have studied IAE in Israel (Cohen & Sayag 2010), Libya 
(Abu-Azza 2012), Malaysia (Fadzil, Haron & Jantan 2005) and Saudi Arabia (Al-
Twaijry, Brierley & Gwilliam 2003). Further, Yee et al. (2008) studied the perception 
of Singaporean internal audit customers regarding the role and effectiveness of IA. 
However, previous research has paid little attention to the potentially important role of 
IA’s institutional environment, instead focusing on organisation-level determinants of 
IAE. Admittedly, IA activities directly relate to organisational processes that are 
designed to coordinate activities directed at achieving goals (Raelin 2011b). 
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Nevertheless, in the public-sector setting, organisation-level controls tend to be 
influenced by internal factors and external institutional forces (Baum & Oliver 1992; 
DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Fombrun 1986), and they may sometimes be contrary to 
organisations’ operational circumstances (Vermeulen et al. 2016; Bertels & Lawrence 
2016). Thus, the literature suggests that the social setting of the institution upholds 
pressures and institutional uncertainties (Bertels & Lawrence 2016; Greenwood et al. 
2011; Thornton 2004). It is important to imagine what goes on within the IAF when 
the organisation it serves is under the influence of institutional forces. The IAF needs 
to move in line with the changes taking place in the organisation to remain relevant 
and effective. The changing shape of organisational processes require attention to risk 
management therefore, creates both opportunities and threats (Spira & Page 2003). 
The IAF needs to facilitate the organisation in such a situation with proactive 
discussions about managing risks that an organisation is facing or may face (Barac, 
Coetzee & Van Staden 2016; Endaya & Hanefah 2013). IA stakeholders expect the 
IAF to create a platform that facilitates and influences others especially organisation’s 
leaders to build an effective culture of controls throughout their organisation (Pizzini, 
Lin & Ziegenfuss 2014). 
However, despite the changing shape of organisational processes in risk management 
and the integration of the risk-based IA approach, studies on IA have shown that an 
IAF is not always effective (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & Gwilliam 2003; Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2004; Mihret 2010). Experiences that demonstrate IAE 
have not been sufficiently explored. There is a need for further research to explore the 
drivers needed to achieve IAE and reverse the dilemma between experience and 
literature about IA and (Barac, Coetzee & Van Staden 2016; Endaya & Hanefah 2013). 
An interrelationship exists in the form of dependence between functions within an 
organisation and within other organisations in the same setting, where embeddedness 
is required to survive and obtain resources (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Frumkin, Frank 
& Jackson 2004; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Mihret 2010). Given that previous studies on 
IA and IAE have approached the topic from the perspective of the organisational 
setting, the present study aims to understand IAE in PSOs from the institutional setting 
perspective by: 
1. evaluating the effectiveness of the IAF in achieving stakeholders’ expectations 
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2. Determining the factors that influence IAE in PSOs. 
Thus, this study examines how IA practices seeks and create change in PSOs with or 
without help to achieve IAE. 
1.4 Rwandan Public-Sector Setting 
This section provides background information about the history of the Rwandan public 
sector setting to show what compels the current state of affairs. It first discusses the 
pre-colonial period, followed by the period in which Rwanda was under German and 
Belgian control. Second, this section discusses Rwanda’s independence, which was 
followed by genocide and its aftermath, including how Rwanda has since moved 
forward. It then outlines the reforms that enhanced the restructuring in the management 
of public resources and the establishment of an IAF in PSOs. 
1.4.1 Pre-colonial Rwanda 
Rwanda is populated by three ethnic groups. The dominant is a Hutu ethnic group who 
are believed to have settled in the area between fifth and eleventh centuries finding the 
Twa who are the initial settlers. Then, the Tutsi whose historical appraisal emphasises 
that they migrated from the north, with the emergence of a small nuclear kingdom in 
the central region and settled in Rwanda at the beginning of the fourteenth century. 
The Tutsi traditions trace the birth of the Rwanda as a kingdom to the miraculous feats 
of its founding hero, Gihanga, whose arrival in Rwanda is said to coincide with the 
advent of civilisation. This kingdom was ruled by the Tutsi minority until the arrival 
of Europeans in the nineteenth century. As a result, Rwanda differs from most 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa because its general boundaries were not drawn by 
European powers, but reflect the fully established nation-state that existed until the 
introduction of German rule (Encyclopaedia Britannia Online 2017). 
1.4.2 Rwanda Under German and Belgian Control 
Rwanda was a monarchy under the Tutsi as the ruling tribe. It was initially colonised 
by Germany but later handed over to Belgium administered authority under the 
mandates system of the League of Nations. By the end of World War II, a growing 
number of colonial civil servants and missionaries had come to recognise the 
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legitimacy of Hutu claims against the ruling Tutsi minority. Beligians facilitated the 
Hutu and started a peasant revolt in 1959 which led to Rwanda declaring itself a 
republic in 1961 and forced its king into exile (Britannica 2010). What began as a 
peasant eventually transformed itself into an organised political movement aimed at 
the overthrow of the monarchy and the vesting of full political power in Hutu hands. 
Under the leadership of Grégoire Kayibanda, Rwanda’s first president, the Party for 
Hutu Emancipation (Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation du Peuple Hutu) emerged 
as the spearhead of the revolution. Communal elections were held resulting in a 
massive transfer of power to Hutu elements at the local level and an all-Hutu 
provisional government came into being. Independence was proclaimed in July 1962, 
when the revolution had already run its course and thousands of Tutsis began fleeing 
Rwanda, (Britannica 2007, 2010; Domres & Mang 1997). 
When the Tutsi were eliminated from the political arena, north–south regional 
competition among Hutu politicians arose, reflecting the comparatively privileged 
position of those from the central and southern regions within the party, the 
government and the administration. Regional tensions started 1973 and a group of 
army officers from the north overthrew the government and installed a northerner, Maj. 
Gen. Juvénal Habyarimana who ruled for 21years (Encyclopaedia Britannia Online 
2017). Rwandans who fled the country amidst these revolutionaries flared in 1990, led 
by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels invading from Uganda. Cease-fire 
negotiations between the RPF and the government began in 1992. The negotiations led 
to revisions to the 1978 constitution, and the new document, allowing multiparty 
participation in the government, was promulgated. An agreement between the 
government and the RPF was signed in August 1993 at Arusha, Tanzania, that called 
for the creation of a broad-based transition government. The meant to include the RPF 
which angered the Hutu extremists who were strongly opposed to this plan 
(Encyclopaedia Britannia Online 2017). 
1.4.3 Genocide and Aftermath 
On his way back from Arusha Tanzania, on 6 April 1994, the then president of Rwanda 
was shot down in a plane over Kigali and the ensuing crash killed everyone on board. 
The then Prime Minister of Rwanda was assassinated the following day subsequent 
were the murders to eliminate moderate Hutu or Tutsi politicians, with the goal of 
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creating a political vacuum. The vacuum led to formation of an interim government of 
Hutu extremists that was inaugurated on 9 April 1994 which officiated massive killing 
of Tutsis and moderated Hutus. Over the next several months, the wave of anarchy and 
mass killings continued, in which the army and Hutu militia groups known as the 
Interahamwe (‘those who attack together’) and Impuzamugambi (‘those who have the 
same goal’) played a central role. The RPF responded by resuming their fight and was 
successful in securing most of the country by early July 1994 (Britannica 2007, 2010; 
Domres & Mang 1997). 
1.4.4 Moving Forward 
In July 1994, a transitional government was established, a new president and vice 
president were sworn in. A new constitution aimed at preventing further ethnic strife 
in the country was promulgated in 2003. Prevention of ethnic strife led the government 
to implement a significant administrative reorganisation, replacing the previous 12 
prefectures with five larger multiethnic provinces that aimed to promote effective 
administration (see Figure 1.1). Reform and decentralisation were started and involved 
rebuilding the nation from scratch including the public sector and all the government 
structures. The country’s economy, which was adversely affected but recovered 
gradually (Encyclopaedia Britannia Online 2017). It is not the purpose of this study to 
re-tell the most important achievements of the people of Rwanda through their 
leadership in rebuilding the country and re-establishing its growth. However, it is 
indispensable for a proper understanding of current conditions of the PSOs from where 
data for this research were collected. 
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Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/rwanda-admin-map.htm 
Figure 1.1: Map of Rwanda. 
1.4.5 Reforms in Public Resources Management in Rwanda 
The need for efficient and effective use of organisations’ resources led to the 
establishment of the Public Finance Management (PFM) policy in 2006, which 
involved changing from a typical francophone custom of centralised administration 
and decentralisation practices. As there were no existing administrative structures to 
build on, government reform programs in this sector had to create new structures to 
shape a strong society with a reliable PFM system. The government then introduced 
an Anglophone system of checks and balances based on parliamentary authority 
(Klingebiel & Mahn 2011). The Rwandan Constitution, which was approved in a 
national referendum and adopted in Parliament on 4 June 2003, defines the principles 
and overall legal framework for the management of public finances in the country 
(Republic of Rwanda [ROR] 2003). The constitution and the organic law determine 
that the major PFM institutions in Rwanda are the Parliament, Cabinet, Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) and Office of the Auditor General 
(OAG) (ROR 2006). Further, they define the roles of each institution in the 
management of public finances.  
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The process of public sector restructuring in the Rwandan government embraced 
rebuilding the entire governance system and establishing anti-corruption institutions. 
These mechanisms enhanced corporate governance and PFM and strengthened the 
legal and institutional frameworks. Institutions and policies established for this 
purpose included the OAG (for state finances), Rwanda Public Procurement Authority 
(RPPA), Office of the Ombudsman, National Prosecutor General Authority and the 
results-based performance management (RBPM) policy. Further, the Rwanda National 
Police was strengthened with structures that focused on corruption. These institutions 
and policies were designed to facilitate the implementation of effective PFM processes 
and spearhead the fight against corruption in their varying scopes of operation (BBC 
News 2010; Hitchen 2013; Mwai 2013; The East African 2016; Transparency 
International 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014; Worldwide Governance Indicators 2011). 
However, it was difficult to end malpractices in Rwandan public-sector institutions, 
and the struggle to enhance effective PFM continued. 
1.4.6 Establishment of IAF in PSOs 
The commitment to achieve the highest standards of accountability and transparency 
in public fiscal management, which was exemplified in the strong will of the state to 
create a corruption-free society, led to the establishment of the office of the Chief 
Internal Auditor (OCIA). This was in accordance with the organic law on state finances 
and property and the ministerial order on financial regulations to ensure adequate 
internal audit arrangements in government organisations. This office is based in the 
Ministry of Finance and is responsible for helping ministries, districts, provinces and 
government parastatals meet their statutory and fiduciary responsibilities. The IAF in 
the respective organisations is also responsible for helping them ensure that public 
resources are efficiently and effectively managed (GOR 2007). Several mechanisms 
have been created to standardise the IAF in government organisations. A procedure 
manual was established as Ministerial Order N° 2/09/10/GP/A of 12/02/2009, revised 
in 2016, to legalise the execution of IAF in Rwandan government organisations. This 
ministerial order is also used as the IA manual, which contains procedures to be 
followed by government internal auditors. The office of the OCIA helps government 
organisations make informed decisions, as well as efficiently and effectively use 
resources and satisfy their respective statutory and fiduciary responsibilities. Overall, 
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the office of the OCIA is responsible for strengthening, guiding and supporting all IAF 
activities in PSOs (MINECOFINE 2016). 
1.5 Motivation of the Study 
IA literature has shown the significance of the IAF in modern organisations (Al-
Twaijry, Brierley & Gwilliam 2003; Bou-Raad 2000; Endaya & Hanefah 2013; IIA 
2009; Yee et al. 2008) to achieve the set goals. This significance is demonstrated 
through the involvement of IA in the internal control systems, risk management and 
corporate governance of an organisation (Goodwin 2004; Hermanson & Rittenberg 
2003; Hermanson, Ivancevich & Ivancevich 2008; Subramaniam et al. 2011b). The 
involvement of IAF that explains its significance is to achieve stakeholders’ 
expectations and demonstrate the effectiveness of IA. This is largely pronounced by 
the literature that has shown how the changing shape of organisational processes has 
created unique opportunities (Spira & Page 2003) for the IAF. The IAF has emerged 
as a key player in monitoring organisations’ risk profiles and determining areas that 
require intervention for risk management purposes (Goodwin 2004; Goodwin-Stewart 
& Kent 2006). 
Yet, Spira and Page (2003) point out that the changing shape of organisational 
processes develop with in challenges. This argument is supported by the literature, 
which shows that PSOs are required to comply with regulations and survive on 
perceptive environmental elements to achieve acceptability and support (Pfeffer & 
Salancik 2003). These requirements tend to create pressures and institutional 
uncertainties (Bertels & Lawrence 2016; Greenwood et al. 2011; Thornton 2004). 
Requirements that are sometimes not coherent to organisational circumstances and 
hence threaten performance. In this regard, the process of organisational response to 
institutional pressures affects functional areas because of interrelationships within the 
organisation and the embeddedness of the institutional framework (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003). Yet, IA research has not considered the effect of institutional pressure 
on the IAF when organisations they serve focus on addressing multiple institutional 
requirements. The literature on IA and IAE has focused on factors around the IAF and 
organisations. Yet, when there is lack of coherence when required to satisfy one 
demand it may require forfeiting others (Pfeffer & Salancik 2003). The current study 
pursues this area that had not been tackled in IA research to examine the internal 
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auditors experience in such situations. The investigations in such a situation desired to 
identify what happens if the forfeited demands relate to the IAF. This examination 
would identify the continuity of IA activities. This is because if continuity of IA 
activities would be jeopardised, it would in turn be difficult to achieve IA stakeholders’ 
expectations hence IA ineffectiveness. In addition to the notion that the IAF does not 
operate in isolation (Arena & Azzone 2009), it is not clear how IA and interdependence 
on other organisational functions influences IA activities during the constraining 
situations describe earlier. In general, IA literature has not provided how organisations 
respond to institutional pressures that have impact on IAE. 
1.6 Contribution of the Study 
This study seeks to understand the factors that influence IAE in PSOs in an institutional 
setting using multiple case studies, and it makes a major contribution to the literature 
regarding the context and perception of IAE in PSOs. This study provides a new 
understanding of IAE by focusing on contextual factors that influence IAE within the 
institutional setting rather than the IAF in the organisational setting. Despite the need 
to validate the results in similar studies conducted in different settings, this study 
makes several useful contributions to IA literature. This contribution involves multiple 
cases being studied and examining IAE from an institutional setting perspective. 
Previous studies have mainly used institutional theory to explain IA development at 
the organisational level and outlined patterns of IA implementation at the functional 
level. The insights generated from the theoretical perspective of the current study can 
help IA professionals and practitioners to manage their IA environment. These insights 
also can help legislators to pay attention to priority areas to achieve high levels of 
effectiveness. Assessing the institutional setting will help all actors involved to 
develop an improved perspective of what impedes the IA performance that could be 
the response as to why IAF is not always effective. 
1.7 Scope of the Study and Limitation 
This study focuses on IAE in Rwandan PSOs by examining relational influences in the 
institutional setting. It aims to explore how the IAF meets stakeholders’ expectations 
of IAE from a holistic perspective. Previous studies on IA and IAE have examined 
characteristics at the organisation and function levels; however, this has not informed 
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the objective of the current study. This study employs the case study method; five 
PSOs are selected based on the availability of the IAF in the organisations and their 
willingness to participate in the study. Examining all aspects of such a social system 
is unattainable in the current study and is satisfied using approximations. The five 
cases selected are representative of Rwanda’s public sector institutional setting. 
1.8 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises seven chapters. Chapter one presents the introduction, including 
the background, scope and limitation of the study. Chapter two presents the literature 
review, which discusses other research on the same subject and the approaches 
employed by other researchers. Chapter three outlines the theoretical framework 
designed for this study. Chapter four discusses the research design and methodology 
used in this study, as well as justifications for their suitability. Chapter five presents 
the case study analysis, and Chapter six discusses the findings. Chapter seven presents 
the conclusion and discusses the study’s limitations and implications, as well as areas 
for future research. 
1.9 Chapter Summary 
The awareness and perception of IAE have largely been based on IA and IAE literature 
generated from a review of the IAF at the organisational level. This study considers 
the dynamic circumstances through which IA activities are conducted, which shape 
the varying experiences of internal auditors in PSOs. Although an IAF is required to 
comply with the International Standards for Professional Practice of Internal Auditors 
(ISPPIA) (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & Gwilliam 2003; Spraakman 1997), achieving IAE 
varies across settings and cannot be examined by singling out components. 
Understanding IAE requires considering organisational circumstances which 
determine the relationship and the level of interaction between actors within the entire 
setting to determine the IA approach. Chapter two presents a literature review of IA 
and IAE. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This study notes that diverse organisational responses to institutional dynamics 
(Greenwood et al. 2011) can have impact on IAE. IA studies have not sufficiently 
examined the effect of institutional factors on the IAF. It is not clear how diverse 
organisational responses to institutional dynamics (Greenwood et al. 2011) affect IA 
activities given that PSOs are embedded in the institutional setting. Although most 
studies suggest that IA adds value in modern organisations (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & 
Gwilliam 2000, 2003; Roth 2000; Yee et al. 2008) and helps them to achieve their 
objectives (Gramling et al. 2004; IIA 2009), it would be naivety to assume that 
achieving such expectations can be automatic. This is because, given organisational 
responses to institutional dynamics (Greenwood et al. 2011), there is a likelihood of 
interrupting functional programs in an embedded institutional field. Therefore, this 
study contends that IAE in the public sector should be examined at the institutional 
level rather than the organisational and/or IA operational levels. This chapter conducts 
a literature review of IA and IAE and focuses on organisational and institutional 
considerations to understand IA processes in PSOs. It begins by establishing the 
theoretical perspective upon which the conceptual framework for this study is 
grounded. 
2.1 Theoretical Perspectives 
Concern to intertextual coherence considered previous studies on IA research, which 
examined IAE using different approaches. For instance, Twaijry et al. (2003) used 
ISPPIA as a parameter to explore and determine IAE. Mihret and Yismaw (2007) and 
Arena and Azzone (2009) established their own models to study IAE. Few studies have 
employed economics-based theories in IA research. Mihret (2010) combined 
institutional theory and Marx’s theory of the circuit of industrial capital to study the 
antecedents and organisational performance implications of IAE. Bryer (1999a, 
1999b, 2006b) introduced Marx’s theory to accounting to explore the link between 
IAE and company performance. Agency theory (Adams 1994), transaction cost theory 
(Spraakman 1997) and Foucault theory (Mihret & Grant 2017) provide conceptual 
foundations of the role of IA in corporate governance. Further, communication theory 
(Davidson 1991) expresses how internal auditors should be effective communicators. 
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Nevertheless, previous research has not provided generally agreed theories or 
approaches to the study of IAE.  
To systematically interpret previous research on IAE and contextualise it to PSOs, it 
is worth exploring the theoretical lenses they employed. For example, agency theory 
was established by Ross and Stephen (1973), who believed that there must be two 
parties for any contract to be a successful transaction. It holds that shareholders are the 
owners of the firm, while the management is an agent. Agency theory, which was first 
employed by Adams (1994), cannot fully inform the current study because it does not 
sufficiently address both direct and indirect features within the public-sector setting. 
For instance, agency theory cannot inform this study to understanding how IA 
processes are affected by the institutional setting. Employing agency theory cannot 
help this study to explain how IAF meets stakeholders’ expectations when 
organisations they serve are constrained by institutional complexities, and the factors 
that influence IAF effectiveness in constrained circumstances. 
Transaction cost theory, which was employed by Spraakman (1997), was built on 
assumption that IA provides useful information to managers. Based on this 
assumption, Spraakman (1997) argued that transaction cost theory provides a 
comprehensive perspective for economising because a series of activities is linked to 
transactions. IA is an economics-driven response to risk (Knechel et al. 2012). In this 
study, transaction cost theory is limited to conceptualising the perception of IAE 
because Spraakman (1997) focused on the bounded rationality of management and the 
limitations of human ability and perception. The operational dimensions that 
Spraakman (1997) assumed would positively facilitate IA efforts because of in-house 
production perceptions but can be contradicted by institutional uncertainties. Mihret, 
James and Mula (2010) used Marx’s theory of the ‘circuit of industrial capital’, which 
explains capitalist production as an increasing capital by continuously generating 
surplus value (profit). Marx presents the production process in a circuit of industrial 
capital, which is irrelevant to the research questions in this study and the current 
research motive. 
Another theory employed by previous studies is Davidson’s (1991) communication 
theory, which explains how internal auditors should be effective communicators. The 
study suggests that an IAF needs to possess superior communication skills to be 
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effective. Further, internal auditors should keep abreast of current communication 
concepts and endeavour to evaluate, improve and apply their communication skills 
(Davidson 1991). Effective communication is an appropriate feature for an IAF 
because it involves understanding the audience, keeping messages clear and simple, 
presenting ideas in a straightforward manner, having clear objectives and persevering 
despite disappointments (Davidson 1991; Endaya & Hanefah 2013). However, 
achieving IAE in an embedded setting involves more than just communication. Given 
that the current study focuses on an environment that is unstable and unpredictable, 
communication theory is insufficient. 
Mihret and Grant (2015) employed Foucault’s theory in IA research. However, its 
view of governmentality, which is the study of the autonomy of individuals’ capacity 
for self-control and its links to forms of political rule and economic exploitation, does 
not enable comparisons (Foucault et al. 1991). Foucault’s theory does not examine the 
relationship between experiences and rationalities, which would help this study to 
generate insights from organisations to answer the research question. The current study 
focuses on institutional and organisational considerations by establishing a theoretical 
platform from the perspective of the institutional setting to facilitate an understanding 
of IAE in PSOs. 
2.1.1 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory, which was employed by Mihret, James and Mula (2010), states 
that organisational structures and practices are designed through changes induced by 
institutional pressures, which are caused by institutional uncertainties (Thornton 2004; 
Greenwood et al. 2011; Bertels & Lawrence 2016). Therefore, organisations are 
considered members of an institutional field that comprises several organisations that 
are interrelated in some way (Mihret, James & Mula 2010). This interrelation is 
exhibited in the form of a relationship of dependence, which leads some organisations 
to influence others. The philosophy behind this influence is that institutional linkages 
determine legality, acceptance and resource provisions of organisations (Baum & 
Oliver 1992; Meyer & Scott 1983; Tolbert 1985; Zucker 1987), hence the complexity 
of PSOs being embedded in an institutional cage. This embeddedness results from the 
fact that PSOs are largely concerned with service delivery and beneficial outcomes of 
social service to the public rather than the commercial motivation of profit 
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maximisation (Vijayakumar & Nagaraja 2012). Nevertheless, the process of meeting 
the desired objectives faces several types of internal and external risks. 
The institutional linkage perspective encouraged the current study to employ 
institutional theory. This is particularly relevant to IA research in the public sector 
because it is founded on the principle that organisations function by conforming to 
expectations to achieve legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan 1977) within the same setting. 
This principle validates the literature, which shows that organisations tend to follow 
the legitimacy of the sectors in which they are embedded to survive and obtain 
resources (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Mihret 2010). The 
literature also shows that organisations facing similar circumstances share a common 
institutional context and tend to use similar structures, forms and processes which 
common in bureaucratic systems. This attribute aligns with the principle that a 
bureaucratic structural framework places expectation on organisations, which is the 
legitimacy with which institutional theory seemingly relates. However, Lawrence, 
Suddaby and Leca (2009) argued that results of legitimacy assumed in institutional 
theory are not connected to reality but a ceremonial display, yet operations of PSOs 
are a practical phenomenon. As theorised by Weber (1978), PSOs operate under 
bureaucratic controls which makes institutional theory suitable for this study. 
Frumkin (2004) compared the effects of institutional pressures on public, private and 
non-profit organisations. The study by Frumkin (2004) found that PSOs are more 
susceptible because of institutional pressures which express bureaucratic controls as a 
system of organisational control. Susceptibility of PSOs is attributed to the 
bureaucratic system of organisational control. The effects that results from the 
institutional setting, and this kind of organisational control system is a common 
practice by most countries. Frumkin’s (2004) findings provide a platform to employ 
institutional theory for this study because it can generate a conceptual framework for 
understanding IAE in PSOs. The element of susceptibility of PSOs spawned by the 
bureaucratic system of organisational control provides the framework for institutional 
embeddedness besides institutional theory for this study. 
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2.1.2 Institutional Embeddedness 
The literature defines institutional embeddedness as the interconnections between a 
population and its institutional environment (DiMaggio 1988; Fombrun 1986). Thus, 
in this study, institutional embeddedness demonstrates the institutional field from 
which PSOs operate. It expresses the level of collaboration between organisations, 
functions and personnel (Baum & Oliver 1992; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Fombrun 
1986). This concept is relevant to the theoretical perspective because it conforms to 
similar circumstances and the use of similar structures, forms and processes in service 
delivery. According to Baum and Oliver (1992), institutional embeddedness is 
operationalised as relational density. This description encouraged the current study to 
define it as an environment in which members of institutions must comply with formal 
obligations. The element of embeddedness is strengthened by the organisational 
control system. The nature of embeddedness is evident in its status, roles and 
responsibilities in observing rules, processes and procedures within its setting. 
Given the dynamics of the nature of the service, organisations and their IAFs in the 
public-sector setting must observe government requirements. The difference here is 
that the IAF observes institutional requirements indirectly through the organisation it 
serves. The IAF must observe the hierarchical obligations within the organisation. 
Thus, this suggests that IA studies should not underestimate the tension between 
organisational managers when they are trying to achieve organisational objectives and 
examine the effects of this tension on IA activities. Further, Dobbin (2009) pointed out 
that PSOs sometimes operate in an environment with strong organisational control 
mechanisms. Thus, it is important to identify the factors that influence IAE by 
examining the IAF and the organisations it serves regarding the complexities generated 
by institutional demands. 
The literature shows that IAF is not a sole player (Arena & Azzone 2009; Mihret & 
Zemenu Woldeyohannis 2008), and that the IAF in the public sector interacts with 
different actors to achieve the desired outcomes. Success is dependent on the effective 
mechanisms of the IAF responding to, and managing, uncertainties within the 
operational framework. Understanding IAE in PSOs examining the capacity of the IAF 
whether it can apply practices that interrupt institutional pressures and complexities to 
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meet organisations’ objectives. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the position of IA and the 
institutional environment. 
 
Figure 2.1: Internal audit environment in the public setting. 
Figure 2.1 shows that the IAF is established in the institutional setting (in this case, the 
public-sector setting). Further, it shows the setting of public sector institutions to 
validate the effect of such a setting on IA activities. This implies that operations are 
based on the trust demonstrated by these organisations, which consistently conforms 
to communal expectations to achieve correctness (Meyer & Rowan 1977). This is 
consistent with the fact that PSOs are established and driven by the concern of service 
delivery to provide beneficial social service outcomes to the public. The literature 
points out that some organisational control mechanisms do not allow operational 
managers to exercise their will (Dobbin 2009). The suggestion made in the literature 
about the lack of flexibility to exercise their strength of character (will) provides 
evidence of bureaucracy in PSOs. 
2.1.3 Bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy uses its characteristics to measure the reality that makes institutions 
successful. Characteristics considered in this study include rules and regulations and 
the hierarchy of authority (Holton 2013; Raelin 2011a, 2011b; Schibler 2012; Weber 
1978; Yasuyuki & Olejniczak 2014). Rules and regulations are put in place by the 
principle owners of the organisation to help workers perform tasks required in a guided 
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and more professional manner. They help to create uniformity and may come from 
higher levels of administration, but the main purpose is to ensure smooth functioning 
of the bureaucracy system. The relevance of these characteristics in the public-sector 
setting is emphasised to ensure that national goals are achieved in a timely manner 
(Nippel 2005; Weber 1947, 1954, 1978). 
The hierarchy of authority principle is drawn from the organisational structure that 
places one individual or office in charge of another and operates on superior and 
subordinate relationships. The authority of a position in the organisational structure 
increases with each higher level of a person or organisation (Nippel 2005; Weber 1947, 
1954, 1978). This means that the decision-making power in bureaucratic system moves 
from top levels of administration down to lower levels of employees. Despite the clear 
path of decision-making, the process is not convenient for operationalisation at the 
organisational level. The principle goes beyond the organisational level and generates 
dependences. The links create embeddedness within the institutional field and breed 
institutional isomorphism. 
2.1.4 Institutional Isomorphism 
The philosophy behind characteristics of bureaucracy within institutional linkages 
leads to institutional isomorphism, which is an effort to achieve rationality, with 
uncertainty and constraint leading to homogeneity of structure (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983). According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), organisations exist in a field of 
other organisations. Management of pressures and institutional uncertainties within the 
social setting of a public sector, which sustains interrelations and exhibits dependence 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz 2004; Frumkin, Frank & Jackson 
2004; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Mihret 2010), is a choice that must be made among the 
alternatives to condense their risk. Sustainability under this setting exposes some 
organisations to mechanisms of institutional isomorphic challenges. These 
mechanisms include coercive isomorphism, mimetic processes and normative 
pressures (DiMaggio & Powell 1983) (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4). However, it is 
important to acknowledge that organisational structures are arranged in such a way 
that they convene to a legitimate, desirable and appropriate socially constructed system 
of standards, values, beliefs and characteristics (Deephouse & Suchman 2008). This is 
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supplemented by Scott (1995, p. 132), who argued that organisations exist in an 
environment of institutions that exert some degree of pressure on them. 
Institutional environments are characterised by the elaboration of rules and 
requirements to which individual organisations must conform if they are to receive 
support and legitimacy (Scott 1995; Scott & Meyer 1994; Spencer 1970). Their 
interaction therefore creates the institutional field of a social structure. The prescribed 
relations are achieved when a high probability exists that a significant number of actors 
in such a context will conform to the agreed behaviour and with the same norms. This 
conforms to the principle of authority, which determines the relationship between two 
or more actors in which the commands of certain actors are treated as binding by the 
others (Weber 1954). Given this notion, this study seeks to understand the effect of 
operationalisation from the institutional embeddedness perspective given that 
achieving desired expectations necessitates survival mechanisms (Meyer & Rowan 
1977; Scott & Meyer 1983) to ensure consistency with institutional service delivery to 
society (Vijayakumar & Nagaraja 2012). A survival mechanism for organisations or 
functions in such an environment is institutional entrepreneurship (Child, Lu & Tsai 
2007; Fligstein 2001b; Garud, Hardy & Maguire 2007; Greenwood & Suddaby 2006; 
Levy & Scully 2007; Misangyi, Weaver & Elms 2008; Wijen & Ansari 2007). 
However, IA researchers have not considered how the IAF in the public sector will use 
its unique position and employ institutional entrepreneurship as a transformation 
approach to achieve the desired objectives. 
2.1.5 Institutional Entrepreneurship 
Understanding the institutional entrepreneurship concept requires to explain them 
considering their two different perceptions - institutions and entrepreneurship.  
Institution has got several definitions provided by varying dictionaries but all dwell on 
“an established official organization having an important role in a society” (Oxford 
Living Dictionaries). Literatures suggests that institutions are commonly defined as 
“rules, norms, and beliefs that describe reality for the organization, explaining what is 
and is not, what can be acted upon and what cannot” (Hoffman, 1999: 351). From these 
perspectives, institutions are considered to have “stable designs for habitually repeated 
activity sequences,” (Epperson, 1991: 145) thus nonconformities would lead to 
sanctions.  
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Entrepreneurship has been defined as a mechanism for economic growth (Schumpeter 
1942). This mechanism is employed by individuals or people who can exploit the 
opportunities (Kirzner, 1997; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Garud and Karnøe 
(2001) argue from a sociological perspective of change linked to entrepreneurship and 
suggests that it indicates deviations from ordinary standards. (Garud and Karnøe, 
2001). Garud, Hardy & Maguire (2007) suggest that it is unlikely that activities of 
entrepreneurships may to be accepted by people who are consistent with traditional 
standards in certain field.  Thus, commonly emerging with threats to some people 
involved whereas others may embrace the change as an opportunity to create 
acceptability.   
Merging institution and entrepreneurship perspectives into a single concept provides a 
platform that considers how and why different people or groups collaborate and get 
things done. Literature suggests that whereas institutions have traditionally focused on 
continuity yet with increased awareness of change entrepreneurship emphasise on 
change (Garud, Hardy & Maguire 2007). 
Several authors have described institutional entrepreneurs as agents of change that 
pursue certain interests and act purposefully (Child, Lu & Tsai 2007; Fligstein 2001b; 
Garud, Hardy & Maguire 2007; Greenwood & Suddaby 2006; Levy & Scully 2007; 
Misangyi, Weaver & Elms 2008; Wijen & Ansari 2007). This description is relevant 
to actors in the IA environment to achieve IAE not necessarily the drastic change of 
the processes to form a new organisation but conduct activities with interest 
institutional arrangements that pull resources to transform the traditional norms 
(Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004: 657). The literature shows that despite 
institutional pressures and complexities (Bertels & Lawrence 2016; Greenwood et al. 
2011; Thornton 2004), organisational actors with grounded transformational 
approaches, such as institutional entrepreneurs’ perceptions, create a positive 
breakthrough which IAF does to achieve IA stakeholders’ expectations. The assurance 
of IAF in transformational approaches focus on innovation, creativity and problem 
solving regarding the difficulty to accomplish or achieve the desired objectives. 
Individuals or a group of people with institutional entrepreneurship perspective 
operate with courage and still find opportunities to penetrate the institutional field 
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without interruption, and they encourage others to adopt and accept them (Garud, 
Hardy & Maguire 2007). 
The conceptualisation of this perspective to understand IAE in PSOs shows how the 
IAF acts as an agent of change in an institutional field of embeddedness. This view is 
supplemented by Garud, Hardy and Maguire (2007) and Garud and Karnøe (2003), 
who suggested that institutional entrepreneurs are knowledgeable agents with the 
capacity to reflect and act in ways other than those prescribed or taken for granted as 
social rules and technological artefacts. Given the emerging challenges of being 
marginalised, the process of IA performing as a tool for risk management within the 
institutional field of embeddedness (IIA 2013; Lenz & Hahn 2015; PwC 2013) needs 
to demonstrate its potential as able and significant to the institution. Given that other 
functional areas seek advice and support from IA, it is possible to obtain other people’s 
consent into institutional entrepreneurship, hence social experts (Fligstein 2001, pp. 
106). 
This is relevant to several authors on institutional entrepreneurship, who appreciate its 
component of mobilising resources to conduct material actions (Battilana, Leca & 
Boxenbaum 2009; Garud, Hardy & Maguire 2007; Misangyi, Weaver & Elms 2008). 
Fligstein’s argument was escalated and improved by the literature, which provides that 
institutional entrepreneurs control the prevailing circumstances and use social 
expertise to mobilise IA stakeholders to the same purpose (Misangyi, Weaver & Elms 
2008; Perkmann & Spicer 2007; Rao & Giorgi 2006). Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) 
noted the other characteristic of institutional entrepreneurs, arguing that they create 
meaning. The descriptions provided above and by Beckert (1999), Perkmann and 
Spicer (2007), Rao and Giorgi (2006) and Zilber (2007), which point out that 
institutional entrepreneurs are leaders, visionaries or reflexive agents (Beckert 1999; 
Greenwood & Suddaby 2006; Mutch 2007), plays a major role in demonstrating more 
recognition of the concept in this study. While seeking information that would help 
the study to answer the research questions, using institutional entrepreneurship to 
improve IAE in PSOs is appropriate. 
  25 
2.2 Internal Audit Effectiveness 
Building on the intertextual coherence of literature on IA shows that IAE has been an 
essential subject (Arena & Azzone 2007, 2009; Christopher, Sarens & Leung 2009; 
Dittenhofer 2001; Paape, Scheffe & Snoep 2003), and the importance of IAE has been 
shown (Cohen & Sayag 2010; Sarens 2009; Subramaniam et al. 2011b). Most 
researchers use the context generated from the IA definition suggesting that an 
effective IA is expected to support organisations to achieve their goals. This is 
specifically perceived from the way the IA definition describes its purpose, nature and 
scope. Yet, the description of the IA definition does not guarantee submission to the 
stated requirements by all IAFs in PSOs.  The current study therefore, examined IA 
effectiveness considering the effect of institutional influences on PSOs.  
Al-Twaijry et al. (2003), Gwilliam (2003), Bou-Raad (2000) and Yee et al. (2008) 
supplemented Dittenhofer’s suggestion using value addition as a characteristic and/or 
evidence for IAE. The suggestion was confirmed by Ussahawanitchakit and Intakhan 
(2011), who stated that a program is effective if its outcome aligns with its objectives. 
This is also in agreement with the international professional IIA, which defines IAE 
‘as the degree (including quality) to which established objectives are achieved’ (IIA 
2010). Agreeably, this notion is important and lays favourable grounds for this study 
to generate valuable insights that this study builds upon. However, despite the 
exposure of indispensable characteristics of the IAE and evidence of its importance in 
modern PSOs, more research is needed on the same subject because several concerns 
have not been addressed. For instance, there were questions concerning consequences 
of institutional–organisational relationship towards IA activities and IAE in the public 
sector. This is because arguments exist regarding the institutional dynamics within the 
IA environment in various literature. No studies on IA or IAE had examined the 
institutional pressures in PSOs, and the literature had not explained how organisational 
responses towards institutional demands affect IA performance. 
Further, no studies have shown how the IAF responds to unfavourable circumstances 
to achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE, which is the rationale of this study. 
However, IAE in practice has been continually debated (Deloitte 2010; Ernst & Young 
2006, 2008; KPMG 2009; PwC 2009, 2010). This dilemma is enforced in IA literature 
by academic researchers who show some support for the debate, thereby suggesting 
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that the IAF is not always effective and may lack self-sufficiency (Al-Twaijry, Brierley 
& Gwilliam 2003; Arena & Azzone 2009; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2004; 
Mihret & Wondim Yismaw 2007; Zain, Subramaniam & Stewart 2006). This 
conception therefore lays the foundation for the current study. Table 2.1 provides a 
summary of IA major studies relating to the role and effectiveness of IA. However, 
most of these studies were conducted in the private sector, which is a different setting 
from the current study. This implies that there is need to conduct a study in a relevant 
setting. Further, this study is different from existing studies because it incorporates the 
institutional setting and employs an approach that will generate more insights. 
2.2.1 Defining IAE in PSOs 
Defining IAE in PSOs requires an understanding of institutional circumstances that 
generally provide acceptable conditions and standards of IAE. It requires an 
understanding of what is required to be effective. Given the nature of IAE in PSOs 
(see Section 2.2.2), the perspective of IAE (see Section 2.2.3) and organisational 
controls, it is important to assess the conditions to determine the extent to which IAF 
is effective. The institutional setting helped this study to explore the basis of the IAF 
through the organisational set-up, which helped the study to comprehend IA 
experiences. Understanding that IA is not independent from the organisation it serves, 
is an implication that internal audit independence should not be assumed based on 
stipulations made in the IA definition.  
The context in which the IA role is demonstrated does not guarantee the IA 
independence in the operational environment. Instead, the relationship of IAF and its 
organisation portrays that internal auditing has limitations that originate from its 
position. It is a function that must comply with hierarchical demands within the 
organisation and embedded within the institutional setting. This suggests that defining 
IAE is required to consider the true identify of IA and its approach that affects the 
achievement of IAE. The IA approach is intended to examine the foundation of IA 
activities that enhance fairness in the IA process and outcomes. Thus, this study 
defines IAE as the achievement of stakeholders’ expectations when prevailing 
circumstances within IA activities in the environment have been considered. This 
implies that the quality of IA work is essential (Sarens & De Beelde 2006a) and the 
expectations of IA stakeholders will be realised. However, the definition provided in 
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this study aims at stimulating a scholarly interchange of understanding of IAE and the 
design of the IA profession. Reactions with alternative proposals from other 
researchers are welcome. 
2.2.2 Internal Auditing Effectiveness and Its Awareness in PSOs 
Given the definition of IAE generated by this study, as provided in chapter 2 
subsection 2.2.1, understanding IAE in PSOs cannot be isolated from its contribution 
towards organisational goals. The above statement implies therefore, that it is this 
contribution that paves way to IA awareness. This study approached this aspect with a 
basic question: How can IAE in a PSO be defined? However, the question was 
extended because, prior to defining IAE, it is necessary to understand the public-sector 
setting. Although there is no sufficient literature with this concept, a glimpse of it still 
appears. Spira and Page (2003) stated that evolution that enhanced the IA shift was 
emphasised by institutional influences. Therefore, in the public setting, institutional 
influences emanate from organisational control mechanisms created by the 
government while prescribing logic or rendering services to the people. Generating a 
definition for IAE in public sector setting and understanding IA awareness in PSOs 
requires considering institutional rationalities that prescribe the organisational 
behaviour. This is because institutional prescriptions are sometimes contrary to reality, 
and this generates pressure and complexities (Bertels & Lawrence 2016; Greenwood 
et al. 2011; Thornton 2004). In such circumstances, organisational responses at the 
organisational operational level tend to determine the direction of operations in 
functional areas in order to remain relevant within the institutional setting.  
For instance, Arena, Arnaboldi and Azzone (2006) argued that the pressures imposed 
on organisations tend to dictate the direction that IA should take in the execution of its 
activities. This was confirmed by Mihret, James and Mula (2010), who pointed out 
that increased complexity and regulations may mean greater demands from the IAF, 
including the revision of the IA approach to suit the control systems of organisations. 
The synopsis of the notion generated from institutional pressures and complexities, 
organisational responses and their effect on functional areas show that there is a link 
between institutional circumstances and IAE. Being a public-sector setting, the power 
in the regulatory framework that determines the establishment, administration and 
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control of these organisations should not be underestimated when seeking to 
understand how the IAF achieves stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Relevant Literature on IA and IAE 
Study Method Sample  Scope Study focus and findings/conclusions 
Albrecht, Howe 
and Schuler 
(1988) 
Multiple case 
studies 
13 
organisations 
 The study aimed to identify the factors that enable IAF to be perceived as effective. It 
concluded that a good corporate environment, top management support, quality of 
internal auditors and quality of internal audit work characterises IAE. 
Dittenhofer 
(2001) 
Literature 
review 
N/A N/A The study assessed the IAE. The findings showed that IAE should be based on the 
examination of IA results. 
Al-Twaijry, 
Brierley and 
Gwilliam (2003) 
Questionnaire 
survey and 
interviews 
145 
companies 
Private 
ownership 
The study surveyed IA in Saudi Arabian companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange. 
Interviews were conducted with organisations’ managers and external auditors. The study 
examined compliance with ISPPIA as an indicator of IA effectiveness and concluded that 
IA in Saudi Arabia intensively complies with ISPPIA. It acknowledged the positive 
contribution made by the government to the development of the IAF and the involvement 
of the IIA’s Saudi Arabian chapter. 
Goodwin (2004) Questionnaire 
survey 
120 
organisations 
Private 
ownership 
The study identified the differences between IA in private and PSOs in Australia and New 
Zealand. It reported that IA status and the tendency to outsource IA services are higher in 
the public sector. Few differences were found in IA activities and the extent of IA 
collaboration with external auditors. Resemblances in the IA practices of the two sectors 
were attributed to the similarity of their contexts, which resulted from public sector 
reforms in the two countries. 
Arena, Arnaboldi 
and Azzone 
(2006) 
Multiple case 
studies 
6 companies Private 
ownership 
The study examined the attributes of internal audit departments of companies listed on 
stock exchanges with different characteristics. It concluded that the characteristics of the 
stock exchange on which companies are listed determine the orientation of IA. 
Abdolmohammadi 
and Burnaby 
(2006) 
Literature 
review 
N/A N/A The study reviewed US IA literature and concluded that IA in the US has generally 
positioned itself as a value-addition orientation, but with emphasis on compliance because 
of the issuance of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002). 
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Study Method Sample  Scope Study focus and findings/conclusions 
Mihret and 
Yismaw (2007) 
Case study 1 organisation Public 
sector 
The study evaluated IAE in Ethiopian PSOs to identify the factors that determine the level 
of effectiveness. The study concluded that management support to IA and IA quality are 
the major determinants of IAE. 
Yee et al. (2007) Questionnaire 
survey 
83 managers Private 
ownership 
The study conducted a survey to identify the perceptions of Singaporean managers on IA 
services. It concluded that Singapore managers consider IA a business partner and 
attributed the value-adding orientation of IA in Singapore to its Westernised business 
environment, involvement of the IIA’s Saudi Arabian chapter and the existence of a well-
developed external audit profession. 
Arena and Azzone 
(2007) 
In-depth case 
study and 
questionnaire 
survey 
230 
companies 
Private 
ownership 
The study identified the adoption and characteristics of IA in Italian companies in the 
context of changes in the politico-economic setting. The results supported the diffusion 
of IA practices induced by isomorphic pressures. 
Mihret and 
Woldeyohannis 
(2008) 
Case study 1 organisation Public 
sector 
The study identified the factors that determine the value-adding attributes of IA in an 
Ethiopian state-owned enterprise. The findings concluded that organisational goals and 
strategies and the level of risk exposure of organisations could shape the dominant focus 
of IA as either assurance or consulting. 
Arena and Azzone 
(2009) 
Questionnaire 
survey 
153 
companies 
Private 
ownership 
The study examined IA in Italian companies to identify the determinants of IAE. They 
found that IAE is influenced by (a) IA characteristics, (b) IA processes and activities and 
(c) organisational links. 
Cohen and Sayag 
(2010) 
Survey 108 Private 
and 
public 
ownership 
The study explores the effectiveness of IA in Israel organisations. The findings showed 
that support from top management is the main determinant of IAE, and that the 
organisational independence of IA also has an effect. The effect of the predictors was 
consistent between the public and private sectors. 
Christopher, 
Sarens and Leung 
(2009) 
Questionnaire 206 Corporate 
sector 
The study conducted critical analysis of the independence of the IAF through its 
relationship with management and the audit committee. The findings showed that with 
respect to the IA relationship with management, there is a possibility of using the IAF as 
a stepping stone to other positions by having the chief executive officer (CEO) or chief 
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Study Method Sample  Scope Study focus and findings/conclusions 
ﬁnance officer (CFO) approve the IA budget and provide input for the IA plan. Further, 
the internal auditor is considered a ‘partner’, especially when combined with other 
indirect threats. With respect to the relationship with the audit committee, signiﬁcant 
threats that were identiﬁed included (Chief Audit Executives) CAEs not reporting 
functionally to the audit committee; the audit committee not having sole responsibility 
for appointing, dismissing and evaluating the CAE, and not having all audit committee 
members or at least one member qualiﬁed in accounting. 
Sayag (2010) Survey 47 Public 
ownership 
The study explored IAE in Israel’s local authorities. The findings revealed good 
psychometric properties for the scale developed in this study. Correlation and regression 
analyses showed that support from top management is the main determinant of IAE, with 
some effect also found regarding the organisational independence of IA. 
 Questionnaire 206 Corporate 
sector 
The study conducted critical analysis of the independence of the IAF through its 
relationship with management and the audit committee. The findings showed that with 
respect to the IA relationship with management, there is a possibility of using the IAF as 
a stepping stone to other positions; having the chief executive ofﬁcer or chief ﬁnance 
ofﬁcer approve the IA budget and provide input for the IA plan; and considering the 
internal auditor to be a ‘partner’, especially when combined with other indirect threats. 
With respect to the relationship with the audit committee, signiﬁcant threats identiﬁed 
include CAEs not reporting functionally to the audit committee; the audit committee not 
having sole responsibility for appointing, dismissing and evaluating the CAE; and not 
having all audit committee members or at least one member qualiﬁed in accounting. 
Vijayakumar and 
Nagaraja (2012) 
Questionnaire 
survey 
24 enterprises Public 
sector  
This study focused on identifying the effectiveness of AI as a tool of internal control 
systems on public sector enterprises of Karnataka. Findings show that an effective IA 
system helps to achieve improved performance and prevents loss of resources. 
Endaya and 
Hanefah (2013) 
Literature 
review 
N/A N/A The study identified that there is no consensus among researchers about the factors 
influencing IA and how it can be measured, or the best framework for IAE. The study 
extended the literature of IA and its originality, and the argument that it could serve as an 
approach to build a theoretical framework of IAE. The study argued that IAE is directly 
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Study Method Sample  Scope Study focus and findings/conclusions 
affected by internal auditors’ characteristics and performance of the internal audit 
department, as well as organisation members’ support as a moderating variable on these 
relationships, which could provide insights for future research. 
Alzeban and 
Gwilliam (2014) 
Survey 442 
questionnaires  
Public 
sector 
The study assessed factors influencing IAE in Saudi Arabia and provided evidence 
relating to the ways in which competence, size of the Internal Audit Department (IAD), 
relationship between internal and external auditors, independence of IA and extent of 
management support for the internal audit function contribute to perceived effectiveness 
of the IAF in the Saudi public sector. 
Lenz and Hahn 
(2015) 
Literature 
review 
N/A N/A The study provided a synopsis of the views of academic literature on IAE. It provided a 
new set of research questions to help bring out the best of IA. It also identified common 
themes in the empirical literature and synthesised the main threads into a model 
comprising macro and micro factors that influence IAE. The paper identified an ‘outside-
in’ perspective that indicated a disposition to stakeholders’ disappointment in IA. The 
study argued that IA is either running the risk of marginalisation (IIA 2013; PwC 2013) 
or must embrace the challenge to emerge as a recognised and stronger profession. 
Mihret and Grant 
(2017) 
Literature 
review 
N/A N/A The study discussed the conceptual foundations of the role of IA in corporate governance 
by drawing on Foucault’s concept of governmentality. The paper developed an initial 
conceptual formulation of IA as: ex post assurance about the execution of economic 
activities within management’s pre-conceived frameworks and ex ante advisory services 
to enhance the rationality of economic activities and accompanying controls. 
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2.2.3 Perspectives on IAE 
Table 2.1 shows that the notion of IAE has been perceived from varying assumptions 
because of the dynamic circumstances through which IA activities are practiced. For 
instance, Spraakman (1997), Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) and Fadzil, Haron and Jantan 
(2005) reflected on compliance with the ISPPIA as the extent to which IAE should be 
perceived. Compliance with the ISPPIA offers a good approach to assess the existence 
and performance of the IAF because ‘IA is conducted in diverse legal and cultural 
environments; for organizations that vary in purpose, size, complexity, and structure; 
and by persons within or outside the organization’ (IIA 2017). The ISPPIA provides 
guidelines for uniformity of how IA should function. However, considering 
compliance with the ISPPIA alone for IAE would imply positioning the IAF as a sole 
player in the IA environment; however, other factors require attention on this matter. 
Another study that positioned the IAF as a non-solo player was conducted by Mihret 
and Woldeyohannis (2008), who compared IA reports of two periods to identify IA 
findings that were not repeated. Their approach considered that IAE should be viewed 
from the level at which IA findings are implemented; however, the IAF is not 
responsible for implementing IA recommendations. Arena and Azzone (2009) reached 
a similar conclusion using a four-point scale. Unfortunately, the two studies that used 
it have contentions that evoke a minimum level of confidence. Arena and Azzone 
(2009) criticised this approach, arguing that it did not consider the type and quality of 
IA services provided, while Mihret and Woldeyohannis (2008) argued that the 
approach has conceptual merit of considering IA customers. Regardless of Mihret and 
Woldeyohannis’s (2008) argument of customer orientations, where IA customers are 
practically involved in implementing IA recommendations, Arena and Azzone (2009) 
contended that basing on implementation of IA recommendations cannot be 
operationalised given the diverse backgrounds and experiences of IA customers and 
the IA environment itself. These two studies leave room for researchers to identify the 
appropriate approach to examine IAE. 
A study was conducted by Albrecht, Howe and Schuler (1988) to identify the factors 
that make managers, IA directors, boards of directors and external auditors recognise 
the IAF as effective. The study involved 13 of the best internal audit departments in 
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the US as identified by the IIA. The outcome of the study indicated that organisational 
culture, management support, internal auditors’ competency and the IA quality of 
work portrayed IAE. However, given that the literature on organisations shows that 
organisations encounter pressures that must follow a legitimate trend, Albercht, Howe 
and Schuler (1988) did not explain how IAE would be achieved in case of contentions 
from the normal trend. This approach also leaves room to understand how the IAF can 
achieve IA stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE in PSOs. Mihret and Yismaw (2007) 
used the case study of a government-owned organisation in Ethiopia to identify the 
factors that influence IAE in state-owned organisations. The findings showed that 
management support and internal audit quality are the major determinants of IAE. 
However, these results seem to underestimate the power and influence of the 
institutional setting given Arena, Arnaboldi and Azzone’s (2006) findings, which 
pointed out that institutional pressure on organisations can influence IA activities. 
Arena, Arnaboldi and Azzone (2006) derived this notion after applying the 
institutional theory to Italian companies and focusing on the pressures of stock 
exchange regulations in the development of IAF. 
Arena, Arnaboldi and Azzone (2006) compared Italian stock exchange circumstances 
to the development of corporate governance requirements for listed companies in the 
UK and the US. They illustrated the requirements of the Italian stock exchange for the 
establishment of the SOX of the US and the Turnbull Guidance/Report of the UK. The 
study used the circumstances in different institutional settings to determine the kind of 
response the management of organisations use within these settings and the effect of 
the management response on IA activities. This notion generated an insight that 
understanding IAE can be associated with the institutional setting. Other studies by 
Arena, Arnaboldi and Azzone (2006) and Mihret and Yismaw (2007) demonstrated 
that management support and internal audit quality cannot be determinants of IAE 
where pressures from institutional settings prevail. Arena, Arnaboldi and Azzone 
(2006) confirmed perceptions that institutional pressure on organisations influences 
the trend of IA activities. This notion motivates significant consideration of the 
institutional setting when seeking to understand IAE in the public-sector setting. 
Studies have shown that PSOs are crowded with several institutional requirements, 
and the process of organisational compliance to these requirements determines the 
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level of IA involvement in the internal control system, risk management and corporate 
governance practices. 
The importance of the scope of IA operation in determining IAE was pointed out by 
Alzeban and Gwillian (2014), who suggested that determining IAE requires an 
assessment of those dimensions of business activity that the internal audit observes 
and has the capacity to influence, including corporate performance. This can be closely 
linked to the study by Pungas (2003), which argued that the objectives of an IAF for 
every organisation are subject to the goals of the organisation as determined by the 
management of the organisation. Punga’s argument implied that whatever the IAF 
does in every organisation is in the interest of helping the organisation it serves. 
Punga’s argument also implied that the objectives of the IAF are to meet organisation’s 
objectives, measuring IAE therefore, should consider the environment in which the 
organisation is structured. Therefore, suggestions provided in studies by Alzeban and 
Gwillian (2014) and Pungas (2003) for determining IAE according the degree to which 
the expectations of the organisational objectives are met would be appropriate. 
However, this requires an understanding of the dynamics in the IA environment that 
can influence IAE, as pointed out in a study by Mihret, James and Mula (2010). 
Unfortunately, these dynamics have received little attention in the IA literature. 
Yee et al. (2008) studied the role of IA and its effectiveness in Singapore. Their 
approach focused on the perception of managers regarding IA practice. The study 
found three main characteristics that facilitate the role of IAF and can be attributed to 
its effectiveness: (1) the scope of IA activities covers all operational areas of the 
organisation, (2) well-developed corporate sector and strong external auditing 
profession and (3) competent internal auditors and experience. Yee et al. (2008) 
‘uphold that IAF helps the management to meet its accountability obligations to 
investors’. These three characteristics indicate the requirement to examine the IA 
environment while seeking to understand IAE. Nevertheless, although this perception 
is supported by other research (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & Gwilliam 2003; Arena, 
Arnaboldi & Azzone 2006) and appears to be consistent with the IIA’s definition of 
IA, the characteristics identified in Yee et al. (2008) need to be tested in organisations 
in various settings. This is because evidence from the literature also suggests that IAE 
is influenced by the circumstances in which IA operates (Mihet 2010). This perception 
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is supported by Sarens, De Beelde and Everaert (2009) in agreement with Burnaby et 
al. (2007), showing that IA practices in Anglo-Saxon countries perform differently 
from other countries. 
IA environment is dynamic (Mihret, James & Mula 2010), and other studies have 
noted that there are organisational factors that influence IAF (Al-Twaijry et al. 2003; 
Cohen et al. 2004; Zain, Subramaniam & Stewart 2006; Mihret & Yismaw 2007; 
Anderson 2003). Therefore, it is important to consider that the institutional setting 
plays a significant role in achieving IAE. The twist in these arguments and suggestions 
in the literature shows that organisations are always confronted through institutional 
requirements. For instance, PSOs are confronted with contrary pressures from the 
government bearing multiple institutional requirements (Vermeulen et al. 2016; 
Bertels & Lawrence 2016; Djelic & Quack 2007; Kraatz & Block 2008; Pache & 
Santos 2010). If organisations are confronted, it becomes vital for researchers to 
examine factors beyond functional and organisational settings. This is confirmed by 
the literature, which states that structures can shape actors’ practices (Mihret, James & 
Mula 2010). This facilitates an understanding of the dynamic IA environment, 
identifies how the IAF meets stakeholders’ expectations in the institutional setting and 
examines factors that influence IAE in PSOs. 
2.2.4 IAE and Organisational Control Mechanisms in PSOs 
The government maintains authority for the organisational control of PSOs for 
effective monitoring of national programs. Organisational control is proposed to lessen 
the ambiguity that could emanate from spontaneous behaviours of organisational 
members. The prime objective of the government is to direct efforts towards the 
attainment of organisational objectives (Raelin 2011a, 2011b; Schibler 2012; 
Yasuyuki & Olejniczak 2014). Most PSOs are bureaucratically controlled as a form of 
control mechanism to measure, assess and reward the performance and behaviours of 
organisational members. The assessment of performance in the bureaucratic control 
mechanism is based on the formal exchange of information and written documentation 
such as standards, operating procedures and status reports (Raelin 2011a, 2011b; 
Schibler 2012; Yasuyuki & Olejniczak 2014). Rewards and sanctions in the 
bureaucratic mode of control take a formal procedure that involves payments with 
additional bonuses, promotions and/or demotions based on following the prescribed 
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behaviours or achieving predefined targets (Raelin 2011a, 2011b; Schibler 2012; 
Yasuyuki & Olejniczak 2014). 
Roles and relationships among organisational members in the bureaucratic mode of 
organisational control are principally hierarchical. There is a superior–subordinate 
relationship where the main characteristic mode of control is formalised by a word of 
caution for its operationalisation (Raelin 2011a, 2011b; Schibler 2012; Yasuyuki & 
Olejniczak 2014). Given the summary of organisational circumstances and their effect 
on functional areas, this implies that it affects how organisations are controlled. Hence, 
it is evident that IAE is impeded because rules create inflexibility and the process leads 
to rigidity and slow decision-making, or even impossibilities when facing unusual 
cases, hence delaying change and evolution (Raelin 2011a, 2011b; Schibler 2012; 
Yasuyuki & Olejniczak 2014). 
2.2.5 Dual Reporting Channels for IAF 
Expectations of the achievements of the IAF are rooted in IA pronouncements that 
show that the IAF must comply with the International Professional Practice 
Framework (IPPF) of IA (Standards, 1321). For example, the IAF must have 
organisational independence by reporting to a level within the organisation that allows 
the internal audit activity to fulfil its responsibilities (Standard, 1110). Further, IA has 
direct communication with the board of directors (Standard, 1111) and has an 
obligation to conform to the Code of Ethics (Standards, 1321). Expectations and 
outcomes of IA activities depend on varying factors within and beyond their control. 
The IIA Research Foundation (2003) shows that the evolution of the IAF, which led 
to the current definition of IA (IIA 1999), recognises that the IAF has several 
customers—mainly the audit committee and senior management. The foundation also 
states that the two organs need IA reports for different purposes. The IIA Research 
Foundation (2003) and the standards (IIA 2017) suggest that the IAF reports 
administratively to the senior management for the day-to-day administration of IA 
activities and budget and functionally to the audit committee or another appropriate 
governing body. Studies show that IA is effective when heads of IAF have sufficient 
access and report functionally to the audit committee, and researchers confirm that a 
dual reporting structure enhances IA objectivity (Cohen et al. 2004; Zain & 
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Subramaniam 2007; Raghunandan & McHugh 1994; Scarborough et al. 1998). Zain, 
Subramaniam and Stewart (2006) confirmed that audit committees enhance IAE; 
however, not all IAFs in PSOs have dual reporting channels. 
2.2.6 Organisation-level Determinants of IAE 
Few studies exist on IAE, with research findings reflecting the examination of features 
at the organisation level (Endaya & Hanefah 2013). Arena and Azzone (2009) 
categorised these features based on the characteristics of the IAF, IA processes and 
activities. Mihret and Yismaw (2007) argued that organisational characteristics can 
influence IAE but the literature does not show the difference of varying organisations 
in similar sector. The current study examines organisation-level determinants of IAE 
because PSOs differ in their settings. Further, institutional requirements affect them 
differently because of their set-up, operational circumstances and practices. However, 
there are common factors (e.g., auditee attributes, auditee committee involvement in 
IA activities and relationship between IA and external auditors). These common 
factors affect the IAF to achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. This notion is 
significant when seeking to understand IAE in PSOs given the differences in the public 
sector institutional settings. There are dynamics at the operational level and due to 
organisational control systems (see Section 2.1), but the literature on IA has not 
explained how IAE will be influenced under such circumstances. 
Novelty motives have sought to explore how IA achieves stakeholders’ expectations 
hence IAE in PSOs from this perspective. For instance, Dittenhofer (2001) described 
that auditees’ attributes influence IAE as consequence of the quality of IA work. 
Dittenhofer also argued that if the IAF performs well, quality work will greatly 
contribute to improving the performance of the organisation—specifically those 
audited—leading to favourable auditee attributes. This implies that cooperation from 
auditees is directly linked to audit performance, hence achieving IAE. Studies by 
Brierley et al. (2001), Gwilliam and El-Nafabi (2002), Al-Garni (2008) and 
Almohaimeed (2000) suggested that there must be a good relationship between IA and 
external auditors to facilitate the management of the organisation to offer good public 
service. Al-Garni (2008) and Almohaimeed (2000) identified that the absence of 
cooperation between internal and external auditors weakens the quality of both forms 
of audit. External and internal audits are two distinct functions, but their coordination 
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and cooperation are important for each other (Alzeban & Gwilliam 2014; Lenz & Hahn 
2015). For instance, Mihret, James and Mula (2010) suggested that external audit 
affects the development of IA. The coordination of these two functions is also a 
requirement by the ISPPIA. This implies that an effective relationship would improve 
the auditing function in the organisation. Consequently, the better the IAF, the more 
effective the IA activities. 
Further, literature on IA research shows that audit committee support is an important 
element for the IAF to be effective. For example, Zain, Subramaniam and Stewart 
(2006) suggested that audit committees could enhance IA effectiveness. Raghunandan 
and McHugh (1994), Scarbrough et al. (1998), Goodwin and Yeob (2001), Cohen et 
al. (2004) and Zain and Subramaniam (2007) noted that audit committees’ 
involvement in IA activities enhances oversight tasks—for example, monitoring 
whether internal audit results are given appropriate attention (Zain, Subramaniam & 
Stewart 2006). Studies have shown that audit committees are involved in the planning 
process of IA activities (Cohen et al. 2004; Goodwin & Yeob 2001; Zain & 
Subramaniam 2007; Raghunandan & McHugh 1994; Scarbrough et al. 1998), which 
implies that IA activities are properly supervised and monitored. This involvement 
enhances constant interactions, which is appreciated in the IA literature. For instance, 
Goodwin and Yeob (2001) and Scarbrough et al. (1998) suggested that constant 
interactions with audit committees enhance IA independence and objectivity. The 
existence of IA independence and objectivity are a requirement by the standards (IIA 
1100) which is reflected by Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) because they drive IA processes 
and professionalism. 
2.2.7 IA Processes and Professionalism 
Arena and Azzone (2009) suggested that IA processes and activities are among the 
factors that influence IAE. An effective IA process starts with planning, which 
involves identifying priorities using a risk-based approach. This perception was 
confirmed by Spira and Page (2003), Gramling et al. (2004), Beasley et al. (2009) and 
Sarens, Adolmohammadi and Len (2012), who suggested that risk-based IA helps the 
system of the IAF to act as a deterrent to fraud and a protection against malpractice. 
This is directly linked to the objectives of the role of the IAF, as demonstrated by the 
IIA pronouncements and IA definition (IIA 1999). At the same time, the IAF must 
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have a disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the risk 
management, control and governance processes of the organisation. The ISPPIA, 
(1210-Proficiency) also requires that internal auditors should possess the knowledge, 
skills and competencies needed to conduct an audit (IIA 2017). The literature confirms 
the significance of the IA process and professionalism considering their effect on the 
quality of IA work. The literature confirms that the quality of IA work influences IAE 
(Brierley, El-Nafabi & Gwilliam 2001; Dittenhofer 2001; Mihret & Zemenu 
Woldeyohannis 2008). 
However, considering this study’s institutional theoretical perspective for 
understanding the factors that influence IAE in PSOs, examining the IA process and 
professionalism requires consideration of the IA environment from the institutional 
setting perspective. This is because the literature shows that organisations are always 
confronted with contrary instructions to uphold institutional requirements (Vermeulen 
et al. 2016; Bertels & Lawrence 2016). This notion was emphasised by Bertels and 
Lawrence (2016), Greenwood et al. (2011) and Thornton (2004), who argued that 
PSOs respond to institutional pressures (see Sections 2.2.1–2.2.3). Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) agreed, stating that there are complexities generated by the dynamism to 
conform to communal expectations. In circumstances where pressure prevails, the IA 
process is vulnerable (Mihret, James & Mula 2010), and efforts towards 
professionalism cannot be consistent, hence they are ineffective. 
2.2.8 Size of IA Team 
The size of the IA team is considered by the literature an essential element for IAE. 
Arena and Azzone (2009) stated that the size of IA team is a significant feature in the 
characteristics of the IAF. This is not only for the achievements of the objectives of 
the IAF, but also the capacity from the stakeholder point of view—for example, if 
external auditors use it to measure reliance on IA work or quality (Al-Twaijry et al. 
2004; Felix et al. 2001; Zain, Subramaniam & Stewart 2006). The size of the IAF team 
is significant in determining the quality of IA work given the scope of the 
organisational activities. Previous studies by Dittenhofer (2001) and Mihret and 
Woldeyohannis (2008) suggested that the size of IA team should be considered a 
measure of IAE. This is also a requirement by the IIA standards for the IA activity to 
ensure that IA resources are appropriate, sufficient and effectively deployed to achieve 
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the approved plan (IIA 1230). However, from the theoretical perspective, the literature 
shows that PSOs operate in an embedded environment, and rules and regulations 
determine their course of direction. PSOs vary in nature, and individual functions link 
up for different provisions (Baum & Oliver 1992; Scott & Meyer 1983; Tolbert 1985; 
Zucker 1987). Given that the government maintains the authority for organisational 
control of PSOs for effective monitoring of national programs (see Section 2.2.3), 
there must be associations with IAE that literature has not yet provided. 
2.2.9 Organisational Structure 
Mihret, James and Mula (2010) stated that the IA environment is structured in a variety 
of dynamics. Vermeulen et al. (2016) and Bertels and Lawrence (2016) and Mihret 
and Yismaw (2007) agreed, stating that organisations are always confronted with 
contrary instructions to uphold institutional requirements. If these requirements are 
unfavourable towards the organisational structure, the IAF will not be spared because 
it is also part of the organisation. In that case, IA activities will be affected and IA 
stakeholders’ expectations will not be achieved, or they will be achieved with great 
difficulty, and IAE will be influenced. 
2.2.10 Management Support 
Researchers such as Mihret, James and Mula (2010), Mihret and Yismaw (2007) and 
Carcello et al. (2005) emphasised that management support is the key to the IAF and 
determines IAE. Cohen and Sayag (2010) considered the same provision in the 
literature, arguing that senior management has the authority to facilitate the IAF to 
obtain required resources. For instance, Baltci and Yilmaz (2006) argued that senior 
management has the potential to allocate the IAF with a sufficient budget, whereas 
Cohen and Sayag (2010) stated that the IAF can acquire resources with ease under the 
support of senior management. Mihret and Yismaw (2007), Mihret, James and Mula 
(2010) and Carcello et al. (2005) pointed out that management support improves IAF 
potential to execute their responsibilities. However, given the views of the theoretical 
framework of this study, organisational control systems (see Section 2.2.3) impede 
operations, and management support can be difficult to obtain. When organisations 
face a dilemma, the senior management of PSOs focus on overcoming institutional 
pressures. 
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2.3 Chapter Summary  
The literature has shown that an effective IAF can significantly contribute towards 
achieving organisational goals. However, there are times during which IA activities 
are not effective. Further, there are dynamics in the IA environment that sometimes 
create pressure on organisations, which in turn affect the functional areas that influence 
the IAF, hence IAE. The literature review notes the following gaps: 
i. IA research has not yet extensively examined the factors affecting IAE in 
PSOs. The few studies that exist mainly concentrate on private sector 
organisations. 
ii. The literature notes that organisational control systems place pressures on 
organisations with conflicting institutional demands. However, there is no 
agreed upon framework that facilitates an understanding of the effect of 
institutional demands on IA activities in PSOs and how organisational 
responses to institutional demands can influence IAE. 
iii. Methodical predictions about the way in which organisations and/or IAF are 
affected in response to such conflicts in institutional prescriptions are not 
provided. This study aims to address this gap. 
iv. Previous research theories that are applicable to IA research have not extended 
the theoretical focus to multiple organisations in a public-sector setting. 
Thus, it is important to understand IAE, which has a wider theoretical perspective 
because of various empirical settings. This is because IA has continued to evolve 
because of changes in corporate governance from diverse settings, varying business 
strategies and requirements. The literature review for this study has provided a 
theoretical foundation for understanding IAE in PSOs. Chapter 3 presents the 
conceptual framework, which explains the broad nature of the public sector 
institutional setting and the purpose of IAF involvement in the conceptual issues within 
the IA environment to fill the gaps identified in the literature review. 
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework 
The literature review presented in Chapter 2 outlined the concept of IAE and 
highlighted the significance of IA in achieving organisational goals. The focus is on 
responding to the requirements prescribed by legislators in the institutional setting in 
PSOs. The review also emphasised IAE that contributes to achieving organisational 
objectives. Additionally, it argued that IAE is associated with institutional pressures 
and organisation-level dynamics in an IA environment. Thus, this study examines 
internal audit practices in selected PSOs in Rwanda to: a) explore how IAF meets IA 
stakeholders’ expectations and b) identify the factors that influence IAE. This chapter 
therefore outlines the research questions and the conceptual framework of the study. 
This study draws on institutional theory to explain the public sector institutional setting 
because IAE is associated with institutional pressures and organisation-level dynamics 
in an IA environment. The study uses three strands of institutional theory: institutional 
isomorphism, institutional embeddedness with bureaucratic characteristics and 
institutional entrepreneurship to examine internal audit experiences in PSOs. 
Institutional embeddedness explains the nature of organisational arrangements within 
the public-sector setting. Institutional isomorphism explains how organisations are 
influenced by institutional agents and requirements, as well as the pressures that PSOs 
encounter for conformity within the requirements driven by institutional agents in the 
institutional field. Institutional entrepreneurship demonstrates how interrelationships 
within PSOs offer dependence arrangements that create influence (Mihret, James & 
Mula 2010). Institutional entrepreneurship explains how actors within organisations 
are influenced by the IAF to respond to the pressures generated by institutional 
requirements. By generating strategies for institutional entrepreneurship, the study 
explains how the IAF achieves stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. 
3.1 Research Questions 
Insights drawn from the literature review show that organisations are always 
confronted with contrary instructions from elements holding multiple institutional 
requirements (Vermeulen et al. 2016; Bertels & Lawrence 2016). This observation 
compelled Mihret, James and Mula (2010) to argue that although IA strives towards 
professionalism, not all organisations have favourable factors for the IAF to add value 
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to organisational objectives. Their argument implies that if the IAF cannot add value, 
it cannot achieve effectiveness based on Ussahawanitchakit and Intakhan (2011), who 
state that the effectiveness of a program is linked to achieving its objectives. 
Previous studies have provided a rich and coherent account of how organisations 
comply with regulative and perceptive environmental elements to protect acceptability 
and support. However, studies on IAE have not considered that organisations facing 
multiple and challenging demands face a dilemma because satisfying one demand may 
require the sacrifice of others (Pfeffer & Salancik 2003). Thus, if the sacrificed 
demands concern IA activities, the sacrifice could jeopardise the performance of the 
IAF and consequently affect IAE. Building on this argument, the literature on IAE in 
PSOs has not explained how organisations have developed strategic responses to these 
pressures. Strategic responses would protect operations from inter-organisational 
dynamics in which functions such as the IAF would achieve its objectives and enhance 
IAE. To generate knowledge to fill this research gap, the following research questions 
are developed: 
Research question 1: How effective are IAFs in achieving stakeholders’ expectations 
in PSOs? 
Research question 2: What factors influence IAE in PSOs? 
3.2 Conceptual Framework 
Given that IA remains a neglected area of research (Gendron & Bédard 2006; Roussy 
2014) and there is no unanimously agreed framework for understanding IAE (Endaya 
& Hanefah 2013), the idea of using a conceptual framework to demonstrate a system 
of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs and theories to support and expose a 
perspective is borrowed from Miles and Huberman (1994) and Robson (2011). The 
research design for this study considers using multiple approaches to accommodate 
the use of different types of data, sources and theories because the IA profession and 
the nature of IA activities need to be explored further since the literature shows that 
the profession is considered not fully formed (Endaya & Hanefah 2013; Gendron & 
Bédard 2006; Roussy 2014; Vinten 1996). 
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The literature shows that organisations are confronted with instructions that may be 
contrary to their operational circumstances (Vermeulen et al. 2016; Bertels & 
Lawrence 2016). Nonetheless, organisational responses and their effect on IAE appear 
to be unexplored. The use of a conceptual framework that considers the institutional 
setting will contribute valuable insights to knowledge. 
A conceptual framework is designed based on the association between the bureaucratic 
institutional setting as a cause for institutional embeddedness, organisation-level 
driving factors of the IAF and the effort of IA to achieve stakeholders’ expectations 
hence IAE. Institutional theory and Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy are used to 
assimilate the IA environment and describe the process undertaken by the IAF to 
achieve IA stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. Figure 3.1 presents the conceptual 
framework for this study. 
The conceptual framework merges with the main concepts discussed in Chapter 2 and 
exposes their connected features in the IA process (see Figure 2.1). As discussed from 
the institutional embeddedness perspective, the institutional setting is used to represent 
the public-sector context. Components in the institutional setting (legal framework, 
regulations and enforcement agencies) represent the drivers of institutional 
requirements in the institutional setting. Bureaucracy is used as an organisational 
control system in this type of environment to administer the drivers of institutional 
requirements. The control system describes the characteristics of operational attributes 
that prevail in the institutional environment. This description presents the nature of the 
public sector as an institutionally embedded setting. Institutional embeddedness 
describes the link between people within an institutional environment (Baum & Oliver 
1992; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Fombrun 1986). This concept is relevant to the 
theoretical perspective employed in this study (institutional theory). The conceptual 
model shows that the foundation of PSOs is in the same setting, thereby confirming 
the suitability of the theoretical perspective of the study. This conforms to the view 
that organisations operate under similar circumstances and using similar structures, 
forms and processes (Mihret, James & Mula 2010). 
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework for the IAF in a public-sector setting. 
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Given that the public-sector setting is largely concerned with social service to the 
public (Vijayakumar & Nagaraja 2012), the bureaucratic system of organisational 
control is operated using institutional instruments (shown in Figure 3.1 as the legal 
framework, regulations and enforcement agencies). Bureaucracy in the public sector 
is given power through rules and regulations and the hierarchy of authority, which 
largely offer excellent service and benefits to the public. These instruments are 
successful given the relational density atmosphere of operationalisation under 
institutional embeddedness (Baum & Oliver 1992). 
The literature has noted that institutional requirements induce bureaucracy to take root, 
and inflexible responses create pressure on organisations (Bertels & Lawrence 2016; 
Greenwood et al. 2011; Thornton 2004). This pressure determines the relationship and 
perception of actors within the organisation (management, audit committee, auditees, 
institutional agents and the IAF) towards the IAF at the operational level. The 
perspective behind the conceptual model is that IA activities are indirectly influenced 
by actors’ feelings regarding pressures from the institutional setting. The effect of the 
responses to these pressures regulates the organisation-level driving factors of the IAF. 
The interrelationship exhibited in the form of dependence between functions within an 
organisation are legitimately embedded to survive and obtain resources (DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983; Frumkin, Frank & Jackson 2004; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Mihret 2010). 
The influenced organisation-level drivers in the institutional environment are not 
conducive to helping IA activities achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE, and 
yet the IAF is expected to perform. The challenge within institutional linkages that 
determine legality and resource provisions (Baum & Oliver 1992; Scott 1995; Tolbert 
1985; Zucker 1987) of the IAF are not always provided on time which this impedes 
IA activities. Besides, elements of embeddedness enhance bureaucratic characteristics, 
which measure the reality of what makes institutions successful (Raelin 2011a, 2011b; 
Schibler 2012; Weber 1978; Yasuyuki & Olejniczak 2014) to maintain their purpose. 
For example: 
 Rules and regulations maintain their course of demands to help workers 
perform required tasks in a more professional manner to ensure smooth 
functioning of the bureaucracy system. 
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 The hierarchy of authority maintained by individuals or offices in charge of 
others and operates on a superior–subordinate relationship. Decision-making 
power is an ordinary path and sometimes there are delays caused by the process 
of this path and these delays have impact on timely performance of subordinate 
organisations or individuals. 
The literature shows that the perspective of organisations’ decision-makers regarding 
the environment determines their ability to perform (Child 1972, 1997; Child, Lu & 
Tsai 2007). Therefore, this study extends the attempt to explore the categories or types 
of pressures within the institutional setting and how they affect PSOs and influence IA 
performance to achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. 
3.3 Isomorphism 
Institutionalisation, which is commonly defined as the establishment of an 
organisation, takes place after a collection of socially and culturally approved practices 
is motivated by the achievement of legitimacy of their actions (Washington & Peterson 
2011). From the institutional theory perspective, practices and processes that society 
and culture consider legitimate determine how an organisation will be designed, 
administered and monitored (Suchman 1995). Organisations that are established 
within a highly controlled environment find that compliance with pre-existing 
legislature and institutional norms is the easiest way to attain legitimacy. Compliance 
involves conforming to the demands and expectations of the existing social structure 
in which the organisation exists (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002). Compliance with the 
norms and legislations of the institution to achieve legitimacy creates isomorphism. 
Isomorphism is therefore referred to as the degree to which an organisation adheres to 
the norms and practices established and institutionalised within the environment 
(Washington & Patterson 2011). However, institutional theorists argue that as 
organisations consistently conform to similar norms and practices, they will eventually 
adopt the same practice and structures, thereby making them isomorphic (Deephouse 
& Carter 2005; Deephouse & Suchman 2008; Washington & Patterson 2011). The 
process of conforming to these norms and adopting the practices and structures 
includes underlying institutional pressures. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) outline three 
types of institutional pressures that organisations encounter in the process of achieving 
isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative. The relationship between institutional 
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pressures and Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy is that the characteristics of 
bureaucracy enable the demands and expectations of the institution to exhibit the type 
or nature of institutional pressures directly to the organisation. 
Coercive Pressure 
Interrelation is mostly exhibited between organisations within an institution in the 
form of dependence. Some organisations determine the operations and existence of 
others. Independent organisations therefore influence those that are dependent in a bid 
to follow the legitimacy of the sectors in which they are embedded to survive and 
obtain resources (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz 2004; Frumkin, 
Frank & Jackson 2004; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Mihret 2010). Under such 
circumstances, the institutional pressures are coercive, with institutional linkages 
determining the legality and resource provisions of organisations (Baum & Oliver 
1992; Meyer & Scott 1983; Scott 1987; Tolbert 1985; Zucker 1987). For example, 
coercive pressures may be generated by the government to request organisations to 
achieve the prescribed mandate for a national program (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). 
Dependent organisations must therefore comply to achieve legitimacy and provisions 
for continuity. 
Mimetic Pressure 
Mimetic pressures are generated by a lack of clear direction. Organisations with an 
unclear direction tend to imitate others in the same setting. According to DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983), this is possible when there are uncertainties in the environment and 
the organisations do not have appropriate objectives. 
Normative Pressure 
Normative pressures are inflicted on the professions of individuals or teams within an 
organisation. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define professionalism as the way in which 
members within an occupation collectively interpret and define the appropriate way in 
which to perform. This is based on the theory that individuals within a profession 
understand the norms and ethical behaviours associated with that profession. 
Normative pressure is passed through ordinary standards of formal education to 
students and to individual associations with professional networks (DiMaggio & 
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Powell 1983). These standards of suitable behaviours are delivered to those within a 
profession through their involvement in professional training, schools, workshops and 
seminars, as well as professional and trade magazines (Ashworth, Boyne & Delbridge 
2009; Brass et al. 2004). However, individuals with ambiguous and uncertain 
circumstances seek help from their professional networks to create stronger 
connections and take the best course of action (Galaskiewicz 1985). 
3.4 Effect of Isomorphism on IAF 
The IAF has consistently emerged as a powerful force in the internal control systems, 
risk management and corporate governance of an organisation (Hermanson & 
Rittenberg 2003; Hermanson, Ivancevich & Ivancevich 2008; Subramaniam et al. 
2011b). IA plays a major role in monitoring organisations’ risk profile and determining 
areas that require intervention for risk management purposes (Goodwin 2004; 
Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2006). There has been an increase in regulatory 
requirements in the public sector setting to establish an IAF (Sterck, Bouckaert & 
Scheers 2005). Further, the need for improved accountability is somewhat achieved 
through IA activities in the governance of PSOs (Normanton 1966; Sterck, Bouckaert 
& Scheers 2005). However, despite the perspective derived from the role of IA 
(Ramamoorti 2003), literature on IA and IAE shows that the IAF is not always 
effective (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & Gwilliam 2003; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright 
2004; Zain & Subramaniam 2007; Zain, Subramaniam & Stewart 2006). Thus, if the 
IAF is not consistently effective, then the quality of IA work that is essential (Sarens 
& De Beelde 2006). This implies that achieving stakeholders’ expectations is not 
consistently guarantee. Further still, the value-addition expectations perceived from 
the IA definition and literature arguing that effective IAFs support organisations to 
achieve their objectives (Dittenhofer 2001) will have no consistency. 
Isomorphism therefore, creates room for examining the level of IA performance and 
real-life experiences. This attitude helps to understand the process that the internal 
auditing goes through to work for the organisations helping to achieve their goals. This 
attitude also helps us to identify the role and position of IA while the PSOs strive to 
respond to the established and institutionalised policies within the environment 
(Washington & Patterson 2011). The examination of IA performance and real-life 
experiences also helps to identify factors that influence IA that originate from the 
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organisation and within the institutional setting. This because the links within the 
institutional setting exhibit an interrelation and dependence to follow prescribed 
legitimate norms in the sector in which they are embedded to survive (DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983; Frumkin, Frank & Jackson 2004; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Mihret 2010). 
PSOs encounter challenges as they strive to achieve national objectives within 
embedded social links (Polanyi & Polanyi 2001; Vijayakumar & Nagaraja 2012). 
The literature shows that institutional theory can be practical in IA research (Abu-Azza 
2012; Al-Twaijry et al. 2003; Arena, Arnaboldi & Azzone 2006; Endaya & Hanefah 
2013; Mihret et al. 2010). The strand of institutional entrepreneurship determines how 
PSOs can overcome organisational and IA challenges using innovative strategies. The 
institutional entrepreneurship perspective helps actors in organisations that are 
influenced by the IAF to respond to the pressures generated by institutional 
isomorphism. The process of generating strategies for institutional entrepreneurship 
help the IAF to achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. 
3.5 Institutional Entrepreneurship 
Given the IA challenge to perform, the conceptual framework describes the change in 
the IA approach using institutional entrepreneurship (see Section 2.1.5) to overcome 
pressure at the organisational level and answer the research questions. This approach 
conforms to the ISPPIA given that the IIA acknowledges that IA ‘is conducted in 
diverse legal and cultural environments; within organizations that vary in purpose, 
size, complexity, and structure’ (IIA 2017). The IIA does not provide this approach 
but acknowledges that differences can affect IA practice. The IIA emphasises that 
conforming to the standards is essential to meet the responsibilities of internal auditors 
and IA activities. However, the IIA also states that appropriate disclosures are required 
if internal auditors or IA activities cannot conform to the standards (IIA Standard, 
1321, 1322). Thus, the IIA acknowledges diverse legal and cultural environments and 
encourages innovative IA activities. 
Additionally, the provision of disclosure of non-conformance to the IIA standards 
provides room to revise IA techniques to an environmentally suitable approach. A 
change in the IA approach therefore enables the IAF to remain relevant to 
organisational functions and consistent in conducting IA activities to achieve IA 
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objectives, IA stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. The conceptual framework 
shows the norms of institutional entrepreneurship (adoptability, co-optation and 
lobbyism, capacity to disrupt and maintain existing arrangement, membership and 
standardisation, influence through innovation). These norms are employed by 
individuals in the IAF, so they can achieve IA stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. 
Chapter 4 discusses the research method used to generate information to answer the 
research questions. 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlined the research design employed in this study, including the 
research questions, defined concepts and specified relationships among the concepts 
in a conceptual framework for the study. Chapter 4 presents the detailed procedures 
employed to address the research questions. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methods 
This chapter presents the practical approaches employed by the researcher to answer 
the research questions. It starts by explaining the research approach and the case study 
method used to explain the qualitative components, followed by a discussion of the 
data collection methods, data analysis techniques and procedures, and the chapter 
summary. 
4.1 Research Approach 
Few previous studies have explored IAE in PSOs, with studies calling for researchers 
to explore the drivers needed to achieve IAE (Barac, Coetzee & Van Staden 2016; 
Endaya & Hanefah 2013). The literature explains that a qualitative approach is 
appropriate for exploring areas where little is known (Malhotra 2012; Maxwell 2012). 
Therefore, the researcher used a qualitative approach to generate in-depth information 
while seeking to understand IAE in PSOs. The aim of this study was to understand 
IAE through the real-life experiences of internal auditors from various organisations 
in the public sector setting by generating insights after examining the context in which 
organisational experiences are structured. This is supported by Maxwell (2012), who 
noted that such a process should focus on individuals and interpreting the complexity 
of a situation. This led to a description of the process and ongoing and changing forms 
of actions, interactions and emotions taken in response to events and problems that 
arise to restrain actions and interactions (Neuman 2014). 
The qualitative research approach enabled the researcher to spell out philosophical 
world views of social constructivists that were relevant to this study. For instance, 
social constructivists believe that individuals seek to understand the world in which 
they live and work (Maxwell 2012). This was the motivation for understanding IAE in 
PSOs. The approach therefore followed the process undertaken by internal auditors to 
achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE by seeking participants’ views 
regarding stakeholders and their real-life experiences. The process involved 
identifying different relationships in the IA environment and studying how these 
connections and interactions determine participants’ behaviours and actions. 
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The research approach employed a case study research design to examine different 
issues related to IA real-life experiences. Lincoln, Lynham and Guba (2011) and 
Mertens (2010) described such exercises as naturalistic inquiry. The case study design 
helped to construct meanings from the IA activities undertaken in the public-sector 
setting. The case study method helped to generate data from research participants and 
their natural settings (Johansson 2003; Scapens 1990; Yin 2015) and understand the 
context of internal auditors’ social perspective in the public-sector setting. The case 
study design provided a method for analysing data to generate meaning arising from 
interactions in the public sector institutional social setting. 
4.2 Case Study Method 
The case study research method was the most relevant to the study and helped to 
generate appropriate data. For instance, it enabled the use of open-ended questions, 
which helped the researcher to generate in-depth data by probing during interviews. 
Interviews were conducted in the natural setting of the public sector, which contributed 
to understanding participants’ real-life experiences because the researcher could 
position herself as the manager of the study and influence the trend of the interview. 
This helped the study to remain focused on IA and IAE. Interviews enhanced 
collaboration with participants, which facilitated data validation. The researcher 
obtained documentary evidence of the responses provided, and the participants agreed 
to validate the transcribed data, which enhanced the accuracy of the findings. The case 
study method also enabled the researcher to include personal values in the study while 
interpreting the data collected to generate strong insights (Maxwell 2012; Yin 2009, 
2015). 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the case study approach and shows the framework of activities 
and guidelines that governed the conduct of the researcher and the research project. 
This approach enabled the researcher to conduct detailed analysis (Soy 1997) to 
generate strong insights while answering the research questions. Further, it allowed 
the researcher to create a well-structured set of procedures from the development 
process. It minimised variation by specifically laying out guidelines for each stage 
throughout the study. Applying the approach uniformly to multiple cases ensured that 
data collected from various organisations in the same setting could be compared. It 
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also enhanced the transparency of how activities were conducted, which in turn 
increased the reliability of the study findings (Yin 1994). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Case study Approach designed for this study 
 
 
 
Getting started 
 Identified previous research on IAE 
 Defined the main research questions to 
address the study 
 Prepared identification of data required to 
answer the research questions. 
 
Selecting cases 
 Five cases were chosen from all types of PSOs in 
Rwanda which led to use of multiple-cases. These 
included autonomous, semi-autonomous and non-
autonomous organizations. 
 
Data Collection: 
 Interviews were held with CEOs, Audit 
Committees, Heads of IAFs, Auditor General’s 
Office Chief IA and Auditees. 
 Documents were collected from these 
organizations and online. 
Data Analysis  
 Thematic analysis was used to 
interpret study findings. 
BN: Some of the analysis would take 
place as the study progressed but these 
were all incorporated here 
 
Planned Validity  
 Prepared a checklist of items for the data collection plan 
 Ensured that the correct operational measures are 
planned for the concepts being studied. Tactics for 
ensuring this included using multiple sources of evidence, 
compiled documents for evidence.  
 Ensured to show a causal relationship between outcomes 
for explanatory purposes. 
 Identified the domain to which study finding can be 
generalized. Tactics include using multiple-case studies to 
investigate outcomes in different contexts. 
Reporting  
 Report writing 
 Submission 
Study Limitations 
 Specifically, the scope was limited to 
PSOs 
 Data generalizability may be difficult 
to countries with varying 
backgrounds 
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4.2.1 Getting Started 
The qualitative approach enabled the use of logical descriptions and explanations of 
the reality of the social world with well-developed explanations and models (Malhotra 
2012). A conceptual framework was designed to form coherent theoretical definitions 
that make sense of the preliminary ideas and the data. The institutional theory was 
employed to explore relational effects on PSOs and the IAF. This approach was 
considered because it provided opportunities for the researcher to step beyond the 
known and enter the world of the participants to understand how the IAF achieves 
stakeholders’ expectations, as well as the factors influencing IAE in the embedded 
setting of the public sector. Given that engaging and accessing participants for research 
can be difficult (Lloyd & Hopkins 2015), the researcher chose Rwanda—a country 
with which she was familiar. Rwanda was studied as a single unit of analysis to 
understand the social practice of IA (Scapens 1990; Yin 2009). 
To answer the two research questions, the study used multiple organisations and their 
contexts to examine social processes. The institutional setting of these organisations 
was explored, along with their organisational set-up and IA professionalism. The case 
study research design was chosen because it enabled investigations to be conducted in 
a natural setting. Further, it facilitated the use of multiple data sources to allow the 
inclusion of different types of PSOs and the flexibility of comparing information to 
obtain results that could be applied to varying circumstances (Baxter & Jack 2008; Soy 
1997; Stake 2010; Yin 2015). Information generated for research question 1 helped 
the researcher to understand the status of the IAF in Rwanda. This in turn enabled the 
study to generate information for research question 2 by examining the determinants 
of IAE. 
4.2.2 Selecting Cases 
To answer the research questions, the researcher first had to identify the population of 
interest—that is, PSOs. The scope of PSOs in Rwanda was narrowed down to a 
sufficient size and capable of answering the research questions (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 
2015). The characteristics used to select the organisations were organisational set-up, 
structure settings and administration (Firestone 1993; Omair 2014). All PSOs in 
Rwanda have an IAF, and although some can customise it to their setting (which is 
 57 
discussed in Sub-section 551), the IAF in all government organisations is governed by 
the same legal instrument (Ministerial Order N° 002/09/10/GP/A; Organic Law N° 
12/2013). 
However, this required an understanding of the set-up of PSOs in Rwanda, which are 
categorised as autonomous, semi-autonomous and non-autonomous. All three 
categories were included in this study. Autonomous organisations are independent in 
their set-up. They have the capacity to generate funds for their budget and are not 
subject to external administrative controls. These are differentiated by their business 
activities, but the expectations of IA activities are the same. The semi-autonomous 
organisations have capacity to generate funds for their budget but are subject to 
external administrative controls. Non-autonomous organisations depend on 
government budget, are subject to external administrative controls and these include 
districts, provinces and ministries. One organisation was selected from each category, 
and a total of five organisations were studied. The selection exercise ensured that the 
study embraced the complete context of the public sector of Rwanda. Selecting an 
organisation from each category enabled data to be compared from different PSOs in 
the same institutional setting and under similar conditions (Firestone 1993). 
4.2.3 Selecting Participants 
The main criterion for choosing an organisation was that it must have an IAF. 
Interview participants were selected from organisations with a view to generating 
insights regarding their IA experience. A familiar environment helped the researcher 
to identify organisations with individuals that would be willing to participate. 
Although engaging and accessing participants for research can be difficult (Lloyd & 
Hopkins 2015), it was not a problem in this study because there was effective 
coordination with the data collection supervisor. The supervisor enabled the researcher 
to access the OAG and the OCIA, whose roles are significant in IA activities in 
Rwandan PSOs. 
The researcher conducted the first interview with the OCIA to become more familiar 
with the culture of the IAF in Rwanda prior to the data collection. Although the 
researcher had consulted IA materials used by the IAF in Rwanda 
(www.minecofin.gov.rw), a session with the OCIA was like a preliminary visit to all 
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PSOs because data received from the OCIA provided an overview of the IAF for all 
PSOs. The OCIA’s role as the coordinator of all IA activities in Rwanda helped the 
researcher to understand the IA culture, legal system and structural framework. Data 
provided by the OCIA were of a higher hierarchical level regarding the IAF, which 
enhanced the trustworthiness of the research, as emphasised by Lincoln and Guba 
(1985), Pitney (2004) and Shenton (2004). The researcher then analysed the actual 
operations of IA activities in their individual settings to examine the extent to which 
stakeholders’ expectations and effectiveness were achieved, as well as the factors that 
influenced IAE. 
The OCIA communicated to all IA units in PSOs via email that a researcher was 
conducting a study on IAF. As a senior government executive who was responsible 
for coordinating IA activities in the public sector, the OCIA’s willingness to participate 
was a strong endorsement of the study and the researcher. Further, the session with the 
OCIA generated information that helped the researcher to identify which organisations 
were suitable for the study in the three segments of PSOs. Prior preparations had 
helped to identify the concepts to be studied, but the session with the OCIA helped to 
identify the organisations that would be willing to participate. The session provided an 
understanding of people in positions of power, authority and with technical skills 
desired for the study. When choosing case organisations, the researcher focused on 
CEOs, whose willingness to participate influenced the participation level of their 
organisation.  
The researcher obtained a list of PSOs and the contact details of CEOs, who were 
contacted by phone. The researcher introduced herself, briefly explained the reason for 
the call, outlined the study and requested permission to conduct interviews within the 
organisation. When the CEO agreed, they were informed that a plain language 
statement and a consent form would be sent via email, and they were asked to sign the 
form and return it to the researcher. 
After receiving the signed consent copy, the researcher arranged an appointment to 
conduct the interview. Almost all contacted CEOs were willing to participate, except 
one who was not comfortable sharing organisational data. This CEO was replaced with 
another from the same category of organisation. The respondents were therefore 
obliged to participate, and challenges were negligible. At the researcher’s request, the 
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CEOs informed their audit committee that the researcher wanted to interview them. 
Table 4.1 outlines the participation in all organisational categories and how the identity 
of each participant was encrypted to protect their identity and enhance confidentiality. 
The table below shows the date and duration of the interviews. Since participation in 
interviews of this project was voluntary, and no rewards was expected from it 
participants had the liberty to withdraw from participation at any time during or after 
the interview. A withdraw of consent form would be attached, in that case would be 
signed and sent by email to let the researcher know that a certain participant withdrew 
his or her consent to participate in the project interviews. However, none of the 
participants withdrew his or her consent for the duration of this study.   
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Table 4.1: Interview Participants in Each Organisation 
Organisation 
type 
Participants Date of 
interview 
Duration of 
interview 
OAG Deputy Auditor General 17/11/2016 1.30 hrs 
Office of 
Government 
Chief Internal 
Auditor 
Chief Internal Auditor (CIA) 01/11/2016 2 hrs 
Autonomous 
organisation 
CEO—Participant 1 Au 30/11/2016 1.40 hrs 
Audit Committee—Participant 2 Au 19/12/2016 1 hr 
Head of IAF— Participant 3 Au 20/12/2016 2 hrs 
Auditee— Participant 4 Au 17/11/2016 1 hr 
Semi-
autonomous 
organisation 
CEO—Participant 1 Semi 02/12/2016 2 hrs 
Audit Committee—Participant 2 Semi 08/12/2016 1.30 hrs 
Head of IAF—Participant 3 Semi 10/11/2016 2 hrs 
Auditee—Participant 4 Semi 10/11/2016 1 hr 
Non-
autonomous 
organisation 
(ministry, 
province, 
district) 
Permanent Secretary—Participant 1 
Ministry 
14/11/2016 1.10 hrs 
Advisor to the State Minister in the 
Ministry of Finance and Audit 
Committee at another ministry —
Participant 2 Ministry 
23/11/2016 1.30 hrs 
Head of IAF —Participant 3 Ministry 14/11/2016 2 hrs 
Auditee—Participant 4 Ministry 20/11/2016 1 hr 
Governor of the Province—Participant 
1 Province 
08/11/2016 1.30 hrs 
Executive Secretary—Participant 2 
Province 
03/11/2016 2 hrs 
Audit Committee—Participant 3 
Province 
04/11/2016 1.30 hrs 
Head of IAF —Participant 4 Province 03/11/2016 2 hrs 
Auditee—Participant 5 Province 03/11/2016 1 hr 
District Mayor—Participant 1 District 16/11/2016 2 hrs 
Audit Committee—Participant 2 
District 
16/11/2016 1.30 hrs 
Head of IAF —Participant 3 District 06/12/2016 2 hrs 
Auditee—Participant 4 District 06/12/2016 1 hr 
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4.3 Data Collection 
Data collection for this study included both primary and secondary sources. 
Appropriate research instruments were chosen to collect reliable data to answer the 
research questions. These were obtained from reading journals, which described 
suitable instruments for case study research. The research instruments used in this 
study were interviews and a document review. Interviews were used to generate 
primary data, and secondary data were obtained from a document review (Cooper & 
Schindler 2006). Interviews were conducted with four participants from each of the 
five PSOs (see Table 4.1), as well as the OCIA and the OAG because of their 
connection to the IAF. There were 22 interview respondents in total. 
The OAG was involved in the interviews as the external auditor for the government of 
Rwanda (MINECOFIN 2006a; OAG 2017). Interviews were conducted at the 
organisations during office hours. The process of conducting interview sessions is 
expounded in Section 4.4.3. Ritchie and Lewis (2003) and Gillham (2000) described 
interviews as a managed verbal exchange, and Yin (2009) noted that interviews are the 
most important sources of case study information. Thus, interviews conducted with 
multiple participants require well-developed interview questions to help generate 
comparable data to answer the research questions. 
4.3.1 Development of Interview Questions as a Research Instrument 
Semi-structured interview questions were developed to generate in-depth data through 
the effective application of interview skills. The development of the interview 
questions was mainly guided by the research questions to generate the data required to 
understand how IAF achieves stakeholders’ expectations, as well as the factors that 
influence IAE in PSOs. The interview questions were designed in two parts. Part one 
was designed to generate data concerning stakeholders’ satisfaction, and part two was 
designed to generate data regarding the factors that influence IAE. 
The use of semi-structured interview questions required the researcher to listen 
attentively (Clough & Nutbrown 2007), pause where necessary, generate probing 
questions from responses and prompt interviewees to talk more where necessary. The 
approach to interviews followed David and Sutton’s (2004) proposal of listing key 
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themes and sub-questions in advance to create order from which to draw questions for 
unplanned encounters. Key themes proposed by David and Sutton (2004) were the 
concepts generated from the conceptual framework. Along with sub-questions, these 
concepts helped the researcher to stay focused on the research objectives during the 
interview sessions. 
The trend of the interview session was flexible and allowed interviewees to speak 
freely. In most cases, this changed the order of the questions depending on the direction 
of the interview, and additional questions were asked to guide the interview and probe 
for more information. This helped the researcher to determine the order of generating 
information for the topic under investigation (Gray 2004; Lloyd & Hopkins 2015). 
Semi-structured interviews helped the researcher to maintain discretion regarding the 
issues, and they generated information that would not have been generated if the 
participants had been asked direct questions (Corbetta 2003; Lloyd & Hopkins 2015). 
Supplementary to the list of interview questions, the researcher asked sub-questions 
focusing on the concepts to probe for an in-depth understanding of the subject. The 
concepts that were generated were complementary to the sub-questions and 
supplemented the semi-structured interview questions. The concepts included a legal 
framework that establishes the public organisation, dependence affiliations, effect of 
bureaucracy, stakeholders’ satisfaction, professionalism, internal audit performance 
and IAE. 
The interview questions were prepared in different sets for each group to enhance 
focus and consistency (see Appendix 2), and to maximise the time available. The first 
set of questions were for CEOs (set A), the second set was for audit committee 
members (set B), the third set was for heads of the IAF or internal auditors (where 
there was no fully flagged IA structure; set C) and the fourth set was for operational 
managers (auditees; set D). Two sets of interview questions were also designed for the 
OAG and OCIA. Thus, there were six sets of interview questions in total. 
4.3.2 Interview Process 
A list of questions was sent to each participant prior to the interview session to help 
them understand what to expect. After arriving at the participant’s organisation, the 
interviewee led the researcher to the pre-arranged place. The researcher was welcomed 
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to the organisation and given an opportunity to provide an introduction. The researcher 
introduced herself and explained the purpose of the study and the interview process. 
Sufficient information about the study was provided, repeated what was written in the 
plain language statement, but did not ask the interview questions before the discussion 
begun. The researcher allowed the participant to ask questions for clarification. When 
the participant was satisfied and prepared to continue with the interview, the researcher 
asked the participant to sign the consent form. This exercise confirmed that the 
individual participants agreed to participate in the data collection process for that 
particular area. 
The interviewer began by asking a question and allowing the participant to understand 
the aim of the interview before going into detail. The interviewer waited for the initial 
response without interrupting. She waited for the participant to answer the question in 
their own words, and she used encouraging body language. The interviewer requested 
examples or relevant documents to illustrate the participant’s responses by asking 
questions such as: ‘Can you tell me more about that?’ or ‘Can you give us an example 
from your own experience?’ and giving them time to think and talk. 
After asking the questions, the interviewer asked the participant whether they had 
anything to add. Some participants added further information, and others did not. The 
interviewer was flexible, but at the same time strict with time. She thanked each 
participant and told them that the interview recordings would be transcribed and 
returned to them for approval. After concluding the interview, the interviewer shed 
light on how the data would be analysed and used, and she committed to providing 
feedback with the thesis report or papers that would arise from the study. 
There were no language issues during the interviews; the interviewer and all 
participants understood English and the local language because the researcher had a 
similar background. This helped the researcher to establish a bond of respect and trust, 
which encouraged the interviewees to talk freely. This approach created a conducive 
atmosphere to generate in-depth data (David & Sutton 2004; Lloyd & Hopkins 2015); 
therefore, the interview process was successful. 
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4.3.3 Document Review 
A document review was used as a complementary source of data. Table 4.2 shows the 
types of documents used, the objective of each document and its purpose in the 
analysis of the data generated. 
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Table 4.2: Document Types, Objectives and Purposes 
Document type Objective Purpose in the analytical 
framework 
1. Internal audit 
documents: 
a) Audit reports 
b) Activity reports 
c) Internal audit plans, 
programs and other 
working papers 
d) Feedback (audit 
committee, CEO, 
auditees and 
auditors) 
e) Minutes from 
several meetings 
(audit committee, 
CEO and auditors) 
Document showed: 
b) quality and quantity 
prepared 
c) scope of completed 
tasks 
d) scope and level of 
planning activities 
e) interactions and how 
active they were 
f) level of involvement 
in IAF activities and 
how helpful they are 
towards achieving 
set goals 
a), b) Examine scope, content of 
reports and format to assess 
whether they are easy for 
everyone to read and 
understand 
c) Examine the level of planning 
and how effective as 
compared with special 
assignments 
d) Examine how comprehensive 
the scope would be and 
compare with the reports to 
measure achievement. 
e) Examine how useful is the 
feedback from the superiors 
f) Examine issues discussed 
with audit committee, CEO 
and auditors 
2.  Organisational chart Establish the organisational 
position of the IAFs within 
the organisations 
Examine independence, authority 
and assess objectivity of the IAF 
3. Constitution and the 
organic law 
Generate data on 
regulations of the IA 
profession in Rwanda 
Examine legal support and 
government expectations 
Correspondence 
between the IA unit 
and other functions 
Collect data on decisions 
relevant to IA activities 
Examine how the IAF is perceived 
and assess independence and 
objectivity 
5. Internal audit charter 
and rules prepared by 
the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic 
Planning for IADs 
Collect data relevant to 
authority and responsibility 
of IA activity 
Examine whether the function 
guides the responsibilities of the 
area in the provision of 
independent internal audit 
services 
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These documents were collected during interview sessions as evidence of some of the 
research participants’ responses. Research participants were willing to provide printed 
copies, but the researcher preferred soft copies for easy storage and retrieval. The 
participants sent the documents via email, which provided assurance of their security 
and validity. 
4.4 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical approval was obtained from the university to conduct research on IA and IAE 
specifically. Thereafter, permission to collect data from Rwanda was granted by the 
Ministry of Education in Rwanda. Except for the information that is publicly available 
on the websites, the rest of the documents used in this study were provided on request 
and after permission was granted to use them for research purposes only. Direct 
quotations are presented anonymously, even if names were included in the primary 
data collected. The audio files and original transcribed interviews are stored in an 
untouched form. The data collection process demonstrates enhanced mechanisms for 
reliability and validity of the research. 
4.5 Reliability and Validity of the Research 
The reliability and validity of the research were inherently bonded within all activities 
conducted to ensure that the study results were meaningful, and that the information 
generated could reliably answer the research questions. For example, the process of 
seeking access to the study area (Rwanda) necessitated obtaining a research permit. 
Permission to collect data from Rwanda was granted by the Ministry of Education after 
obtaining a competent supervisor to oversee the process. Having a supervisor in the 
field of data collection enabled the researcher to communicate with participants of high 
calibre, which increased the legitimacy of the data received. The research permit was 
submitted to CEOs along with the plain language statement form and the consent form. 
Further, the supervisor’s consent letter was sent via email and was also presented in 
hard copy prior to the start of the interview. This approach enhanced the researcher’s 
confidence because all participants understood that she was legally recognised by 
government authorities to collect the data. 
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The interviews focused on establishing data validity in the information generated. 
Primarily, this was enhanced by the process of seeking consent from the data collection 
supervisor, who gave the researcher access to interview respondents at higher levels 
(e.g., board members and CEOs). The data collection process began after obtaining 
consent from all participants. The provision of interview transcripts to participants also 
helps to ascertain the validity and reliability of the data collected for the study. 
Opting to use multiple PSOs prolongs engagement within the study area and exposes 
the researcher to multiple experiences to facilitate an understanding of the factors that 
shape the characteristics of the IAF and influence IAE in Rwandan PSOs. Therefore, 
studying multiple cases provides persistent observations of the identified 
characteristics and elements in different organisations. This process enables the 
researcher to pursue and focus on these characteristics and elements, thereby providing 
an in-depth understanding and hence reliability of the study findings (Lincoln & Guba 
1985). 
Meeting the chief coordinator of the IAF (OCIA) in the public sector, briefing the 
participants on the purpose of the interview and explaining the procedures to be 
followed was important for participants to understand the study and to increase the 
validity of the data generated (Fowler 2002). Further, several activities were conducted 
to enhance reliability in the process of interacting with the interview respondents. For 
example, the purpose of designing similar questions for a set of interviewees (see 
Appendix 1) from different organisations was to enhance reliability by testing the same 
concepts from all respondents at the same level. This approach helped to assess the 
quality and content of the information generated to answer the research questions. 
The other element that enhanced validity and reliability was in selecting the type and 
number of PSOs. All types of PSOs were represented so that the content of the 
information generated would be generalised to enable valid inferences. A decision was 
made to select participants who would provide information that would generate 
reliable conclusions. The process of securing evidence for some of the responses 
generated was considered part of the document review to analyse the tested concepts. 
Participants were asked to sign individual consent forms to enhance ethical 
requirements. The researcher ensured that the correct operational measures were 
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planned for the concepts being studied and were sufficiently demonstrated. Methods 
for ensuring this included using multiple sources of evidence. 
Data were collected in audio format during the interview sessions and were transcribed 
into text and sent back to the participants for review and approval. All participants read 
through the transcribed text but did not raise any issues regarding the accuracy of the 
data generated. After transcribing and compiling the data generated about the IAF in 
Rwanda, the data were sent to the administrative assistant to the governor at one of the 
provinces that participated in the research. The administrative assistant proofread and 
confirmed that the data were correct. This process enhanced the reliability and validity 
of the data used in this research. 
4.6 Data Analysis 
This section explains how data from multiple sources were merged, analysed and 
presented to answer the research questions. Data were captured in audio, transcribed 
and added to the data extracted from the documents. Information was generated with 
insights relevant to the study in line with Miles and Huberman’s (1994) steps of data 
analysis, which include data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing. Data 
reduction included summarising interview responses along major themes that emerged 
from the data. Interviews were uniformly conducted by one researcher, and reliability 
was ensured (Fowler Jr 2013). The process was manually conducted by the researcher; 
there was no division of labour at any stage of the study. This helped the researcher to 
achieve an in-depth understanding of the material being studied and to refine the 
interpretations to enhance academic rigor. The study benefited from data analysis 
exercise that is all-encompassing activity conducted by one person throughout the 
qualitative research process (Basit 2003). This implies that the researcher assessed 
every step taken. She assessed the literature, and the environment during the data 
collection, and she analysed the dialogue with the interview respondents (technicians 
and professionals). This helped the researcher to understand how the data received 
would connect with the concepts being studied to explain the phenomenon. 
To remain focused and maintain a consistent approach, this study employed thematic 
analysis, which is a method of qualitative synthesis that involves identifying key and 
recurring themes and concepts from a body of literature (Braun & Clarke 2006; Dixon-
 69 
Woods et al. 2005, 2006; Goldsmith, Bankhead & Austoker 2007). The thematic 
process involves several activities (examining, categorising, tabulating, testing and 
documenting the evidence) to address the initial propositions of a study (Yin 2003a). 
This approach helped the researcher to present the study findings in a scholarly 
manner. This section therefore provides details of how data from multiple sources were 
merged, analysed and presented. Figure 4.2 outlines the data analysis process 
following six phases of conducting data analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006). 
Data analysis in qualitative research is all-encompassing, as shown in the case study 
approach in Figure 4.1. The process of analysis starts when the researcher notices 
patterns and concerns of potential interest to the information related to the research 
questions. Then follows reporting of the content and meaning of patterns or themes in 
the data identified before, during and after analysis (Ryan & Bernard 2000) to clarify 
how the insights generated in the study were obtained in a scholarly manner. Analysis 
of data for this study involved a continuous moving back and forth between the dataset, 
the coded extracts of the data being analysed and the analysis of the data that are 
produced (Braun & Clarke 2006). 
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Figure 4.2: Thematic analysis process. 
Source: Braun and Clarke (2012) 
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Phase 1: Familiarisation with Data 
Data were captured in audio form and transcribed. Familiarisation with the data 
involved listening to the audio files as many times as possible. This was during and 
after transcribing the data from audio to text to maintain accuracy. As the researcher 
listened, she noted down what needed to be learnt or elaborated in detail. This helped 
the researcher to modify the interview questions to include the identified concepts that 
would help to generate in-depth insights to answer the research questions. The need to 
become familiar with the data encouraged the researcher to continually re-read the 
transcribed texts and listen to the audio files and that is how she gained an in-depth 
understanding of’ the information obtained. 
Phase 2: Generating the Codes 
After re-reading the data and becoming familiar with it, the researcher identified 
features that were relevant and suitable to generate answers to the research questions. 
This process helped the researcher to identify features that would show how IA 
stakeholders in Rwanda perceived IAF—for example, how the auditees related to the 
IAF on a day-to-day basis—and generally recognise potential elements that would be 
relevant to answer the research questions. These features were then classified to obtain 
insights into the research questions. For example, if the researcher identified that 
quality report was significant to stakeholders, she conducted further analysis to 
understand the factors behind achieving or not achieving the quality report. The 
extracted data that were identified to generate the codes were highlighted and marked, 
and the codes associated with them were written down (see example in Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 illustrates how the data from the extracts were coded. After coding the 
extracts, the codes were organised in their diverse patterns to generate themes. 
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Table 4.3: Coding Extracts 
Data extracts Coding 
Participant 1 Au: Like in any other institution, IAF is very important 
for this organisation. Basically, what the internal audit does, it plays 
an independent role in helping the management and the board to 
understand the effectiveness of our internal control systems, help us to 
mitigate risks in the organisation and evaluate all the processes in the 
organisation to enhance good corporate governance. 
Information generated by IAF through its activities is shared with the 
board because the head of internal audit report directly to the head of 
audit committee of the board of directors and that gives a very strategic 
level of independence from the management to ensure that the board 
have the sense of what is happening in the institution. 
The IAF have a set target of what they must do every year. This is what 
we call annual action plan. This plan is also tailored to the strategic 
plan and areas of the institution. Those strategic areas are assessed in 
terms of risks and importance. 
IAF helps the 
organisation 
achieve its goals 
 
Stakeholders 
acknowledge the 
role of IAF 
 
Risk management 
 
Dual reporting of 
IA 
 
IA activity plans 
Participant 4 Au: Like I said, I am talking on behalf of the Eastern 
province, but this is a general case to all the provinces in the country. 
The structure allows only one internal auditor for each district and one 
principle auditor for at the province. 
When there are demands for audit in certain area this one internal 
auditor cannot complete the exercise alone. 
 
 
 
IA structure 
 
IA professionalism 
 
Phase 3: Searching for Themes 
At this stage, the researcher started reorganising the codes to map the themes. The 
themes captured important aspects about the data in relation to the research questions. 
Based on the conceptual framework designed for this study, the themes and subthemes 
were generated from clustering codes that seemed to share unifying features. For 
example, the factors that related to the IAF were clustered together, factors that related 
to organisation were clustered together and those that related to the institutional setting 
were clustered together. However, these clusters are interlinked, as shown in Figure 
4.3, given that PSOs are embedded in the institutional setting, which exhibits 
interrelations and dependence that follows prescribed legitimate norms to achieve 
national objectives (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Frumkin, Frank & Jackson 2004; 
Meyer & Rowan 1977; Mihret 2010). 
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Figure 4.3: Theme development and mapping. 
Figure 4.3 shows the initial thematic mapping with the themes and subthemes 
developed from codes. However, as the analysis continued, some of the themes were 
merged to form main themes and others were discarded as the researcher focused on 
the significance and coherency to answer the research questions. 
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Figure 4.4: Final theme mapping. 
Figure 4.4 displays the cluster themes that reflected and described a coherent and 
meaningful pattern to answer the research questions. After grouping the codes in three 
unifying clusters (IAF, organisational and institutional setting), they were combined 
to focus on their relevance to the research questions. After merging the clusters and 
codes in relevant patterns, the miscellaneous codes were discarded, and two major 
themes were generated into two main clusters (IAF and IA stakeholders). These two 
clusters showed two major themes (IA approach and stakeholders acknowledge the 
role of the IAF), each with one subtheme but shared with four other subthemes (1. the 
level of IAE in public sector institution, 2. Institutional field and its influence, 3. Level 
of IA stakeholder interaction with IAF and 4. Institutional entrepreneurship and IAE). 
These provided the best mapping of the identity data relating to the research questions. 
The two clusters helped to identify their relationships, and this helped the researcher 
to start discerning and considering how the identified themes would work together to 
demonstrate the extent to which the IAF achieves stakeholders’ expectations and 
factors that influence IAE. 
Phase 4: Reviewing Potential Themes 
At this stage, the researcher wanted to know whether the developed themes were valid. 
The themes generated were reviewed in relation to the coded data and the entire 
dataset. This exercise was essential to enhance quality checks, and it was conducted 
when searching for themes. It involved checking themes against the organised data 
extracts and exploring whether the themes worked in relation to the data. The data 
were then organised and categorised to enhance their connection and show their 
relationships and how one concept influenced another. This involved eliminating 
several codes, relocating others under another theme and re-identifying the actual 
themes and their quality. The quality of a theme was measured alongside its usefulness 
to the data and the research questions. Each theme or subtheme was placed into one of 
the three clusters (later, two clusters) to enhance coherence. The same approach 
enhanced coherency, consistency and the development of distinctive themes, which 
enabled the researcher to discuss the congruency between the extract analytics and 
claims. 
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Phase 5: Defining and Naming Themes 
Given that a theme is a concept that captures something important about the data in 
relation to the research questions and represents some level of patterned response or 
meaning within the dataset (Braun & Clarke 2006), the process of validating the 
potential themes led to data analysis, organisation of themes and description of the 
scope and content of each theme. This process helped the researcher to realise that the 
driving force behind the IAF achieving stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE is not 
the sole responsibility of the IAF. Linking data analysis to the conceptual framework 
showed the abilities and disabilities of the IAF and the organisations and empathised 
the necessity for studying IA and IAE considering institutional settings. Thus, the 
analysis led to two main clusters that are significant in IA and IAE and generated 
themes and subthemes that led to the conclusions presented later in the study. 
Phase 6: Producing the Report 
After discussing the data analysis and identifying the generated main theme and 
subthemes of the data, a thesis report was produced. 
4.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter detailed the research methods employed in this study. It explained the 
type of data collected using the case study design method. The description of the 
research methods explains why the qualitative approach was adopted. Further, this 
chapter discussed the methods used for data collection, with special attention paid to 
issues of reliability and validity, and it conducted thematic analysis of the methods 
used for data analysis. The next chapter presents the process of case study analysis. 
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Chapter 5: Case Study Results and Analysis 
This chapter analyses the case study evidence from the data generated regarding the 
IA practices of PSOs in Rwanda. Data were collected from multiple organisations that 
represent the public sector setting in Rwanda to analyse the business processes and 
institutional context of IA experiences in different categories of PSOs. The process 
was guided by two research questions that generated insights to inform IA research. 
Thus, institutional and organisation-level conditions were explored throughout 
interviews with individuals who were directly involved in IA practices and document 
reviews. The data analysis followed a six-phase process of thematic analysis based on 
Braun and Clarke (2006) to generate a study report (see Figure 4.2). The analysis 
considered the factors that influence IAE in Rwandan PSOs, IA experiences and how 
the IAF achieves stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. 
The first section explains the institutional background and reforms in Rwandan PSOs. 
It exposes the motivation for the reforms that led to the establishment of IA to create 
a platform for the conceptualisation of the study. It demonstrates the nature of the 
institutional setting by discussing institutional agents and requirements, how the IAF 
was established and how IAE is perceived in Rwanda. The following section presents 
an analysis of the information on IA practice in PSOs, focusing on selected cases. This 
section discusses different types of PSOs in Rwanda and how IA is practiced in 
different ways, and it compares IA experiences to facilitate an in-depth understanding 
of the study. The subsequent section examines how IA stakeholders perceive the IAF 
and the government’s contribution to its effectiveness. The last section summarises the 
study findings. 
5.1 Institutional Background and Reforms in Rwandan PSOs 
When the RPF ended the genocide against the Tutsi ethnic group and took office in 
July 1994, the country was devastated and became a collapsed state (Britannica 2010; 
Rosenberg 2014). Development aid in support of Rwanda’s transition to a peaceful 
and more prosperous future demanded better responses to state violence against 
civilians. The 1994 genocide taught Rwandans not to rely on external aid to solve their 
problems. Rwanda’s wariness of relying on external actors to protect its civilians 
created a reflective sense of responsibility. The moral lessons taught by the experience 
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of genocide provided opportunities for the Rwandan government to promote a strong 
agenda characterised by programs aimed at building a state that could manage crises. 
Along with the learnt experience, external support and influence from international 
lending organisations and development aid, the Rwandan government started to 
implement institutional reforms (Kumar 1996). 
Reforms implemented in collapsed and devastated systems aimed to rebuild an 
effective state, which required the implementation of bold development policies 
(ECORYS 2012). The policies used a systematic problem-driven approach to public 
sector reform, tackling all sectors at the same time. The main purpose of the reforms 
was to create a system that would help Rwandans overcome the irritations of old 
regimes, reduce corruption and create an effective and efficient state in which social 
services were equally shared. The desire to build a state that could manage crises led 
the government to employ a self-reliance approach in its systems. The government 
intensified awareness of self-reliance in its civilians and minimised the perspective of 
dependence. There is a constant campaign to initiate solutions for the problems arise 
(Fullan 2011; Golooba-Mutebi 2014). 
Attributes of self-reliance in Rwandan reforms have generated an inspiring slogan— 
‘Kwishakamo ibisubizo byibibazo bitwugarije’—which translates to ‘self-solution 
generators’. This slogan is cyclically reflected in speeches made by senior executives, 
such as His Excellence the President of the Republic of Rwanda, to motivate a mindset 
of urgency, ownership, responsibility and service (Chemouni 2016; Mpunzwanall 
2016). The motivation to be self-reliant has been imparted to the people of Rwanda to 
the extent that it has become a culture in which national systems and performers are 
naturally innovative. Underpinned by a strong ideology of national reconstruction and 
self-reliance, which called for efficient use of state resources, the government 
established policies and processes that facilitated the implementation of political and 
socio-economic programs. 
5.2 Overview of IAF in Rwandan PSOs 
Rwanda rebuilt its economy, peace and political stability, and it re-established macro-
economic and structural policies backed by a substantial legal framework (GOR 2006; 
MINECOFIN 2006), which is the same program that generated the IAF. Initially, it 
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was a unit in the Ministry of Finance known as ‘Inspection Générale des Finances’. 
The unit had three divisions, including one in charge of projects, another for public 
administration and the third for decentralised services (former commune and 
prefectures). The main role of Inspection Générale des Finances was to assess how the 
budget allocated in those institutions was used (Participant 3 Ministry, Head of IAF; 
OAG; OCIA). 
Reforms emerged with regulations that established internal control and internal audit 
in government (GOR 2003, 2009, 2011, p. 53). The IAF helps ministries, districts and 
agencies (MDAs) satisfy their statutory and fiduciary responsibilities and ensures that 
they use public resources effectively and efficiently. Government IAs must ensure an 
independent and systematic evaluation of risk management, control and governance 
processes in government (GOR 2011a, p. 53). The activities of the IAF in PSOs are 
generally cross-cutting, and its mission is summarised in Figure 5.1. 
 
Source: GOR (2011, p. 53). 
Figure 5.1: Mission of internal auditor in PSOs in Rwanda. 
Figure 5.1 presents the entire scope of the IAF in PSOs in Rwanda. This scope is 
expected for all types of PSOs, whether autonomous, semi-autonomous or non-
autonomous. The scope and approach of operations according to the document review 
show a plea for effectiveness. Regardless of the structure of the IAF in an organisation, 
every PSO must establish an IAF. Various types of IA are expected to be conducted, 
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including systems, financial, performance, compliance and forensic audits. The law 
requires IA activities to follow a risk-based approach (GOR 2011a, 2013b). 
The ministerial order defines what effectiveness means in the Rwandan context, stating 
that effectiveness is the extent of actual outcome relative to the corresponding planned 
outcome. That is, it is the degree of achievement of an activity relative to the plan 
(GOR 2009). This definition is slightly different from the perception of this study, 
which assumes that IA will achieve its expectations given the desired resources. The 
ministerial order does not define ineffectiveness in the Rwandan context. However, 
the definition of IAE in the Rwandan context is viewed according to the activities that 
are conducted in relation to expectations and how these activities are conducted. It 
does not consider why an IAF would not be effective. This study focuses on IA 
processes relating to institutional factors. It implies that an IAF that breaks through the 
odds of institutional complexities should be effective; otherwise, it is just an ordinary 
IAF. 
The government of Rwanda expects IA to provide value to organisations’ operations 
by providing objective assurance that the major business risks are being managed 
appropriately. Other expectations were that IAF would provide assurance about risk 
management and the level of internal control. For example, an internal control system 
is considered effective if it provides reasonable assurance that: 
 Government resources at the entity are used with economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness, and are consistent with the mission of the entity. 
 Government assets at the entity are safeguarded against waste, loss, misuse, 
damage or mismanagement. 
 Government programs executed by the entity achieve intended objectives, 
goals and targets. 
 The entity complies with laws and established regulations, policies, plans and 
procedures. 
 The entity’s management information and financial reporting are reliable and 
of high integrity (GOR 2007). 
However, this study interprets the description of an effective internal control system 
in the Rwandan ministerial order as a mechanism for engaging actors to be innovative. 
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Rwanda looked forward to an effective internal control system in its PSOs. The law 
bestows the responsibility of establishing and implementing an effective internal 
control system to CEOs and all other personnel in the organisation. It states that 
employees in an organisation are responsible for ensuring that internal controls are 
effective (GOR 2011b). 
The study interprets the government approach as creating institutional isomorphic 
pressures for actors within the public-sector setting. The process of an organisation 
responding to the requirements of institutional isomorphic pressures of an IAF 
becomes significant. Actors in PSOs seek IA services to achieve acceptability and 
legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, 1991): 
 Through the audit committee, the board of directors expects to receive 
‘objective assurance and consulting activity’. 
 Senior management expect to find ‘added value and improvement on 
organization’s operations’. 
 Auditees expect ‘help to accomplish objectives’. 
 Institutional agents expect to find ‘a systematic, disciplined approach to 
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, internal control 
systems and governance processes’ (IIA 2017). 
Government programs were implemented from institutional structures that were 
strengthened by compliance to several requirements prescribed to enhance 
effectiveness, transparency and accountability. This process was implemented and 
reinforced by complementary components that encompassed a range of activities, 
including planning and budgeting, budget execution and expenditure control, audit and 
inspection (internal and external), reporting and accountability, and oversight 
arrangements. Various reviews have indicated that the basic structures, systems and 
procedures, and the legal and regulatory framework are now in place to support 
government policies (GOR 2011a, p. 53). These arrangements are conducted in all 
types of PSOs— autonomous, semi-autonomous and non-autonomous. Adding to the 
external reviews, there are citizen outreach programs which are conducted by the 
president of the republic of Rwanda himself. The citizen outreach programs allow 
citizens to expose their problems to the president face -to- face. The citizen outreach 
programs are preserved like all other organisations’ performance evaluations and 
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PSOs’ leaders fear these confrontations because there are tougher measures that 
follow, like layoffs, forced resignations and imprisonment (Sabiiti, 2017; Mugabo, 
2017). That is why senior management officials and operational managers have found 
the IAF most significant. 
This study interprets government expectations of IA involvement in internal control 
systems as strengthening controls. Further, the government perceives that the IAF can 
break through the odds of institutional influences, and that it will have the capacity to 
achieve the expectations of an effective internal control system through risk 
management processes in terms of both their design and the implementation of the 
design (IIA 2009; Subramaniam et al. 2011a). The next section outlines the public 
sector institutional set-up. The setting illustrates several institutional agents that drive 
institutional requirements within PSOs. 
5.3 Public Sector Institutional Set-up of Rwanda 
The public sector institutional set-up provides the overall context in which PSOs 
operate and IA takes place. Enforcement mechanisms such as expenditure control, 
audit and inspection to enhance reporting, accountability and oversight arrangements 
originate from the broader institutional set-up. Figure 5.2 describes the agents that 
operationalise institutional norms in the Rwandan public sector, their relationship to 
the organisation level and the implication of the IAF. These agents are conceptualised 
in this study as external organs that interact with organisations that share the same 
institutional domain. 
The interview respondents stated that every organisation in the public sector—whether 
autonomous, semi- autonomous or non-autonomous—relates to and interacts with all 
listed organs in one way or another. However, the frequency varies, and the variance 
depends on organisational status and business. Table 5.1 outlines the relationship of 
institutional agents and requirements in PSOs and their purpose for interaction in the 
Rwandan public sector setting. This study only considers institutions whose 
involvement with the participating organisations affects IA activities. For example, 
OCIA is the overall coordinator of IA activities in Rwandan PSOs (see Section 5.4.4), 
whereas OAG, RPPA and RBPM are institutional agents for effective use of 
government funds to enhance accountability and equal opportunities (see Sections 
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5.4.1–5.4.3). Further, affiliated ministries enforce institutional requirements, whereas 
MINECOFIN coordinates budget and financial requirements. Institutional agents and 
requirements aim to enhance the consistency of organisations’ business activities with 
government programs. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Agents operationalising institutional norms in the Rwandan public 
sector. 
This study interprets that the government of Rwanda did not take for granted the roles 
given to PSOs. This suggests that the creation of these features contributes towards 
internal control systems in PSOs. This contribution is also interpreted as a 
premeditated effort in the process of organisational development and strengthening the 
institutional framework. Premeditation efforts aim to achieve organisational goals and 
ambitions using individual and/or collective organisational efforts. This study 
considers premeditation efforts an attribute of complexity for being aware of the 
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problems and weaknesses that may be present in internal control systems and laying 
policies to be more strategic (Beckert 1999). 
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Table 5.1: Summary of Relationship between Institutional Agents and 
Requirements in PSOs 
Institutional agents 
and requirements 
Autonomous 
organisations 
Non-autonomous organisations 
Semi-autonomous 
organisations 
Complete non-
autonomous 
organisations 
Office of the Chief 
Internal Auditor 
(OCIA) 
IAF may attend 
organised training 
IAF may attend 
training organised by 
OCIA 
Submit reports 
according to OCIA’s 
requirements 
All activities of IA 
are coordinated by 
the OCIA. 
Attend trainings 
organised by OCIA 
Office of the Auditor 
General (OAG) 
Conduct external 
auditor services on 
behalf of the 
government 
Conduct external 
auditor services on 
behalf of the 
government 
Conducts external 
auditor services on 
behalf of the 
government 
 
Rwanda Public 
Procurement 
Authority (RPPA) 
 
Audit procurement 
executions 
Audit procurement 
executions 
Audit procurement 
executions 
Results Based 
Performance 
Management (RBPM 
Performance 
evaluation is 
conducted by 
affiliated ministry 
 
Performance 
evaluation may be 
conducted by RBP 
Performance 
evaluation is 
conducted by RBP 
Administration 
requirements 
conducted by 
affiliated ministries 
Affiliated ministry 
may be informed of 
decisions made 
Affiliated ministry 
makes major 
decisions regarding 
administrative 
matters 
Affiliated ministry 
makes major 
decision regarding 
administrative 
matters 
 
With these features, the government is assured of its constant connection in PSOs. 
However, given that institutional rules are not always comprehensible to 
organisational circumstances (Beckert 1999; Scott 1995; Scott & Meyer 1994), these 
features instead create isomorphic pressures on organisations in the public-sector 
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setting. Table 5.2 describes the isomorphic pressures that are created, including 
coercive, mimetic and normative pressures. 
Table 5.2: Types of Isomorphic Pressures 
Institutional agents and 
requirements 
Process Type of institutional pressure 
Requirements 
determined by laws and 
regulations 
Determine the 
organisational status, 
administration structures 
and operational 
framework 
Affiliations create 
inflexibility and 
bureaucratic 
administration procedures 
that halt organisational 
activities 
 Coercive pressures to comply with 
rules and regulations established by 
the government to execute 
government programs 
 Normative pressure from the 
government, which continues to 
redevelop and redefine the legal 
framework 
 Normative pressure to comply with 
established standards adopted by 
affiliations that govern how 
operations will be conducted 
Institutional Agents 
(OAG, 
RPPA, 
RBPM, 
OCIA) 
Establish policies for 
enforcement agencies to 
conduct external reviews 
and evaluations of public 
sector operations 
 Coercive pressures regarding the 
presence of institutional agents that 
conduct external reviews 
 Mimetic pressures to adapt to the 
standards adopted by institutional 
agents that review the 
implementations of government 
programs 
 Normative pressure to comply with 
established standards adopted by 
institutional agents 
 
As institutional agents enforce isomorphic pressures to PSOs, the affiliate 
departments/functions to PSOs observe organisational connections as described in 
Table 5.1 to remain legitimate, relevant, accepted and trusted. Actors within PSOs start 
seeking IA services. This is relevant to institutional theory, which argues that in 
situations where the best course of action is uncertain, institutional entrepreneurs will 
initiate principles that are perceived to be productive. However, evidence shows that 
the level of IAF tends to lack exclusive control of the factors that determine its 
effectiveness in the highly institutionalised public-sector context of Rwanda. This 
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study shows that in the process to achieve stakeholders’ expectations, the IAF employs 
institutional entrepreneurship strategies. These strategies described in section 6.2.5 are 
designed to suit the prevailing circumstances of individual PSOs by their IAF. For 
example, demands initiated by institutional requirements to comply with the legal 
system create coercive pressures. 
When constrained by institutional demands operational functions, who are at the same 
time IA stakeholders within the organisation, seek advice from the IAF, which also 
initiates an alternative course of action to offer the help required. If advice offered by 
the IAF is considered and compels organisational success IAF is perceived effective. 
This suggests that effectiveness is determined by the ability of the IAF to initiate 
strategies that yield to organisational success. Implementation of IA advice by 
operational functions is test for IA’s ability. The effectiveness of these strategies 
indicates that the IAF has achieved IA stakeholders’ expectations. This implies that 
IAE in PSOs is dependent on the IAF and operational functions within the 
organisation. However, this study interprets the influence of institutional features on 
IAE as important for understanding IA’s relationships within organisational structures 
and the wider social environment in which organisational structures are established. 
Since institutional theory claims that changes occur in institutions that are failing 
(Beckert 2010; Sutheewasinnon, Hoque & Nyamori 2016), internal auditors are strong 
actors that can influence change as institutional entrepreneurs.  
The above explanations provide evidence that the IAF is not exclusive to achieve the 
expectations outlined in its role as a sole player. This evidence shows that efforts that 
lead to the achievement of IA stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE emerge from both 
the IAF and the IA stakeholders involved in implementing the advice sought from IA 
engagement. Nevertheless, organisational actors must understand the role of the IAF 
not waiting to seek IA intervention when organisations are challenged. The IAF also 
needs to offer advice that is suitable for actors to implement focussing on required 
remedial actions. The next section explains how institutional agents who create an 
opportunity for organisational actors to connect with the IAF to achieve stakeholders’ 
expectations hence IAE. 
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5.4 Role of Institutional Agents 
As stated earlier, government programs have been implemented from institutional 
structures and strengthened by compliance to institutional requirements and enforced 
institutional agents. Institutional agents are organisations that execute external review 
policies and ensure compliance with institutional requirements. The policies that 
establish these requirements aim to control and enhance the effective implementation 
of government programs. The agents are involved in managing risks, mitigating 
threatening practices and verifying the appropriateness of policies and procedures that 
PSOs adopt while executing their obligations. This exercise creates tension to all PSO 
in general with uncertainties that cause inconsistences and hence isomorphic pressure. 
The three types of isomorphic pressure (see section 3.3) and their effects (see section 
3.4) threaten the organisational performance. Intensified regulatory establishment 
require the PSOs to have IAF to help achieve organisational goals. According to the 
Deputy Auditor General no PSO wants to be involved misappropriation. Institutional 
agents related to the current study include the OAG, RPPA, RBPM agents (GOR 2006, 
2013) and the office of the OCIA, which coordinates IA activities for all PSOs. 
5.4.1 Office of the Auditor General (OAG) of State Finances 
According to the constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 4 June 2003 as amended 
to date, the Auditor General of State Finances conducts external audit activities in 
Rwandan PSOs. These activities include: 
a. auditing revenues and expenditures of the state, as well as local administrative 
entities, public enterprises, parastatal organisations and government projects 
b. auditing the finances of the institutions referred to above, particularly verifying 
whether the expenditures were in conformity with laws and regulations in force 
and sound management and whether they were necessary 
c. carrying out all audits of accounts, efficient management, control of the 
functioning of state organs and institutions (OAG 2016). 
The OAG of State Finances submits its audit reports to the Chambers of Parliament 
and provides copies to the President of the Republic, the Cabinet, the President of the 
Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General. The contents of the Auditor General’s 
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report include observations on the use of government funds and a complete report on 
the balance sheet of the state budget. The Auditor General’s report also indicates the 
way in which the budget was used, and the nature of expenses incurred, with a 
thorough examination of the misappropriation and accountability of resources (OAG 
2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). The OAG’s reports have resulted in normative pressures on 
PSOs because numerous professional weaknesses have been found. This forced the 
OAG to suggest that the government needs to strengthen corporate governance in 
general and specifically enhance IAE in Rwandan PSOs: 
There is need for government to strengthen corporate governance in public entities, 
ensuring that structures in public entities are effective. This included effectiveness 
of internal audit function through the office of Chief Government Internal Auditor, 
there is need to ensure effective oversight and coordination of government 
programmes by line ministries and regulatory agencies. (OAG 2014/15) 
The review by the OAG compels normative pressure on PSOs after failing to find the 
IA reports not useful during their review exercises. This becomes evidence that 
institutional agents rely on or use IA reports and acknowledge the effect of an effective 
IAF. This recommendation from the Auditor General’s report also shows the 
enforcement of normative pressures advocates for effectiveness which led to the 
revision of the IA structure in some PSOs: 
We understand the need and significance of IAF in public sector institutions but 
during our reviews we found that the quality of IA activities needed great 
improvement given what we found and what they reported. We are among the 
organs that advocate for IA structure reform. (Deputy Auditor General) 
The above statement as well as the interviewee agree that the OAG review sought to 
address this gap because the IAF was not achieving expectations despite the usefulness 
of their activities. The OAG expected organisations with an IAF to demonstrate 
relatively effective performance, but they did not. Thus, the OAG advocated for an 
effective IAF in PSOs. However, this is also evidence that institutional agents seek to 
find an effective IAF because of the perceived ability to use IA expertise during their 
exercise to examine the internal control system of the organisation while executing 
government programs. 
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5.4.2 Rwanda Public Procurement Authority Reviews 
Law N°25/2011, which establishes and determines the mission, organisation and 
functioning of RPPA, provides the requirement for auditing to be conducted using the 
methods of procurement proceedings and contracts. The implementation of public 
procurement proceedings is subject to regular monitoring by the RPPA to ensure 
compliance with the prevailing procurement legal framework. Every procuring entity 
and any entities in charge of contract execution are required to cooperate with the 
RPPA to carry out this mission (GOR 2003, 2007, 2009, 2011, p. 53). The RPPA 
therefore serves as another institutional agent. The interest here is how the exercise 
and frequency of RPPA audits within PSOs creates strain that results into isomorphic 
pressure.  Due to fear of bad reports being generated by the RPPA, operational areas 
seek IAF to review what RPPA will come to audit and this has enhanced the 
relationship between the IAF and auditees (IA stakeholders). The interview 
respondents demonstrated that: 
Other functions in the organisation used to see internal auditors as 
policemen/women, but nowadays the story has changed. There is team work and 
auditees consider IAF as colleagues/helpers. (Au Participant 1, CEO) 
Initially, IAF suffered a challenge of perception as they were looked at as ‘police’ 
by most public institutions. We felt this too as the OAG and eventually realised that 
the IAF suffered most because, the function was least understood even by some 
senior members of the institutions. IAF became actively desired when institutional 
agents frequented organisations. IA stakeholders in the organisation realised their 
claim for professionalism and ethics. (Deputy Auditor General). 
These statements indicate that the IAF was the least understood, but awareness was 
enhanced by the IA contribution as the necessity for collaboration soared. Internal 
auditors are no longer perceived as fault-finders: 
To date, that perception has changed and now IA stakeholders in some organisations 
have started looking at internal auditors as workmates, advisors and even 
consultants. (Deputy Auditor General) 
The fact that internal auditors were initially perceived as ‘fault-finders’ or acted like 
‘police’ does not mean that stakeholders did not need them. The stakeholders needed 
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IA services but awareness was minimum which isomorphic pressures have gradually 
changed. In the process of offering the operational functions to overcome the pressures 
internal auditors have apparently been perceived as workmates, advisors and/or 
consultants. This is evidence that the IAF employed certain strategies that were 
persuasive and influential to address stakeholders’ responsiveness towards IA. For 
example; 
Before the RPPA auditors start auditing an organisation, they meet with the head of 
IAF for the organisations they want to audit. This meeting is intended to share 
information on important issues that need special attention. The RPPA auditors also 
review IA reports before they start procurement auditing. (GOR 2013a) 
Analysis of the above statements shows that IA activities are not only valuable to IA 
stakeholders within the organisation alone but also IA stakeholders outside the 
organisation find them necessary to be considered during their work. RPPA auditors 
are after compliance to public procurement regulatory system for PSOs, monitoring 
and building capacity in public procuring entities. This exercise cannot be 
accomplished without help from internal organs.    
5.4.3 RPPA Reporting Levels Augment Normative Pressure 
The RPPA audit report is transmitted to the ministry of finance, which has the 
responsibility of public procurement, with a copy to the procuring entity audited. For 
Districts, Provinces and the City of Kigali, a copy is forwarded to the Ministry of Local 
Government for information (GOR 2007). The level of reporting regarding 
organisational procurement to higher authorities in the government generates 
isomorphic pressure to PSOs. This is because individuals and organisations want to 
maintain a clean reputation; every organisation wants to appear genuine; fear of 
inconsistencies make the operational functions seek help from IAF because they must 
ensure that they comply with the prescribed standards. The need for solutions compels 
the IAF and the operational functions to work together to initiate appropriate responses 
to these pressures generates. This approach creates awareness of the responsibility and 
support from each other. The auditee takes the lead and connects with the IAF to ensure 
that they receive a clean report but the IAF also tries to generate responses that would 
serve as a remedial action. This is because the IAF is perceived as effective when clean 
reports are obtained: 
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I was transferred from one department to procurement function. I was new to the 
tasks but entrusted to manage procurement activities of this organisation. When I 
started, I immediately received institutional agents’ notices. These were the RPPA 
auditors and another from the OAG. I know that reports by these organs are about 
the performance of the organisation to higher authorities within the government, to 
the Prime Minister’s office and even to the president. I approached the head of IA 
and he assigned a team to evaluate the internal control systems, assess compliance 
with the legal requirements and operational processes. After the IA evaluation then 
the institutional agents were let in and their reports were clean. From then onwards 
it became a habit to use IA to evaluate their operations before institutional agents 
and they have never got a bad report. (Participant 4Au, Auditee) 
These explanations demonstrate how the relationship between the IAF and auditees 
improved through seeking remedial action to isomorphic pressures. Collaboration 
generates favourable atmosphere for IA activities to achieve IAE. The relationship is 
a mechanism to respond to normative pressure. This response enhanced compliance 
with the procurement regulatory measure established to enhance effective service 
delivery and the use of government resources to protect government resources and 
ensure proper execution of government programs. Analysis of this perception shows 
that the response to isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell 1983) has created a 
platform for effective networking between organisational functions. 
5.4.4 RBPM 
RBPM was a policy implemented by government agents to assess whether 
organisations achieved their goals in the performance contracts. This policy is 
extremely serious because heads of PSOs sign performance contracts in a cerebrated 
function presided over by the president of the republic of Rwanda. This study interprets 
this policy in two ways. However good this policy seems to improve operations of the 
PSOs this study finds that it has scientifically become a platform for introducing 
isomorphic pressures into the operations of PSOs. For instance, the policy sets out 
guidelines for implementing RBPM practices in the Rwandan public service. The 
policy has concepts and principles that are fundamental to facilitating accountability, 
ownership, inclusiveness, alignment of operations to RBPM, evidence-based learning, 
transparency in operations and a culture of results. The policy is built on Rwanda’s 
ancient culture of performance contracts, ‘Imihigo’, where institutions or individuals 
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commit to deliver given targets in a stipulated time. This captures the broader 
framework that governs the national planning, monitoring and evaluation of 
government programs (GOR 2015). The policy necessitates planning, which is 
conducted by responsible institutions and provides systematic and harmonised 
mechanisms to identify priorities. The identified priorities are distributed in a 
cascading manner from institutional to individual employees in an organisation. These 
results-based performance contracts are designed to fast-track the delivery of 
interventions and the achievement of aspirations. Monitoring and evaluation is 
conducted on each contract, cascading from individuals to institutions (GOR 2015). 
The policy involves monitoring and evaluation frameworks, which are progressive 
across all sectors and institutions in the implementation of the results under the 
National Development Framework. The National Monitoring and Evaluation System 
(NMES) informs the national planning process and provides evidence on the 
implementation. Monitoring is conducted at the national, sectoral and institutional 
levels (MDAs). Monitoring involves collecting data and producing reports on the 
implementation of planned activities and results. Evaluation is also conducted at the 
national (national development strategy), sector and program or project levels (GOR 
2015). Ministries or parent institutions have the coordination role of monitoring 
progress against the execution of action plans for such institutions and their affiliated 
agencies. Accordingly, quarterly and annual reports are submitted to line ministries, 
which then consolidate the progress of their performance, including that of their 
affiliated agencies, and submit the reports to the ministry in charge of national 
planning. This ministry submits the consolidated reports to the office of the Prime 
Minister regarding the performance of the respective ministries and implementing 
agencies, together with agreed upon remedial actions (recovery plans) to address areas 
of weakness (GOR 2015). 
The RBPM policy for Rwanda has reward and sanction mechanisms for both 
individuals and organisational performance. The policy requires the production of 
reports that illustrate the best performance of individuals and organisations that are 
recognised and rewarded, while non-implementation is sanctioned for explanations 
and appropriate actions taken by the office of the Prime Minister. Responsible 
organisations consistently work hard to obtain reports without, or with minimum, 
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weaknesses. The policy then enhances competition perceptions within organisations 
in the institutional setting. Competition creates mimetic and normative isomorphic 
pressures regarding the need to provide quality products and services. This study finds 
that the process of responding to pressures creates strong internal connections within 
the organisation. These connections are enforced to enhance effective performance. 
The RBPM policy therefore creates isomorphic pressure on PSOs because the policy 
contains fundamental principles that help to achieve the goals set out in the Rwanda 
National Vision and medium-term strategy. These principles include careful planning, 
monitoring and the evaluation framework in the context of results-based performance 
(GOR 2015). Organisations are operationally stressed to achieve the signed goals 
which is coercive pressure, no organisation wants to be labelled with bad performance 
and since they are graded to achievement they are later compared at level of 
performance which creates mimetic pressure and they have standards to measure their 
achievements which created normative pressures. Organisations operate on fear 
because any of threats from isomorphic pressure. The fear compels the operational 
managers to connect with IAF. Yet, IAF is not an independent unit it is also part of the 
organisation and sometimes IA organisational level drive factors cannot support the 
function to help its stakeholders.  
5.4.5 Office of the CIA 
Government reforms and restructuring recognised the need for change from the old 
system of “Inspection Générale des Finances”. This was combination of both, internal 
audit and external audit roles conducted as one function and focused on the utilisation 
of budget allocated. Reforms and restructuring established the OAG and then a 
consolidating office of internal audit activities within government systems. This led to 
the establishment of the office of OCIA in the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning. The scope and mandate of this office focuses on the IAF in government 
budget agencies and all organisations that benefit from state resources. The OCIA is 
responsible for supervising and supporting all internal audit units in government 
organisations. The OCIA reports administratively to the permanent secretary and 
functionally to the Minister in Charge of State Finances (OCIA; Participant 2, 
Ministry, Audit committee). 
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The role of the IAF in Rwandan PSOs is described in the IA Charter designed by the 
ministerial order. The charter states that all internal auditors: should audit all activities 
of the MDA; possess full and complete access to all records, physical properties and 
personnel relevant to the performance of an audit; acquire full access to top 
management and the supervisory board; are entitled to appropriate resources, set 
frequencies, select subjects, determine scopes of work and apply the techniques 
required to accomplish audit objectives; and obtain full cooperation of personnel in 
MDAs (GOR 2011a, p. 53). However, autonomous organisations may make 
adjustments that suit their specific circumstances. Customisation of the IA Charter has 
created differences in the structure of the IAF in PSOs, whereby autonomous 
organisations must consider which provisions suit it best, unlike in semi – autonomous 
and non-autonomous organisations (OCIA).  
The interview respondents stated that PSOs are constantly frequented by institutional 
agents (OAG, RPPA and RBPM) (Participants 3, 4 Au, Head of IAF and Auditee; 
Participants 3, 4 Semi - Au, Head of IAF and Auditee; Participants 3, Ministry Head 
of IAF and Auditee; Participants 3, 4 Province, Head of IAF and Auditee; Participants 
3, 4 District, Head of IAF and Auditee). According to the interview responses, when 
institutional agencies (OAG, RPPA or RBPM) deliver the terms of reference to a PSO, 
the CEO instructs area managers to be audited to ensure that operations are conducted 
properly. The process of reviewing the operations of PSOs by institutional agencies 
generate mimetic, coercive and normative isomorphic pressures on PSOs. These 
pressures compel compliance to standards to achieve certain performance levels, 
whereas others require the accomplishment of certain governmental mandates.  The 
operational managers seek IA prior review to evaluate areas in the terms of reference 
before the institutional agencies arrive. This approach enables the organisations to 
obtain clean reports and enhance compliance with institutional demands because 
‘organisations that get sufficient help from IAF are able to get a clean report’ 
(Participant 4 Au, Auditee). 
Institutional agencies evaluate organisations’ internal control systems and risk 
management, and they examine and review annual operations from the past year of 
executing an act. The ability to have all PSOs externally reviewed is interpreted as a 
significant attempt towards institutionalisation. These reports are submitted to the 
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Prime Minister and the parliament; they reveal how government programs are 
implemented, how resources are used and the sustainability of continuous public-
sector development. 
This study interprets this approach as a provision of avenues for institutional pressures 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983, 1991) and institutional entrepreneurship at the same time. 
They lead to teamwork between organisations, the IAF and the use of IA resources in 
the process of implementing institutional entrepreneurship strategies (see discussion 
in section 6.2.5) employed by the IAF. The next section analyses IA experiences in 
multiple organisations within Rwandan PSOs. The analysis is conducted based on 
organisational type. With the help of the conceptual framework, the study captures 
important aspects about the data that are used as subthemes by examining how 
effectively the IAF achieves stakeholders’ expectations, therefore answering the 
research questions. 
5.5 Analysis of Case Study Evidence 
The analysis of case study evidence focused on reorganising the generated data and 
categorising aspects into codes to map the themes. The subthemes include factors that 
capture important aspects of IA experiences in relation to the research questions, such 
as IA structure, risk management, communication and professionalism, but focusing 
on the conceptual framework designed for this study. The themes and subthemes were 
generated from clustering codes that shared similar features. For example, factors that 
related to the IAF were clustered together. Analysis of the case study evidence 
explained the subthemes within their categories and the system of organisational 
affiliations usually used in the public sector institutional setting of Rwanda. 
The affiliations of PSOs are categorised into three segments: autonomous, semi-
autonomous and non-autonomous. All PSOs are affiliated with ministries, but the 
levels of dependence and independence determine the autonomy of the organisation. 
Autonomous PSOs are independently administered by their senior management and 
board of directors. The administration of other organisations is controlled by an 
affiliation with ministries, and some of their activities are partly monitored by other 
government organs (GOR 2011b). These organisations may be semi-autonomous - or 
completely non-autonomous. Semi-autonomous and non-autonomous organisations 
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are organised and operated for the benefit and in support of government programs, but 
they have no independence to make strategic decisions regarding major administrative 
matters. Organisations that are being developed towards independence are semi-
autonomous. Such organisations must constantly liaise with their mother organisation, 
which has overall responsibility for coordinating activities between the main 
organisation and the affiliated organisation (OCIA). 
Non-autonomous PSOs in Rwanda are ministries and government local administrative 
bodies, which include all districts and provinces. These interact with the OCIA 
regularly about IA issues. They submit internal audit reports to the office of the OCIA, 
which provides feedback. Internal auditors at affiliated organisations receive technical 
support from the OCIA, and the IA attends training organised by the office of the 
OCIA (OCIA). These types are distinguished by the legislature that established each 
organisation. Understanding affiliations and segments of PSOs in Rwanda helped the 
study to explain how the IA system in PSOs varies and operates. 
5.5.1 IAE in Autonomous Organisations 
Autonomous organisations are established as independent and self-managed 
organisations. IA activities at these organisations are considered low risk and 
sufficiently coordinated at the organisational level (OCIA; Deputy Auditor General). 
Autonomous organisations are managed by executive members and have a board of 
directors that performs the oversight role. Boards of directors are composed of both 
executive and non-executives. The chairman of the board may or may not be an 
executive member of the organisation. Such organisations have the capacity to 
generate funds for their budget, and they require no financial support from the 
government treasury (Participants 1, 2, 3 Au, CEO, Audit Committee and Head of 
IAF; OCIA). Instead, they generate income to finance government programs, and they 
plan and execute these programs without seeking approval from the affiliated 
ministries. The IAF in these organisations is designed and structured per the 
organisations’ business activities. The IA design is based on the organisational legal 
framework, performance evaluation and capacity development for IA staff, 
coordination and monitoring of IA activities and IA budget, which are all determined 
at the organisation level (Participants 1, 2, 3 Au, CEO, Audit Committee and Head of 
IAF; OCIA). 
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IA Structure 
The IAF in autonomous PSOs is a full-fledged department designed to meet the audit 
demands of the organisations (Participants 1, 2, 3 Au, CEO, Audit Committee and 
Head of IAF; OAG; OCIA). Figure 5.3 outlines the IAF structure in an autonomous 
organisation. 
 
Source: Rwanda Revenue Authority 
Figure 5.3: IA structure in autonomous organisations. 
Risk Management 
The IA structure of autonomous organisations shows distinctive roles at different 
levels of managing IA activities. There is a head of the department, a middle manager 
and IA team leaders for each IA team composed of two internal auditors. The structure 
depends on the organisational business processes. Different levels of hierarchy and 
their involvement in IA activities demonstrates attention to detail; hence, they are risk-
focused and help other functions in the organisation to mitigate risks (Participants 1, 
2, 3 Au, CEO, Audit Committee and Head of IAF; OCIA): 
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Our internal auditors are involved in risk management. We enforce their 
involvement in most risky area that we feel threaten the performance of the 
organisation. This helps us to mitigate the risks, which we feel that without IA 
activities our risks management potentials would be marginalised. (Participant 1 Au, 
Head of IAF) 
Considering the structure and this statement, it is perceived that the quality of work 
performed under this structure helps organisations to achieve their objectives. The 
quality of IA activities is obtained from effective coordination and is conducted and 
evaluated by different people who examine an item with varying perspectives. The 
number of people involved in an activity increases the frequency of conducting a 
review of the work completed. This approach leads to effective internal control 
systems and enhances effective risk management. Increased frequency also leads to 
constant monitoring of activities, timely execution of IA activities and mitigation of 
risks and attention to detail. 
Effective Communication 
IA activities are performed and communicated in a timely manner to facilitate the 
function to address urgent issues and keep abreast of actions: 
When we send internal auditors out on field work we expect feedback. They must 
report to their team leaders every day and the team leaders interact with IA manager 
who reports to me all the time after examining issues in detail. This helps us to 
address matters arising on timely basis and follow up on actions taken. (Participant 
3 Au, Head of IAF) 
Different levels facilitate effective communication and execution. This approach 
emphasises the significance of nearness to issues that matter, as well as timely risk 
management processes. When urgent information is generated, immediate intervention 
is possible. The head of the IAF has access and effectively communicates to different 
operational managers to prevent or mitigate the continuity of the risk (Participant 3 
Au, Head of IAF). However, senior management and the board of directors have the 
right to determine and provide required resources to achieve the organisation’s pre-
determined agenda. This creates an IAF that is imperious to institutional pressures and 
helps to achieve organisations’ objectives (Participant 3 Au, Head of IAF). 
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Professionalism 
Autonomous organisations have the right to hire the quality of staff desired for the 
IAF. They consider relevant qualifications required for IA activities, and their 
performance is evaluated and monitored intensively: 
I am evaluated annually by the senior management and the audit committee and I 
evaluate the IA manager and the manager evaluates team leaders and internal 
auditors on each team. However, even during execution of IA activities, I evaluate 
the quality of work performed by the entire departments and highlight areas that 
need capacity improvement. (Participant 3 Au, Head of IAF) 
Evaluation of internal audit staff and activities facilitates the management of the IAF 
to decide the training needs for individual internal auditors. This creates IA teams that 
can help the organisation to achieve its goals. The process provides assurance to the 
senior management, the board of directors and every IA stakeholder that the IAF has 
the capacity to achieve its expectations hence IAE. This notion therefore enhances trust 
and confidence, which is partly shown by involving the head of the IAF in senior 
management meetings at which organisational strategic matters are discussed 
(Participant 3 Au, Head of IAF). 
Compliance to Legal Requirements 
The IAF in autonomous PSOs complies with the organic law on state finances and 
property, the ministerial order on financial regulations and the Internal Audit Manual 
and processes and procedures provided by the Ministry of Finance: 
The senior management and the Board of directors have the right to adjust the legal 
framework of their IAF to suit their business process. They can revise the structure 
determine the levels of the IA staff and determine everything as far as the function 
can suitably positioned to achieve organisational objectives. (OCIA) 
This statement shows how legal challenges are managed in autonomous organisations 
to facilitate the IAF to achieve stakeholders; expectations. Thus, there are IA practices 
that are prompted by organisational factors to suit operational requirements. Further, 
the general considerations used while designing the IA legal structure are not 
applicable to all organisations in the institutional setting. Hence, capacity is granted to 
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autonomous PSOs to design additional legal requirements to suit organisations’ 
objectives. 
Coordination and Monitoring of IA Activities 
Coordination and monitoring of IA activities is easy because staff can attend to 
multiple activities in a fiscal year while simultaneously completing activities on the 
IA plan and the special audits assigned by senior management and the audit committee: 
We plan IA activities and ensure that we allocate sufficient time to work and 
development activities. Our internal auditors perform their activities here at the head 
quarter office and even to the branch offices. We encourage proper and alternate 
annual leave planning to ensure continuity of activities and attendance of trainings 
needed for continual professional development. (Participant 1 Au, CEO) 
This level of analysis outlines the systematic procedure of IA in autonomous 
organisations. There is consistent performance of IA activities, and optimum resource 
provisions enhance consistent timely executions and effective planning and 
supervision of IA activities. It is evident that the IAF has the potential to review several 
operational processes in a fiscal year; hence, some PSOs are less risky than others 
(Deputy Auditor General; OCIA). 
IA Reporting Channels 
The head of the IAF submits performance and administrative reports to senior 
management, and functional reports are made to the audit committee. The reporting 
frequency to senior management is weekly, monthly, quarterly and annually. Upon 
receiving the reports, the management provides feedback on IA performance and any 
other input or observations that concern IA activities: 
We find it necessary to provide feedback to IA reports and all other interactions they 
make so that they can help us better. We understand their role and the importance 
of our feedback in the performance of their activities. (Participant 1 Au, CEO) 
The audit committee receives functional reports quarterly and annually. Audit 
committee members meet quarterly or intervene when required by the head of the IAF 
and provide feedback on IA activities. The board of directors and CEOs in PSOs 
understand the role of IA, as affirmed by Participant 3 in the ministry, (head of IAF) 
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implying that management and audit committee support is easily obtained when sought 
because they are aware of the usefulness of the IA activities in the organisations. Both 
audit committee members and CEOs in autonomous organisations are nominated 
considering suitability of competence and individuals’ professional qualifications to 
organisation’s business: 
We know it is in our mandate to technically facilitate the IAF to improve its 
activities. (Participant 2 Au, Audit Committee) 
This suggests that the IAF can improve its performance given the support from 
competent personnel and at higher authorities. With the rich feedback received, 
constant supervision and monitoring the performance of IAF enhances the quality of 
work and IAE. This confirms the interview responses that autonomous organisations 
that have fully fledged IA departments are less risky (Deputy Auditor General; OCIA). 
Internal Audit Budget 
At the start of every fiscal year the IAF prepares its annual business plans under the 
coordination of the head of IAF. The business plan is then forwarded to the senior 
management to ensure that all the desired audit tasks are included on the plan and 
then approved by the audit committee. The approval of the IA business plan is made 
after considering the availability of all desired resources as they are influenced by 
the budget. Once the budget is approved, all the necessary resources are readily 
available when required for timely execution of internal audit plans. (Participant 3 
Au, Head of IAF) 
The budget of IA activities is prepared in the organisation together with other 
organisational functions. The only external actor involved in this process is the audit 
committee, which is also part of the IAF according to the legal structure (GOR 2011a). 
However, permission and authority for the IA budget process to be conducted in this 
manner is obtained through the legal framework of the autonomous organisation. The 
organisation does not seek external funding for its budget: 
Our organisation generates income for the government and we retain 2% of the 
money we generate. The retained funds are channelled into the organisational 
budget. Then we have the right to makes decisions of what should be done and when 
we should do what we think is best for the organisation. (Participant 1 Au, CEO) 
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This implies that their mandates are executed with minimum external pressure and 
financial constraints. Control of financial structures makes it easy to make substitutes 
and/or spread costs depending on urgency and unpredicted circumstances. This makes 
it easy for affiliated functions to perform effectively, implying that an IAF in such 
circumstances is likely to receive sufficient support to achieve stakeholders’ 
expectations. Nevertheless, institutional agents must still verify compliance with 
government policies. 
Collaboration of Organisational Actors 
Collaboration between actors within autonomous organisations is evident and issues 
that arise are facilitated by the power to make decisions by the senior management. 
The IAF is be facilitated by the legal structure, which allows flexibility to adjust IA 
operations to organisational circumstances. Effective collaboration with other 
organisational actors and flexibility of the legal structure helps the IAF to implement 
proper risk management processes, support internal control systems and allows 
consistence of the IA activities to achieve IA stakeholder expectations. Support from 
senior management with powers to make decisions hastens operational practices which 
also helps the IAF to be proactive in generating advice on effective business processes. 
The head of IAF is a member of senior management team which enhances timely 
communication. Timely communication enables IAF to build a trusting relationship 
with the top-level management when communications made by IAF improves 
organisational performance. IA stakeholders build a significant relationship with IAF 
when IA services deliver a new level of added value to improve internal control 
systems, the risk management approach and governance processes. 
For example, an autonomous organisation had a fast-growing information technology 
(IT) function. It faced a challenge that required making a provision that had not been 
budgeted for: 
Execution of IT processes in this organization is purposed to ensure that processes 
are more workflow-driven and can significantly benefit from the specialized 
software support tools introduced. We need constant assurance that software 
development enables delivery of expected services. The operations managers had 
shown some gaps in their expectations from IT function and auditing IT areas. We 
informed the head of IAF that we did not want the AOG to come and tell us that our 
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software development is not effective. The head of IAF informed us that we do not 
have competent staff to perform the current IT audit desired. This item had not been 
planned but because of urgency and significance of our IT systems towards the goals 
of this organisation, we decided as management and outsourced the IT auditors. 
(Participant 3 Au, Head of IAF) 
The head of the IAF, who was a member of senior management, provided a base for 
effective communication between the CEO and the IAF. The CEO had confidence in 
IA, so he invited them to audit before the external auditors arrived. The invitation for 
the IAF to conduct IT auditing shows that the IAF was perceived as a partner to achieve 
the organisation’s goals. Thus, a decision was quickly made to liaise with the director 
of finance and procurement to outsource the service: 
We were asked to conduct an IT auditing of our newly developed software, but we 
did not have competent people to conduct such an audit. I informed the CEO and he 
authorised the directors of finance and administration (procurement) to start the 
process of out sourcing. However, the CEO asked me to attach a team of our IT 
auditors to the outsourced team so that they can learn from them. Afterwards our IT 
auditors proceeded for professional training and now we have our own well-trained 
IT auditors. (Participant 3 Au, Head of IAF) 
The incident at the autonomous organisation is analysed and interpreted in two ways. 
First, normative pressure generated the desire to conduct the IT audit. Second, an 
institutional entrepreneurship strategy was employed in response to the normative 
pressure through collaboration and influencing operational functions and pulled 
management support. Collaboration was between the CEO and the head of the IAF, 
between the head of the IAF and the directors of finance and administration, between 
the head of the IAF and the IT auditors and between the IT auditors and the outsourced 
IT auditors. Expeditious outsourcing is interpreted as facilitation of management 
support enhanced by the power of management to make decision (organisational 
status). Alas, management support towards IAF is evident in facilitating internal 
auditors to learn from the outsourced IT auditors. The IAF moved strategically and 
advocated for improvement of IA skills and this is evidence for support for continuous 
learning to improve IT skills of staff within the IAF. This facilitation by the senior 
management does not only demonstrate that the nature of the institutional setting has 
minimum influence towards organisational factors in autonomous organisations. It 
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also implies that IAF in Autonomous organisations can develop to consistently 
perform better to achieve its stakeholders’ expectations hence, become effective. 
5.5.2 IAE in Semi-Autonomous Organisations 
Semi-autonomous organisations in the Rwandan public-sector setting are government 
organisations that have some degree of independence, but no rights of complete self-
management. They prepare their own mission objectives and action plans. The 
organisation generates funds and contributes to the government budget and has the 
right to retain 2% of its revenue for its budget. However, they have no administrative 
rights to make major decisions. Certain items await approval from the ministry to 
decide their inclusion on the budget. For instance, revising the structure of the 
organisation, making new investments, performing major strategic activities and 
amending or adjusting the budget must be considered and approved by the affiliated 
government agency, the ministry or both (Participants 1, 2, 3 Semi-Au, CEO, Audit 
Committee and Head of IAF). 
The semi-autonomous organisation in this study was a newly merged organisation that 
managed five government schemes that were once independent organisations. They 
were merged to ensure that the services and products provided were geared towards 
improving the quality of life for Rwandan people. The government made a beneficial 
decision for different organisations to become a single legal entity in the belief that 
expenses would be reduced through shared costs and duplicate services would be 
eliminated to offer better services through effective administration (Participants 1, 2, 
3 Semi-Au, CEO, Audit Committee and Head of IAF). 
IAF 
The IAF at semi-autonomous organisation is fully fledged. This implies that the IA 
structure has the positions for the IA staff needed in the organisation. And, the 
organisation has the capacity to employ them all because it generates its income and 
retains enough provisions for its expenses. However, the organisation cannot recruit 
the needed internal auditors for the deigned IA structure until the suggested structure 
is approved by the affiliated ministry. (Participants 1, 3 Semi-Au, CEO, and Head of 
IAF) 
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The above statement is evidence that this category of organisations (semi-autonomous 
organisations) have no discretionary powers. The management of such organisations 
has no authority to make decisions. For instance, the approval of the IA structure must 
be sought from the affiliated ministry. One would expect to find the same level of 
management, coordination and monitoring of IA activities as in autonomous 
organisations (as described in subsection 5.5.1) but this is not the case. Instead, semi-
autonomous organisations operate under bureaucratic controls (Weber 1978). For 
example: 
The head of IAF planned to conduct an assignment which required provision of a 
significant amount of funds. Management was informed, agreed and the item was 
included on the annual activity plan. When it was due to conduct an audit, there 
were no funds availed for the IA activities to proceed because the affiliated ministry 
had not approved. (Participant 2 Semi-Au, Audit committee) 
It is evident that administrative protocols to comply with legal requirements that 
establish semi-autonomous organisations hinder the operations of dependent 
organisations. Operational decisions must go through the ministry and/or other 
government agencies (Participants 1, 2 Semi-Au, CEO and Audit Committee) and can 
take more than two years to approve. This implies that planned activities are not 
executed on time: 
The board of directors and management revise the salary structures basing on the 
nature of business, competition in the labour market, cost effectiveness and the 
availability of resources but execution of such plan await approval even for such an 
organisation that can generate funds for its budget. (Participant 2 Semi-Au, Audit 
Committee) 
Although organisations have the capacity to generate funds for their budget 
requirements, management is limited because it lacks the power to make decisions. 
Decisions to acquire staff are made by the Ministry of Labour. The CEO, audit 
committee, auditee (procurement manager) and the head of the IAF expressed concern 
over these challenges and how they affect the organisation’s performance. For 
example: 
The organisation is currently not doing well and the main problem rests on staffing. 
They have less than half of staff required on the structure. Those who left have not 
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been replaced. They are doing very little work now. Yet this issue has been known 
for a long time which means that they are not working to the organisation’s 
expectations. The whole institution is suffering because of that not only IAF which 
we are talking about. It takes long as MIFOTRA wants to monitor the recruitment 
process. (Participant 2 Semi-Au, Audit Committee)  
It was generally observed that certain decisions concerning some public organisations 
are made by those with a responsibility to discharge administrative rights over them. 
For example, salary for employees of semi and non-autonomous organisations are 
determined based on the job classification and in accordance with general principles 
regarding salaries in public service. This results in high staff turnover from PSOs to 
the private sector or autonomous organisations. The interview responses showed that 
it is difficult to retain skilled and competent employees. The general principles of 
salary calculation in public service do not have the potential to protect the organisation 
from competition with autonomous organisations and/or the private sector 
(Participants 1, 2, 3 Semi-Au, CEO, Audit Committee and Head of IAF). The IAF 
becomes vulnerable in such an environment. 
If similar aspects in autonomous and semi-autonomous organisations are compared, 
there are differences in their attributes towards their contribution to 
operationalisations. For instance, even if semi-autonomous organisations collaborated 
or generated funds for their own budget like in autonomous organisations, the 
significance of collaboration within semi-autonomous organisations or generation of 
funds for their budget is be minimum because of administrative restrictions. The IAF 
must be painstakingly innovative to create problem solving strategies to achieve its 
stakeholders’ expectations in this constrained environment of semi-autonomous 
organisations.  
IAE Expectations 
According to the respondents, IAE expectations are applicable to all IA stakeholders. 
However, they stated that the environment at this semi-autonomous organisation was 
not conducive for IA activities because what affected the organisation also affected the 
IAF. The IAF exists anyway and was expected to help the organisation achieve its 
goals. IA stakeholders will always need IA services. However, they require an IAF 
that can understand the prevailing challenges that an organisation is facing and help to 
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achieve organisations’ goals. Other functions within the government need an IAF that 
can break through the complexities and provide solutions that will sustain 
organisations’ operations because the activities of other linked organisations do not 
stop despite the organisational challenges (Participant 1 Semi-Au, Audit Committee). 
For instance, the OAG must perform the oversight role for the government, while the 
RPPA continues to assess how procurement activities are executed and the RBPM unit 
also actively evaluates the performance of the organisation. Pressures exist, but the 
organisation must continue operating despite the imaging dynamics of the 
organisation, delays in decision-making of administrative concerns and insufficient 
staff within the organisational setting. Yet still, the board members (audit committee), 
CEO and operational managers expect the IAF to remain consistent with the role of 
IAF. (Participants 1, 2, 3 Semi-Au, CEO, Audit Committee and the Head of IAF). 
      However, staff from at least the middle managers are aware of organisational setbacks 
 (Participant 3 Semi-Au, Head of IAF). 
All interview responses showed that there was awareness and concern of middle 
managers about organisational challenges and the requirement to perform to meet 
government expectations. Further, the interviewees showed, that organisational 
setbacks do not stop or change their expectations of the IAF; instead, the services of 
the IAF are highly required, and there are strategic initiatives to overcome the pressure 
(Participants 1, 2, 3 Semi-Au, CEO, Audit Committee and the Head of IAF). 
The head of IAF at the semi-autonomous organisations explained that the senior 
management or board of directors in this organisation are limited by regulations 
that establish this organisation. The management has no capacity to decide on the 
IA structure and these have consequently led to: 
 fewer internal auditors compared with the number IA team required to 
accomplish the scope of IA work 
 insufficient resources to execute all the items on the IA action plan 
 high staff turnover of IA professional staff (3/5 internal auditors with 
ACCA had resigned and no recruitments were readily to be conducted) 
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 uncertainty for IA activities smooth progress since they are not sure when 
resources would be availed.  
The semi-autonomous organisation case studied showed no financial difficulties 
because the organisation retains funds from its business activities for its budget. The 
government believed that it would be beneficial to merge five different organisations 
to improve overall service delivery to the public. However, this level of analysis shows 
that the government’s purpose for deciding to bring about effective performance by 
merging the five government schemes was not fully supported within the institutional 
setting. The interview responses showed that constraints of the semi-autonomous 
organisation studied, which deter the achievement of its plans, are not financial but 
rather stem from the legal structure. For example, 
We are told that the responsible hierarchies understand the challenges that the 
organisation goes through but it’s now two years without any action because 
management and the board of directors are not final decision makers of what 
happens in the organisations. (Participant 3 Semi-Au, Head of IAF) 
This level of analysis facilitated comparisons between the autonomous and semi-
autonomous organisations which showed that the legal structure can affect IA 
activities and therefore influence IAE. The analysis of findings from the autonomous 
organisations showed liberty to adjust and modify their IAF to suit their operations 
which helps to achieve their goals. Whereas the operational system of the semi-
autonomous organisation is limited because the legal structure does not allow the 
management and /or the board of directors to make major decisions or exercise self-
management rights. The organisation was suffocating with the legal structure, which 
caused isomorphic pressure and responses that rendered the IAF ineffective: 
Given the few staff available we cannot go on with the ordinary IA activities. We 
have put on hold the items on the IA business plan and focus on what the 
organisations is doing right now. We conduct follow up of audit recommendations 
for the previous audits. We use the team members to review operations before the 
institutional agents come because for them they keep coming to monitor and 
evaluate the internal control system of the organisation. (Participant 3 Semi-Au, 
Head of IAF) 
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The above statement was analysed from the institutional entrepreneurship perspective 
and it was found that, despite limitations, the IAF in semi-autonomous organisations 
has not completely stopped helping its stakeholders to achieve their objectives. The 
statement reveals how the institutional entrepreneurship perspective stretches the IAF 
to interrupt the isomorphic pressures. The complexity which is evident in the statement 
above is that institutional agents would be auditing areas that IAF had not reviewed by 
IAF due to lack of sufficient staff. There likely hood of the organisation to obtain an 
unclean report. The IAF opts to conduct audits demanded by its stakeholders when 
institutional agents are about to come for investigations. 
5.5.3 IAE in Non-Autonomous Organisations 
The legal framework that provides guidance for IA activities is the same in all PSOs. 
The Internal Audit Manual and process and procedures provided by the Ministry of 
Finance are applicable to all government sector organisations (Participants 1, 2, 3 
Semi-Au, CEO, Audit Committee and the Head of IAF; OCIA). This study analyses 
the uniformity of legal application to all non-autonomous organisations as an avenue 
for mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures. Unlike autonomous organisations, 
in which the legal framework and IA process and procedures are revised to suit the 
organisational structure, major and minor changes are made at the approval of the 
board of directors. Non-autonomous organisations have no such luxury, yet their 
business operations and capacities differ. Any changes or proposals in non-
autonomous organisations must seek review, consideration and approval from the line 
ministry, or the request goes through the Cabinet meeting and/or waits for a replacing 
order from the Prime Minister. However, the IAF has the OCIA, who oversees IA 
activities for all PSOs (OCIA). The law does not permit decisive authority from the 
management of the organisation, the board of directors or the OCIA: 
The management makes administrative plans but lacks the power to make decisions 
that would enable acting on those plans. The senior management or Board members 
(or council for the sake of districts) do not have ultimate authority to make decision 
on the strategies and /or direct access to resources that would facilitate 
accomplishment of those strategies. (OCIA) 
This environment exposes organisations to the demands of strict compliance with the 
legal system in an atmosphere of institutional embeddedness. Non-autonomous 
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organisations are ministries, provinces or districts. These organisations are responsible 
for coordinating good governance and high-quality territorial administration programs 
that promote economic, social and political development throughout Rwanda. The 
next section analyses IA experiences from the ministries, provinces and districts. 
5.5.4 IAE at the Ministry Level 
A ministry as a government organisation has the responsibility of managing specific 
public organisations in its sector of public administration. The PSOs are affiliate 
agencies under ministries and the ministries enact and monitor implementation of 
government decisions under the affiliate agencies. Ministers are responsible for the 
effectiveness and efficiency of agencies within their portfolio. Working with the 
appointed heads of these agencies, they implement government policies and ensure 
that agencies meet their goals and purposes within their allocated budgets. An IA unit 
in the structure reviews and evaluates internal controls, risk management and 
government processes at the ministry level. However, regardless of the size of the 
budget for most ministries, they have one internal auditor for all activities in the 
ministry (Participants 1, 2, 3 Ministry, CEO, Audit Committee and Head of IAF). 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the IA unit at the ministry level and its reporting channels. 
 
Figure 5.4: IA structure at the ministry level. 
The solid lines on the figure indicate multiple reporting of an IA engagement to the 
permanent secretary (PS) and the audit committee. The dotted line indicates that an 
engagement is reported once to the OCIA. The IAF submits to the PS both the draft 
and final reports. Copies of only the final IA report are then submitted to the PS, audit 
committee and the OCIA (Participant 3 Ministry, Head of IAF). The ministry receives 
funds for its budget from the government budget (MINECOFIN). Supervision and 
GCIA 
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monitoring of IA activities, evaluation and continual professional development is 
conducted by the office of the OCIA. 
The analysis of this structure stumbles on quality of IA activities if it cannot support 
the IAF to accomplish it objectives. Evidence shows that there is one staff member 
within the IA unit.  This make one question how one person can have the skills and 
ability to review all the activities of an organisation given the different operations. This 
study interprets the approach as an ultimate challenge towards the IAF especially 
where the organisations must respond to coercive and normative isomorphic pressures. 
The coercive pressures are generated through institutional settings where there is no 
possibility of having more than one staff member on an IA unit. Nevertheless, the input 
generated by several reviewers of IA work should not be under looked, their input 
would influence IAE especially when the IA structure is reliable. Otherwise, interview 
responses show that the IAF is challenged when it faces insufficient resource 
provisions yet expected to conduct different types of IA activities at the organisation.  
However, amidst normative pressure for standardisation because different operations 
required to possess different skills and follow different standards, the study finds some 
evidence which shows that an individual’s character can be reliable when he or she 
receives feedback and input to IA activities from different people in the structure. This 
feedback helps to execute responsibility of IAF and overcome the isomorphic 
pressures. For example: 
I joined IAF when the organisation consistently received bad institutional agents’ 
reports every year. The operational managers were summoned over and again to the 
parliament to explain especially the findings in the Auditor General’s report. 
Sometimes the operational managers would be summoned by the organs in the 
prosecutor general. I worked hard to ensure that we minimised malpractices and the 
summoning stopped. There is more to be done for the institution but at least all such 
petitions stopped. The organisation had never had a clean report from the 
institutional agents especially the Auditor General’s audit report and the public 
financial management evaluation team. Now, the organisation has received clean 
reports from the Office of the Auditor General for three consecutive years, 2012–
2013; 2013–2014 and 2014–2015. (Participant 3 Ministry, Head of IAF) 
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This statement shows how an individual in the IAF improved the reputation of the 
organisation and stopped its staff from being summoned by the prosecutor general over 
misappropriations generated by institutional agents’ reports (OAG, RPPA or RBPM). 
The internal auditor stated that when he faced this challenge, he understood his 
relevance in this organisation and worked hard. This is evidence of the self-reliance 
attribute that was generated by the Rwandan reforms, which motivated urgency, 
ownership, responsibility and service (Chemouni 2016; Mpunzwanall 2016). The 
motivational attitude from Rwandan reforms helped to generate solutions for the 
problems that had perverted this organisation (Fullan 2011; Golooba-Mutebi 2014). 
However, this study interprets the approach as an institutional entrepreneurship 
mechanism through networking, adoptability, membership and standardisation. The 
internal auditor engaged the auditees and advised them to conduct multiple checks 
before submitting a dossier. Thus, the strategy of collaborating with IA stakeholders 
(auditees and engaging with senior management for support) eventually succeeded. 
This is evidence that the isomorphic pressures created a favourable base for 
organisational teamwork and collaboration because the auditees realised that the IAF 
was of help and continually demanded IA to review the operations prior to institutional 
agents (Participants 1, 2, 3 Ministry, CEO, Audit Committee and the head of IAF). 
This analysis confirms the response by Participant 2 Ministry (audit committee), who 
argued that IAF is well established and its effectiveness should depend on the 
individuals’ ability who performs the audit. Further analysis of this response 
demonstrates the need for institutional entrepreneurship attributes. The fact that 
Participant 2 insisted that the IA system is well built and strong enough to support IA 
activities in PSOs, this study translates that inherent challenges can be managed using 
innovation, creative and problem-solving skills initiated by individuals within the 
system. Institutional entrepreneurship attributes therefore, strengthen the IA approach 
to create a framework that facilitated the IAF to help the organisation achieve its 
objectives despite the challenges faced by both the IAF and the organisation. The IA 
approach however, requires the framework to combine efforts with IA stakeholders 
(e.g., senior management, auditees, audit committee and coordination with OCIA). 
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5.5.5 IAE at the Province Level 
A province serves as a coordinating organ to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness 
of central government planning, execution and supervision of decentralised services. 
It mainly serves as an advisor to decentralised entities and coordinates development 
activities. The governor of the province is the custodian of the authority of the state 
and the government’s delegate in the province. The governor of the province ensures 
effective execution of, and adherence to, existing laws and regulations; effective 
implementation of government programs; and all measures and initiatives to promote 
the general development of the province. The provincial coordination committee 
comprises the governor of the province as the chairperson, the provincial PS, the 
chairpersons of councils of districts that make up the province, the coordinators of 
departments in the province and the heads of decentralised services of the province. 
The main functions of the provincial coordination committee are to examine and 
coordinate all matters concerning the administration and development of the province. 
The provincial PS ensures the coordination of the administrative and technical services 
of the province (MINALOC 2011). 
The IAF at the province level coordinates all IA activities in all districts within the 
province and conducts audits of the province as an organisation. The provincial PS is 
the auditee when IA activities are conducted at the province level. Figure 5.5 displays 
the structure of the IAF at the province level. It has one internal auditor in the IA unit. 
 
Figure 5.5: IA structure at the province level. 
GCIA 
OAG 
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The solid lines indicate multiple reporting of an IA engagement to the governor and 
executive secretary of the province, and the dotted lines indicate that an engagement 
is reported once. The IAF submits the draft and final reports to the governor and 
executive secretary of the province. Copies of only the final IA report are then 
submitted to the OCIA and the OAG. However, the IA structure exposes the function 
to the challenges of capacity: 
We can’t complete what we plan to do in a year but when we are called to support 
IA activities in other areas it becomes even worse. We cannot even complete like 
50% of what we planned. (Participant 3 Province, Head of IAF) 
This statement shows that this framework is perceived with complexities, and it is 
difficult to facilitate consistency in the flow of IA activities at the province and district 
levels. Activities at the province level, which are reviewed by one person who must 
coordinate the IA activities of the districts, are exposed to isomorphic pressures in the 
IA environment. The process of coordinating IA activities in the region involves 
combining internal auditors to carry out audits that district internal auditors have not 
conducted. Although the exercise creates teamwork on an assignment, it stops ordinary 
district activities. The draft reports of such audit activities are issued to the governor 
on behalf of the province leadership (also known as the security committee), and the 
responsible district mayor is invited as the auditee. The final report is issued to the 
governor of the province, and copies are issued to the Offices of the OCIA and OAG 
(Participant 3 Province, Head of IAF). Analysis of IA experiences at the province and 
district levels shows obscurity at the structural level. For example, not only are the IA 
activities stopped in individual districts (Participant 3 Province, Head of IAF), but both 
draft and final reports are made to the same authority (governor of the province). The 
above statement shows that the performance rate is already low. This means that 
stopping IA activities significantly affects the performance of the IAF in the district. 
However, reporting to the same authority insinuates a potential conflict of interest. 
This study finds that this approach is an avenue for normative, mimetic and coercive 
isomorphic pressures towards these PSOs. Interview respondents stated that despite 
the one-person structure and demands to participate in IA activities of other areas, 
institutional agents, who evaluate performance and internal control systems and 
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execute government programs, are not stopped. Consequently, IA expectations are not 
met and IAF is considered ineffective: 
We have a challenge of responding to several requirements from multiple 
government organs that come to evaluate us. We are few on the team, we must give 
support any time we are needed at the province, yet sometimes we have not 
completed even our own work. (Participant 3 District, Head of IAF) 
This statement demonstrates the frustration of IA staff in the district. The complexities 
and pressure within the IA environment in the district is overwhelming because of 
workload. According to the District IA staff what she/he needs is not coordination to 
report what she/he has done but help to execute the expected mandate of the IAF for 
the organisation.  Thus, it is necessary to examine the IA structure and its contribution 
to IAE in PSOs. Although some audit committee members did not have any problems 
with the IAF and its structure with limited resource evidence from IA, it was criticised 
by the staff who performed the IA role. The legal framework that establishes internal 
audit activities is positioned so that the provincial regional audit function is static 
unless the law is revised by a ministerial order (Participant 3 Province, Head of IAF). 
More complexities were evident at the province level of reporting. IA reports prepared 
by the regional internal auditor were not reviewed at the operational level. Further, 
there was no audit committee or functional supervisor of IA activities at the province 
level. The draft report or ordinary audits conducted at the province level were issued 
to the governor of the province, with the regional executive officer as the auditee. The 
final audit report was issued to the governor of the province, the OCIA and the OAG 
(Participant 3 Province, Head of IAF): 
Senior management have the responsibility to enhance accountability and make 
effective use of the minimum resources that the government provides to execute its 
programs … I am lucky that he understands the role of IA; he is helpful because 
when I ask him to help me in the process of executing IA activities he does it 
immediately. (Participant 3 Province, Head of IAF) 
This study interprets the senior management acknowledgement and support of the IAF 
as efforts of institutional entrepreneurship through influence and networking to 
overcome isomorphic pressures. In the process of assisting the IAF to conduct its 
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duties, the senior management ensured that communal services were rendered as 
planned while simultaneously responding to isomorphic pressures. The support by 
senior management rendered to the IAF when needed, helped the IAF to remain 
relevant to achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. 
5.5.6 IAE at the District Level 
Reforms and decentralisation aimed to provide an integrated policy framework to 
clarify roles and responsibilities and ensure the efficient use of existing resources with 
clear goals, enhanced efficiency and equity in Rwandese service delivery. The IAF 
was introduced as means of enhancing accountability between citizens, policy-makers 
and service providers. The IAF at the district level facilitates monitoring and makes 
service providers more accountable (MINALOC 2011). Districts therefore exist as 
administrative organisations only in local government, with limited powers and 
responsibilities. However, they are responsible for implementing government program 
and development plans. 
The IAF at the district level is required to evaluate operations and help organisations 
achieve their objectives. Figure 5.6 illustrates the structure of the IAF at the district 
level, with 1–3 internal auditor(s) employed in the entire IA functional unit. 
 
Figure 5.6: IA structure at the district level. 
The solid lines in Figure 5.6 indicate more than one reporting of an engagement to the 
district mayor and district council, and the dotted lines indicate that an engagement is 
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reported once (these received final copies of the IA reports). The IAF at the district 
level reports functionally to the district council, which serves as the board of directors 
for the district. The district council has a subcommittee that acts as the audit committee 
and receives the final report of IA engagements. However, the IAF has access to the 
audit committee and can report to the committee all relevant matters. The district 
executive secretary is the auditee and receives both the draft and final reports. The 
final reports are then copied to the district council, provincial governor, office of the 
OCIA and the OAG (Participants 1, 2, 3 District, CEO, Audit Committee and the head 
of IAF). 
Review, monitoring and supervision are conducted by members of the district council, 
who serve as audit committees. These members are appointed for political motives 
rather than IA professional considerations. Performing as audit committee for the 
District council is a task assigned to the members later. Some of them have no 
background in IA. The other review of IA work at the district level is conducted by the 
OCIA upon completion of the IA work and the submission of the IA report. The OCIA 
contribution to IA report reviewed helps the next IA activity not the actual report where 
the need for collections would be found (Participants 1, 2, 3 District, CEO, Audit 
Committee and the head of IAF). According to the IA ministerial order, internal 
auditors in Rwanda have unlimited access to the audit committee, and their 
intervention is significantly evident in the approval of IA business plans and after the 
reports have been produced. However, the audit committee’s intervention is always 
sought when required: 
We have a challenge of the IA structure. For example, working alone on the IA 
structure in this organisation is quiet challenging, if am not careful and objectively 
focused I can easily be manipulated. I once conducted an IA assignment and the 
district mayor was not comfortable with the audit findings. He asked me to remove 
certain items from the report. I refused, then he threatened that I would lose my job 
and contacted the audit committee. When the audit committee intervened, the 
situation calmed down, I did not lose my job and the items in the report were 
maintained. (Participant 3 District, Head of IAF) 
This statement reveals the sentiments generated by increased isomorphic pressures in 
an embedded setting. The conflict between the district mayor and the internal auditor 
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is driven by isomorphic pressure. The district mayor wanted a false IA report to create 
a pleasant sense of identity to higher authorities as a response to coercive pressures, 
whereas the internal auditor was responding to normative pressures. The statement 
also suggests that the IAF has a sense of self-worth and aims to improve operations, 
which confirm staff motivation and a mindset of urgency, ownership and responsibility 
in service (Chemouni 2016; Mpunzwanall 2016). However, the statement reveals that 
there is a possibility of IA staff being manipulated. 
The challenges of the IA structure at the district level have been stated by institutional 
agents (e.g., OAG) who advocated for the IAF to have more than one internal auditor. 
This led to a few districts obtaining two or three internal auditors; however, some still 
have only one internal auditor, and even those with two or three are all at the same 
level. One was elected as the team leader, but there were no benefits attached to the 
role. This person was underemployed and did not carry out the leadership task. This 
implies that, despite the institutional agents’ advocacy, there is still no review or 
supervision of internal audit activities conducted at the district level. Lastly, three 
internal auditors are not sufficient for IA activity demands (Participants 2, 3 District, 
CEO, Audit Committee and the head of IAF). 
This suggests that there are normative pressures given the expectation of the IAF in 
organisations that engage in diverse activities at their operational centres. Critics argue 
that it is difficult to find employees with multiple qualifications to conduct or 
coordinate all activities. Thus, there is a higher possibility of dissatisfied employees, 
which leads to higher turnover of skilled staff (e.g., interview respondents at the semi-
autonomous organisation stated that they lost ACCA-qualified staff because of 
dissatisfaction; Semi-Au Participant 3, Head of IAF) and poor performance. As a 
result, stakeholders’ expectations are not achieved, and the IAF is therefore ineffective. 
5.6 Comparison of IA Features in PSOs in Rwanda 
The analysis of IA experiences in Rwandan PSOs involved reorganising the aspects 
into subthemes to show similarities and differences. This helped to determine 
significant similarities and differences in IA approaches that mainly emanated from 
the organisational setting. These determined the extent to which stakeholders’ 
expectations are achieved. For instance, interview respondents showed that: 
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IA is significant in all public-sector organisations of Rwanda. IAF has government 
support and most institutions understand the role of IAF and the established legal 
framework. Establishment of the office of the OCIA’s office is evidence for 
government support to strengthen IA activities in the country. The office of the 
OCIA provides technical support to IAF in PSOs. The OCIA has final decision on 
any decision that is brought to motion concerning IAF especially for non-
autonomous organisations. (OCIA) 
This statement suggests a shared interpretation and understanding that was previously 
discussed regarding the purpose of reform in the Rwandan government. It implies that 
there is commitment from the top, and the tone must flow to the lower levels. This is 
evidence of the development of bold policies (ECORYS 2012) by the government to 
create a systematic problem-driven approach in public sector reform. 
All interview responses showed that there is teamwork between the IAF and auditees, 
as well as management support, desire for higher-quality IA work, strong IA policies 
and enhanced compliance with IIA standards. Table 5.3 discusses the differences in 
the IA features in PSOs in Rwanda: 
All IAFs in PSOs employ risk-based approach and this is emphasised in the 
Ministerial Order N° 002/09/10. It is a legal requirement for IAF in PSOs to involve 
in risk management, internal control systems and corporate governance processes. 
(OCIA) 
This statement is drawn from the legal framework, which shows a corporate 
understanding of the IAF and how it should enhance public accountability, 
effectiveness and efficient management of public operations and good governance. 
The IA legal document sets out the basic standards and format with which IA in PSOs 
must comply. Included in the legal framework is the process for conducting IA 
engagements, the role of government bodies in IA executions and guidelines for the 
structure of the function (GOR 2011a, 2009). These elements facilitate the IAF to 
achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. 
However, the emphasis in the legal document does not always show in practice. The 
views expressed by the interviewees revealed that IA performance is associated with 
the structural setting. Table 5.3 shows the real-life IA experiences in PSOs in Rwanda.
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Table 5.3: Summarises the legal and operational aspect of IA in Rwandan PSOs 
N⁰  IAF  Autonomous 
organisation 
Semi-autonomous  Ministry Province District 
1. IA structure. The 
structure of the IAF 
depends on the 
ministerial order on 
financial regulations 
2016 (art. 115, 116, 
125…), Internal Audit 
Manual and process and 
procedures provided by 
the Ministry of Finance 
Fully flagged 
department that 
functions normally 
Fully flagged structure that 
awaits approval on several 
executions 
Note: 2 years of resource 
straggles (e.g., 
understaffing) 
One internal auditor for 
the entire institution 
One regional auditor 
for the entire province 
4 internal audits structured, 
but varying deployments 
as recruitments await 
approval of external organs 
Some still have 1 and 
others have 2 internal 
auditors 
2. Compliance with IA 
Institutional 
Requirements. Legal 
structure pursuant to the 
organic law on state 
finances and property 
2013, art.70; the 
ministerial order on 
financial regulations 
2016 (art. 115, 116, 
125…), Internal Audit 
Manual and process and 
procedures provided by 
the Ministry of Finance 
Independent and can 
freely revise the 
regulations and 
Internal Audit 
Manual and process 
and procedures 
provided by the 
Ministry of Finance 
where necessary 
Partially independent, but 
must obtain approval to 
implement significant 
decisions 
Complies with the 
ministerial order and 
Internal Audit Manual and 
process and procedures 
provided by the Ministry 
of Finance 
Complies with the 
ministerial order and 
Internal Audit Manual 
and process and 
procedures provided 
by the Ministry of 
Finance 
Complies with the 
ministerial order and 
Internal Audit Manual and 
process and procedures 
provided by the Ministry 
of Finance 
3. Reporting channels  Functionally to the 
audit committee, 
administratively to 
senior management 
Functionally to the audit 
committee, 
administratively to senior 
management 
IAF reports functionally to 
the audit committee, 
administratively to the PS 
IAF reports 
functionally to the 
governor and 
administratively to the 
executive office 
IAF reports functionally to 
the district council (some 
members are nominated to 
serve as audit committee 
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N⁰  IAF  Autonomous 
organisation 
Semi-autonomous  Ministry Province District 
No audit committee members), administratively 
to the district mayor 
4. Management of IA 
activities. Access to 
resources (e.g., budget 
for IA activities, capacity 
building and staffing) 
Independent 
Budget plans are 
determined by senior 
management and go 
through the approval 
process with the 
board of directors 
Budget sources are 
fully generated by 
the organisation 
Dependent on approval at 
the semi-autonomous 
organisation, the budget 
plans are prepared by 
senior management, go 
through the approval 
process with the audit 
committee and forwarded 
to the line ministry for 
consideration and more 
approval, although budget 
sources may be fully 
generated by the 
organisation 
Those related to the IAF 
are dependent on 
provisions from the office 
of the OCIA 
Those related to the 
IAF are dependent on 
provisions from the 
office of the OCIA 
At the province level, 
budget plans are 
determined by 
management and await 
approval from the 
Ministry of Finance 
Those related to the IAF 
are dependent on 
provisions from the office 
of the OCIA 
At the district level, budget 
plans are determined by 
management and the 
council and await approval 
from the Ministry of 
Finance 
District provides part of 
funds for its budget, but no 
district generates enough; 
they are topped up from 
the government through 
the Ministry of Finance 
Funds for the 
planned items are 
provided as they are 
due 
Dependent on approval; 
for semi-autonomous, 
staffing depends on the 
function’s design (e.g., 
head of IAF, managers, 
internal auditors), but has 
legal and budget 
limitations because 
recruitment must wait for 
approval from external 
organs (line ministries 
and/or government 
agencies) 
Dependent on approval by 
government; there is only 
one internal auditor for 
each ministry, but one IA 
can hardly cover the scope 
of IA activities in a single 
fiscal year; given different 
operations in the ministry 
that require varying skills, 
one can hardly possess 
sufficient skills to audit all 
ministry operations 
Dependent on 
approval by 
government; for 
provinces, there is one 
IA for the entire 
province, who must 
conduct audits for the 
provinces and 
coordinate audits for 
all internal auditors at 
the province level 
This is difficult 
because there is no 
Dependent on approval by 
government; districts have 
3 internal auditors in the 
structure per the legal 
framework—all at the 
same level; however, 
practically, some districts 
have staffing challenges 
(some still have 1 internal 
auditor, others have 2 and 
those with 3 have a 
challenge with review of 
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N⁰  IAF  Autonomous 
organisation 
Semi-autonomous  Ministry Province District 
supervision for audit 
functions at the district 
level to review and 
coordinate IA 
activities 
their works and 
supervision) 
Districts also have legal 
and budget limitations 
because recruitment must 
wait for approval from 
external organs (line 
ministries and/or 
government agencies) 
Head of IAF after 
evaluating staff 
performance and 
capacity 
requirements and 
considering the 
available budget 
Head of IAF after 
evaluating staff 
performance and capacity 
requirements, but must 
seek approval from 
external organs 
Centrally determined by 
the OCIA depending on 
the available budget at the 
Ministry of Finance 
Centrally determined 
by the OCIA 
depending on the 
available budget at the 
Ministry of Finance 
Centrally determined by 
the OCIA depending on 
the available budget at the 
Ministry of Finance 
5. IA Support Head of IAF, 
managers and 
internal auditors for 
day-to-day activities 
of IAF 
Functionally 
supervised by the 
audit committee, 
administratively by 
senior management 
Head of IAF, managers 
and internal auditors, but 
has legal and budget 
limitations because some 
executions (e.g., structure 
design, recruitment, 
conducting certain audits) 
must await approval from 
external organs (line 
ministries and/or 
government agencies) 
No review of IA work at 
the operational level; the 
only review conducted is 
on the report when the 
audit committee or 
management may have a 
query 
No review of IA work 
at the operational 
level; the only review 
conducted is on the 
report when the audit 
provincial governor or 
provincial executive 
secretary may have a 
query 
No review or supervision 
of internal audit activities 
at the operational level; the 
structure provides 3 
internal auditors for each 
district and all at the same 
level; review, monitoring 
and supervision are 
conducted by members of 
the district council who are 
tasked to serve as an audit 
committee 
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IA Structure 
The IA structure is one of the elements that shows significance differences. It is 
uniform for autonomous and semi-autonomous organisations, but different for IA 
structures in non-autonomous organisations (ministries [see Figure 5.4], provinces [see 
Figure 5.5] and districts [see Figure 5.6]). Details of the IA structure in non-
autonomous organisations were presented in section 5.5.3. However, having a fully-
fledged IA structure like it is at the autonomous and semi-autonomous organisations 
does not automate a criterion for influencing IAE. The interview responses showed 
broad differences between real life and what the framework portrays. The leafy 
framework that governs the organisation determines flexibility to facilitate the IAF to 
achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. However, the IA structure in 
autonomous and semi-autonomous organisations which appears similar in framework 
representation differs in real life practices. The demographic data on IA structure for 
autonomous and semi-autonomous organisations look similar, especially in terms of 
revenues principles and IA operational structures. However, they are different in terms 
of IA staffing setup and this influences practices. While IA operational structures in 
autonomous organisations are backed by the organisational autonomy of management 
to make decisions, at semi-autonomous organisations IA practices within IA 
operational structures are different because management decisions go through 
bureaucratic channels of organisational control. This process creates setbacks for the 
progress of IA activities. The interview responses show that the IAF in semi-
autonomous organisations succeeds by initiating solutions (Fullan 2011; Golooba-
Mutebi 2014) to overcome the difficulties faced by the organisation from institutional 
pressures. Thus, interpersonal interaction can lead to IAE (Lenz, Sarens & Hoos 2017). 
Compliance with IA Institutional Requirements  
Institutional requirements are described in the legal framework, which is generally 
designed pursuant to the organic law on state finances and property, the ministerial 
order on financial regulations and the Internal Audit Manual and process and 
procedures provided by the Ministry of Finance. However, some organisations (e.g., 
autonomous) were eligible to customise the requirements to suit their operations. 
Others had to seek approval to implement significant decisions. Approval was not 
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automatically granted but went through bureaucratic channels that sometimes impeded 
the operations of affiliate departments as the organisation struggled to comply with 
legal requirements. 
Management of IA Activities 
The legal system of Rwanda includes IIA pronouncements. The IA legal system states 
that IA practices in PSOs should conform and be consistent with the standards issued 
by the IIA (Ministerial Order N° 002/09/10). However, the application of these 
requirements is different depending on the type of organisation in the public sector of 
Rwanda, especially examining the IA structure of some organisations. Those with a 
unique IA structure find it difficult to comply with the legal/IIA requirement for the 
effective management of IA activities. For example, it is easy to deploy different teams 
to facilitate IA to focus on the entire scope of different operations of the organisations’ 
core functions, support functions and IT (Au Participant 1, CEO; Semi-Au Participant 
2, Audit Committee). One respondent explained that: 
Organizing IA activities in groups facilitates the IAF right from planning and 
deployment, capacity development, activity planning and generally coordination 
and supervision of IA activities. It is easy to plan for what we must do, deploy the 
resources available and supervise the activities. (Participant 2 Au, Audit 
Committee) 
This statement is applicable to the IAF with fully fledged IA departments. However, 
this cannot be implemented by IA structures whose resources are still disputable and/or 
all at the same level. 
Reporting channels 
Reporting of IA activities in autonomous and semi-autonomous organisations has no 
concerns but reporting of IA activities faces the same challenges as management of IA 
activities in non-autonomous organisations. The law requires audit findings to be 
formally communicated and signed by the head of the IAF and the auditor who 
performed the audit (Ministerial Order N° 002/09/10): 
a. Some IAFs have only one auditor; thus, they do not comply with two 
provisions noted above. 
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b. Others have more than one internal auditor, but all at the same level. 
A respondent stated that when a team of internal auditors does not have a lead auditor, 
they work individually, no one reviews their work, and they are scattered at different 
work stations (Participant 3 Province). This requirement is applicable to autonomous 
and semi-autonomous organisations in Rwandan PSOs. They are the only types of 
organisations that comply with this requirement, but it is assumed that the IA legal 
document for PSOs is uniform. 
Internal Audit Support 
In the interest of efficiency, economy and effectiveness of IA activities, the law 
established for IA in PSOs provides the requirement of an audit committee as part of 
the recipients of IA reports. The IAF in Rwandan PSOs get support from senior 
management of the organisations they serve but there are also audit committees in the 
structure of autonomous and semi-autonomous organisations, ministries and a 
subcommittee tasked with IA issues at the district council. The audit committee 
receives IA reports functionally and has the authority and responsibility to monitor IA 
activities (Ministerial Order N° 002/09/10). However, interviews with respondents at 
the province level revealed that in addition to having an IAF with one internal auditor, 
there is no audit committee in the structure:  
There is only one internal auditor on the IA structure for the province and we do not 
have an audit committee. We interact with the governor directly and the IAF in 
Governor’s office. All the interactions made with employees of the province they 
respond to governor’s office. (Participant 3 Province, Head of IAF) 
This statement not only shows a lack of compliance with institutional requirements, 
but it also creates ambiguity when seeking to understand the quality of IA work 
performed in such a structure. This implies that IA reporting channels in Rwandan 
PSOs differ yet in the same setting. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to 
examine how this difference affects the quality of IA work. Future researchers should 
examine the quality of work among varying structures given that the literature suggests 
that dual reporting channels can significantly improve IA performance (Abbott, Parker 
& Peters 2010). However, this level of analysis shows that some non-autonomous 
organisations are suffocating because of institutional requirements. 
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5.7 Summary of Key Findings 
This chapter presented the data generated from the interviews and document review, 
the data analysis and the major findings of the study. The way in which these findings 
answer the two research questions was shown in the analysis. For instance, the data 
suggest that the IAF is not a standalone function but affiliated with an organisation. 
Thus, the findings of this study focus on how the IAF achieves stakeholders’ 
expectations hence IAE, and it examines the contribution of efforts made by both the 
IAF and other performers to the organisational setting. The findings show that the 
benefiting actors must understand what IA is expected to do for them. This led to 
interpretation and analysis from the data collected, which showed that the IAF cannot 
achieve either IA stakeholders’ expectations or IAE by itself or to the exclusion of 
other organisational actors in the institutional setting. Figure 5.7 presents the data 
analysis and interpretation of the public sector institutional set-up and how it attracts 
organisational responses, showing how the IAF becomes significantly involved and 
influenced. 
 
Figure 5.7: Data analysis and interpretation. 
The argument embraced in this figure is that what affects the organisation affects the 
affiliated departments, which includes the IAF. Insights generated from institutional 
agents and requirements described the effects on organisational operations. However, 
among the technical and structural constraints encountered, the IAF is perceived as 
helping PSOs to achieve their expectation, although not necessarily in the manner that 
was initially anticipated. The change of approach, which this study has conceptualised 
as institutional entrepreneurship, has created a favourable arena for the IAF to achieve 
stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. The aspects focused on for this approach helped 
to cluster themes that reflected a coherent and meaningful pattern to answer the 
research questions. The major findings are summarised below: 
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 The public sector institutional setting is significant in achieving IAE 
 Teamwork between IAF and IA stakeholders is significant to achieving IAE in 
public sector institutional setting. 
 The condition and position of the IAF can facilitate implementation of 
institutional entrepreneurship perspective in PSOs. 
 Institutional entrepreneurship perspective can break the institutional obstacles, 
facilitates IAF to achieve stakeholders’ expectations and contributes towards 
the IAE in constrained organisational structures in the public sector 
institutional setting. 
The next chapter discusses the study’s findings. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion of Study Results 
This study has examined how the IAF in PSOs achieves stakeholders’ expectations 
hence IAE. The investigation considered factors beyond the boundary of the IAF and 
individual organisations and explored how IA performance can be affectted by the 
institutional setting. Chapter 5 presented the case study evidence using thematic 
analysis, which helped to generate subthemes from the re-arranged data relating to 
aspects that answered the research questions. The subthemes helped to explain aspects 
of generated insights by building on previous research of IA and IAE (Al-Twaijry, 
Brierley & Gwilliam 2003; Arena & Azzone 2009; Badara & Saidin 2013; Barac, 
Coetzee & Van Staden 2016; Endaya & Hanefah 2013; Mihret & Zemenu 
Woldeyohannis 2008; Mihret, James & Mula 2010; Yee et al. 2008). Hence, the major 
findings of this study show that there are variations in how IAE is achieved in PSOs 
in Rwanda as perceived by IA stakeholders. This study argues that factors behind the 
variations are grounded in the institutional setting. However, IAE remains significant 
in PSOs. This claim is generated from the findings of this study, which show how 
PSOs require IA provision for the continuous review of the effectiveness of risk 
management, control and governance processes. 
These findings were obtained to answer the following research questions: 
1. How effective are IAFs in achieving stakeholders’ expectations in PSOs? 
2. What factors influence IAE in PSOs? 
The researcher used the case study method to examine the relationship between actors 
within the institutional setting and the basis for their interactions. The findings show 
how the institutional setting of the public sector with established institutional agents 
and requirements influence social relations within and around PSOs. Institutional 
agents enforce institutional requirements to execute established policies within PSOs 
as they evaluate operations. Institutional requirements serve as isomorphic pressure 
drivers as organisations endeavour to comply. The significance of IAE is revealed in 
the way in which IA activities liberate PSOs in response to isomorphic pressures. 
Despite the impression caused by organisational responses, this chapter elaborates how 
these circumstances create an arena for the IAF to achieve stakeholders’ expectations 
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hence IAE. It also discusses the methodology used to explain the approach that helped 
to generate significant insights. The discussion of the methodology used for the study 
explains how the IAF achieves stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE by helping PSOs 
respond to institutional isomorphic pressures. The methodology discussion also 
explains a system of ideas and objectives that led to creation of a consistent set of 
research rules. The methodology section in this chapter considers the ideas and 
concerns that informed the research. The last section presents the chapter summary. 
6.1 Overview of Major Findings 
Driven by how the IAF achieves stakeholders’ expectations to understand how IAE in 
PSOs is influenced, this study examined internal audit experiences in Rwanda. 
Evidence generated from the data collected suggests that the institutional setting of the 
public sector contains factors that affect IA activities through the organisations served. 
These factors are composed of institutional agents that drive institutional requirements, 
which are designed by the government for effective implementation of government 
programs. Institutional agents are meant to drive these requirements within the setting; 
however, conflicts sometimes emanate from these demands because of divergence 
between institutional requirements and organisational circumstances. Organisational 
response mechanisms during these encounters create isomorphic pressures, and 
affiliate departments collaborate with the IAF. The IAF as an affiliate department is 
also affected by these circumstances. As IAF can fail to execute its role due to 
institutional circumstances but survives through its collaboration with other 
organisational actors who are at the same time the IA stakeholders. While helping them 
to achieve their objectives, the IAF also achieves stakeholders’ expectations hence 
remains relevant and becomes effective. 
The major findings of this study include, that IA in the public sector operates in a 
complex and interconnected institutional environment that tends to limit IAE in 
individual PSOs. This was evident within IA activities, which is why studies on IA 
and IAE should not underestimate the effect of this complexity and the interconnected 
institutional field of operation. 
Second major finding which builds from the first one is, that given the institutional 
field of operation, IAE should be determined by the achievement of IA stakeholders’ 
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expectations with consideration of the circumstances prevailing in the institutional 
setting. This is when the circumstances that influence the real-life experience of 
internal auditors are featured. Otherwise, if real-life experiences of internal auditors 
are not considered, insights that inform the study would not be captured and the 
information generated could be peripheral and not provide significant insights.  
The other major finding of this study is that the condition and position of the IAF create 
opportunities for institutional entrepreneurship in PSOs in the process of generating 
suitable responses to solve organisational challenges. The process creates 
opportunities IAF to conduct audits on demand. IA stakeholders are forced to seek IA 
intervention as they plea for side factors to ensure compliance with institutional 
requirements. The outcome of this exercise is that as IAF generates conducts the audits 
demanded, IAF achieves its stakeholders’ expectations. When the recommendations 
suggested by IAF are accepted and implemented and organisations obtain positive 
feedback from institutional agents and/or achieve their goals IAF is perceived as 
effective. Overall, institutional requirements have become helpful to the public sector 
institutional setting, PSOs and facilitate the IAF to be perceived as significant and 
acceptable. While the institutional agents are assessing compliance to institutional 
requirements in the operational setting, the process compel organisational functions to 
collaborate with the IAF and the outcome of this teamwork help overall achievement 
of the organisation and institutional goals. The next section discusses the study 
findings in more detail. 
6.2 Discussion of Major Findings 
This study provides a conceptualisation that generates solutions to setbacks that 
threaten the activities of the organisation but serve as an opportunity to validate IA, 
achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. IA experiences in Rwandan PSOs helps 
to understand how IAE should be perceived given the uniqueness of the public sector 
institutional setting, as discussed below. 
6.2.1 Public Sector Institutional Setting and Its Significance in IA Activities 
The IAF in PSOs of Rwanda is designed to operate under a uniform legal framework 
that determines its scope, reporting structure and status in an organisation. However, 
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these PSOs are established under varying status and operational designs (see Section 
5.5). All these organisations are designed for different business programs and have a 
different capacity in terms of operational status and the number of employees. They 
all have an IAF designed within the parameters of a uniform legal framework. The 
complexity generated from the design and legal framework is how organisations can 
differ in scope, structure, status, business program, capacity in terms of operational 
status and number of employees but have a similar IA legal framework. Understanding 
IAE in the public sector institutional environment helped to realise the difficulty of 
this phenomenon with varying organisational segments. The complexity also emanates 
from organisations’ variety, given their resource provision differences and the nature 
of the work. PSOs conduct programs with diverse schemes that involve different 
professions (e.g., IT, construction, health, marketing, education) and are exposed to 
varying budgets plans and allocations. For instance, a ministry has one internal auditor 
despite the diverse activities conducted to accomplish government programs; a district 
has an expenditure budget of more than US$10 million and the IAF has one or two 
internal auditors both at the same level. The complexity is that the structure is not 
suitable; one or two internal auditors cannot conduct required IA activities and its 
associated budget for an organisation with such diverse schemes. This study found that 
not only is a uniform legal framework not generally suitable for all PSO in an 
institutional setting but also 2 or 3 internal auditors cannot achieve IA expectations of 
an expenditure budget of over USD10 million in one fiscal year. 
Second, the PSOs differ in their purpose and set-up, even IA activities are conducted 
with differing operationalisation, but they are interconnected within their institutional 
environment. The interconnections are created by system designers to create strong 
organisational control systems that safeguard resources and help achieve government 
programs. For instance, other than autonomous organisations, the senior management 
of other PSOs does not have the power to make certain decisions; they must seek 
approval from either line ministries or other government agencies to perform certain 
duties. This requirement emphasises the need for organisational actors to focus on 
government programs, but it creates setbacks that hinder the progression of 
organisational activities. The IAF in PSOs is affected by this relationship because it 
operates under interconnections of a legal framework in the institutional setting. IAF 
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therefore suffers especially from time constraint and resource shortage if the concerns 
that need approval relate to IA activities.  
This study found that having a fully-fledged IAF can be misleading and misinterpreted 
as significant to achieving IA stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE if institutional 
setting is not examined. This is because the law that established the organisations in 
public sector setting determine the segment of that organisation; these may be 
autonomous, semi-autonomous or non-autonomous. The segment will also determine 
the IA structure such organisation should have. Having a full-fledged IAF can be 
misleading thinking that it is effective when it cannot achieve its stakeholder 
expectations. For example, the semi-autonomous organisation studied was fully 
fledged (see Figure 5.3); however, with several restrictions hence staff turnover in the 
IAF could not be controlled. The organisation could not retain skilled and competent 
internal auditors, which implies that factors that transcend in individual organisational 
boundaries shape IAE.  Internal auditors are recruited but later leave because of 
organisational restrictions that affect work continuity. In contrast, autonomous PSOs 
which provide a relatively more flexible institutional setting for IA activities can be 
more effective. Staff turnover is not a threat and has the capacity to attract experienced 
and professional people and retain them. These factors that create a difference in the 
work environment emanate from the law that establishes PSOs and cannot be 
understood without examining the institutional setting. Institutional setting is 
significant given that there are institutional requirements created by the legal 
framework which support some organisations whereas others are restricted. Yet, the 
purpose of the legal framework is to shape certainty in adaptable relations between 
substances and subjects. 
Institutional agents and requirements keep up with the ever-increasing demands of 
compliance to institutional expectations, and this creates complexity. Institutional 
agents (e.g., OAG, RPPA and RBPM) aspire for monitoring and evaluating, whether 
implementation is consistent with accomplishing government programs. Given that 
social factors which determine organisations’ conduct are volatile, consistency in 
better implementation of the legal rule is least expected. Therefore, the IA, which is 
an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity that is designed and 
required to add value and improve an organisation’s operations (IIA 2017; 
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Ramamoorti 2003), becomes most relevant. Nevertheless, the assurance and/or 
consulting activity that the IAF offers to the organisation to improve its operations is 
dependent on factors that transcend individual organisational boundaries. For example, 
a comparison of autonomous and semi-autonomous organisations that have similar IA 
structures show differences in the latitude of IA experiences and the approach to IA 
activities. Factors that rise above individual organisational boundaries such as the law 
that established them do not grant similar operational independence. These confines 
create variance in the performance of the IAF and express substantial influence on IAE 
at these two types of organisations. Studies on IA and IAE should not underestimate 
the effect of this complexity and the interconnected institutional field of operation. 
Understanding IAE PSOs requires consideration of organisational status and the 
institutional environment. Otherwise, institutional complexity tends to impact IAE in 
individual PSOs, which may not be directly evident within IA activities. 
The legal framework establishes explicit settings or restrictions that must be 
conformed within pursuing aims and objectives or gaining access to privileges. The 
legal rule states what should be prescribed as the conduct of the legal substances and 
subjects to which the law is applicable. The government establishes enforcement 
agencies that execute the requirements of the legal rule and affiliations that serve as 
administrators of the implementing bodies. The institutional agencies and 
requirements enforce the implementation of the legal rule in the same institutional 
field. This creates a setting embedded in interrelationships, connections and networks 
for different motivations, but with an aim to achieve government programs. However, 
although legal rule prescribes expected conduct, it does not determine the conduct of 
the actors, which is instead determined by many social factors that prevail in the 
institution and organisational setting. Social factors in PSOs relate to the type of 
relationship, quality and stability of social connections, participation, cohesion and 
usefulness of the work environment. PSOs and their affiliations pursue better 
implementation of the legal rule. 
Although the IAF is described as an independent function, its activities are halted by 
the interconnections of the organisations they serve. For instance, if organisations must 
wait for approval for budgeted items that concern IA activities, stakeholders will not 
appreciate IA performance and IAF will be considered ineffective. This therefore 
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becomes the platform for isomorphic pressures. For example, although professional 
requirements state that IA activities should be risk based (Spira & Page 2003), several 
risky areas cannot always be audited. For example, when the IAF is constrained by 
lack of resource provisions like it was evident in semi-autonomous and non-
autonomous organisations (see Table 5.3) achieving IA stakeholders’ expectations 
becomes difficult hence IAF considered ineffective. 
6.2.2  The Significance of Teamwork to Achieve IA Stakeholders’ 
expectations in public sector institutional setting. 
Several determinants of IAE have been suggested in the literature (Al-Twaijry, 
Brierley & Gwilliam 2003; Hanim Fadzil, Haron & Jantan 2005; Spraakman 1997). 
However, little attention has been paid to how circumstances prevailing in the 
institutional setting affect IA activities. The literature has not provided information on 
the real-life experiences of IA in diverse cultural environments and organisational 
variances in purpose, size, complexity and arrangements. The current study explains 
that undervaluing circumstances that prevail in the institutional setting while studying 
IAE is naivety. Explanations show that power generated by institutional requirements 
influence expectations of these requirements, and varying organisational 
circumstances and settings affect organisational responses. Given the complexity of 
the institutional field of operation and its interconnectedness, IAE should be 
determined by the achievement of IA stakeholders’ expectations with consideration of 
the circumstances prevailing in the institutional and organisational settings. 
The concept of IAE is cited by many academic researchers who point out that IAE is 
essential in IA (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & Gwilliam 2003; Arena & Azzone 2007, 2009; 
Barac, Coetzee & Van Staden 2016; Christopher, Sarens & Leung 2009; Cohen & 
Sayag 2010; Dittenhofer 2001; Endaya & Hanefah 2013; Paape, Scheffe & Snoep 
2003). This study argues that determining IAE after examining the achievement of IA 
stakeholders’ expectations considering the circumstances prevailing in the institutional 
setting is unbiased and open-mindedness. Paying attention to real-life experiences of 
the IAF helps to generate reliable information and provide significant insights because 
PSOs operate in a solid regulatory setting and have enhanced commitment to 
compliance (Pfeffer & Salancik 2003). A lack of consideration of the real-life 
experiences of the IAF in the institutional setting will lead to the generation of 
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peripheral outcomes. Thus, IA and IAE studies must pay attention to the factors 
surrounding the IAF in the organisation and institutional setting. Examining factors 
within the settings would help to understand how IAF and organisation are influenced 
to determine the level of direct factors that reveal IAE as shown in the literature; 
internal auditor competence, the quality and scope of their work, the organisational 
setting and operations, the status and structure of IAF, the IA relationship with its 
stakeholders, professional proficiency and the level of management support (Al-
Twaijry, Brierley & Gwilliam 2003; Arena & Azzone 2009; Badara & Saidin 2013; 
Barac, Coetzee & Van Staden 2016; Endaya & Hanefah 2013; Mihret & Zemenu 
Woldeyohannis 2008; Mihret, James & Mula 2010; Yee et al. 2008). Otherwise, IA 
research had not explained what IA would to do when ordinary circumstances are 
threatened. Understanding the institutional setting provides details on the factors that 
determine the perception about the IAF and achieving IAE. This is supported by the 
supposition that every actor in an organisation wants their existence to be perceptible.  
For example, the head of the IAF at the semi-autonomous organisation felt frustrated 
when resources could not be availed, and IA activities were on a standstill. The 
supposition of perceptibility makes it important to examine the surroundings beyond 
the IAF and the organisational setting. Perceptibility gives the impression that if 
studies on IA and IAE in PSOs do not conduct in-depth analysis of institutional 
settings, the actual experiences cannot be revealed and the effect of institutional 
influence on organisations in a solid regulatory environment cannot be understood. 
When in-depth and real-life examinations are not conducted in the process, generated 
factors would not show genuine causal factors. Information provided would be bare 
and in the open; hence peripheral and consequential. It is significant to consider that 
organisations that operate in a solid regulatory environment are expected to address 
multiple obligations, which sometimes leads to a predicament (Pfeffer & Salancik 
2003). Therefore, we cannot ignore that an organisation trying to satisfy certain 
demands in unfavourable circumstances can forfeit or sacrifice others. 
The findings in this study show that this kind of forfeiting affects the performance of 
affiliated departments to which the IAF belongs. Thus, while analysing the affiliated 
departments, it is necessary to understand the atmosphere of operation to generate 
insights from real-life experiences. For instance, studies at semi-autonomous 
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organisations show that when forfeited resources concerned the IAF, IA activities in 
branch offices were stopped for two years. At the district level, the forfeited demands 
to increase IA staff affected the IA and the planned activities were put on halt. This 
information was obtained after considering examining of the institutional set-up. 
Understanding the institutional setting helped to identify actors involved at different 
levels in the IA environment and their contribution to the scope of IA. The findings 
showed that none of the IA activities in PSOs were performed in isolation, and some 
were members or non-members of the organisation. The regulatory environment of the 
PSO links them as they strive to meet their individual statutory aims. The interview 
responses showed evidence that factors that transcend in individual organisations 
influence what they do and their interactions within the environment. For example, the 
IAF of the organisations studied was linked to multiple relationships for the execution 
of the IA role in organisations. The scope of IA activities covers all operations of the 
organisation, interacts with institutional agents (e.g., OAG, RPPA and RBPM) and 
coordinates with senior management and the board of directors through the audit 
committee. These relationships have an impact on the organisations’ operations which 
cannot be understood without understanding what the organisation goes through. 
Focusing on prescriptions of the factors generated from examining the formal 
organisational structures and effects of the structure and structural representation can 
be misleading. This is because both formal and informal structures are complex and 
many-sided. 
Considering the institutional setting therefore, helped to understand how relationships 
influence IA performance, especially in an institutional field of embeddedness. This 
approach helped to estimate the influence and implications that institutional pressures 
and complexities (Greenwood et al. 2011; Thornton 2004) can have towards 
organisational activities (Holm 1995; Mihret 2010), as well as consequences for IA 
activities. This study findings revealed that institutional pressures and complexities 
sometimes demand special attention because responses can sometimes conflict with 
organisational circumstances which IA literature had not provided. This implies that 
little attention has been paid to institutional settings, while studying IA and IAE which 
disregards informal interactions, networks, social influences and the control of valued 
resources. Yet, they have a significant effect on job-related perceptions in addition to 
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effects of traditionally emphasised sources of influence such as formal position and 
departmental affiliation (Ibarra & Andrews 1993; Pfeffer & Salancik 2003). This 
notion makes it easy yield intellectual findings from the natural setting of the IAF to 
reveal real-life experiences to establish how the IAF relates to achieve stakeholders’ 
expectations hence IAE. 
The IAE concept is important in helping organisations to achieve their goals (Cohen 
& Sayag 2010; Sarens 2009; Subramaniam et al. 2011b). However, despite this 
significance, IAE in action has been insistently debated by practitioners (Deloitte 
2010; Ernst & Young 2006, 2008; KPMG 2009; PwC 2009, 2010). This debate is 
generated by the disproportion between theory and expectations from IA activities and 
achievements. Studies have shown that IA often seems to over-promise and under-
deliver (Lenz & Sarens 2012). Using examples from Rwanda, reports from different 
anti-corruption organs (OAG 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016; OMB 2016; TIR 2016) and the 
media (Bachorz 2009; Emmanuel 2010; IGIHE 2017; Ivan 2016) show that Rwanda 
continues to deal with several weaknesses in the performance of audited PSOs. 
Although Participant 2 Ministry stated that the government has created a strong IA 
legal system that provides sufficient support to IA activities in every government 
organisation, issues of malpractice, which include the mismanagement of public 
resources, are still committed. The respondent’s expectations were like those of IA 
researchers who believed that a system of internal control would act as a deterrent to 
fraud and a protection against incompetence (Beasley et al. 2009; Gramling et al. 2004; 
Sarens, Abdolmohammadi & Lenz 2012; Spira & Page 2003). Given the dilemma and 
the essentiality of IAE, this study argues that, in the case of doubt in the effectiveness 
of IA activities, IA researchers and professional practitioners should seek to 
understand the institutional setting. It is important to determine how IAF achieves 
stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE to understand the institutional setting. 
6.2.3 The condition and position of the IAF and opportunities to break 
institutional obstacles in PSOs to achieve IAE. 
As discussed earlier, the IAF cannot achieve the expectations outlined within its role 
as described in its definition (IIA 2009, 2017; Ramamoorti 2003) as a distinct actor. 
This study shows that efforts that influence IA activities to achieve stakeholders’ 
expectations hence IAE are enforced by IA condition, position and collaboration with 
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other actors in the organisation. These features within the IA environment affect the 
design of IA approach for its responsibility towards IA stakeholders. The condition 
and position of IAF which would be made ineffective by constraints within the 
institutional setting are activated by collaboration with other operational functions to 
achieve institutional requirements driven by institutional agents. The process of 
examining compliance by the institutional agents is not always coherent with 
organisational circumstances leading to isomorphic pressures. Realities of lack of 
coherence with organisational circumstances create opportunities for institutional 
interaction and networking with IAF. The other functions within the organisation 
interact with IAF to seek help whereas institutional agents interact with IAF to 
understand the organisation’s internal control systems, level of risk management and 
governance processes. The position and condition of IAF facilitates the process by 
providing information that neutralises institutional obstacles within the organisation. 
This creates organisational coherence with institutional requirements in PSOs and 
helps IAF to achieve its stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. 
This study found that governments do not take the roles given to PSOs for granted. 
They create features that drive their efforts within the social environment of these 
organisations by executing external review policies. This is viewed as a government 
contribution and interpreted as a premeditated effort in the process of organisational 
development and strengthening the institutional framework. Premeditation efforts aim 
to achieve organisational goals and ambitions using individual organisational efforts 
and/or collective ones. This study considers premeditation efforts an attribute of being 
aware of potential problems and weaknesses in internal control systems and enacting 
policies to be more strategic (Beckert 1999). This attribute leads governments to create 
institutional environments with features such as laws, regulations and affiliations to 
ensure that there are constant organisational connections. However, given that 
institutional requirements are not always comprehensible to organisational 
circumstances (Beckert 1999; Scott 1995; Scott & Meyer 1994), institutional 
environments create isomorphic pressures on organisations. 
When features within the institutional environment enforce isomorphic pressures, the 
affiliate functions within the PSO seek help from organisational connections to remain 
legitimate, relevant and trusted. The institutional theory employed in this study claims 
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that changes occur in institutions that are failing (Beckert 2010; Sutheewasinnon, 
Hoque & Nyamori 2016), but there is a need for strong actors that can influence change 
to sustain these institutions. The findings show that this is where IA influence in PSOs 
becomes exceptional. An in-depth understanding of institutional setting and the theory 
facilitated the conceptualisation to investigate how IA initiates side factor strategies to 
help organisations respond to institutional pressures. Institutional theory also helped 
to explain how the situations created an opening that reinforced IA opportunities for 
PSOs to adopt suggestions made by this function, and hence to achieve stakeholders’ 
expectations hence IAE. 
This study therefore suggests that research on IA that seeks to examine IAE should 
use approaches that appreciate the complexity and real-life experiences of internal 
auditors given the IA condition and position. Yet, approached and theories employed 
by previous studies, like the agency theory employed by Adams (1994), a combination 
of theories employed by Endaya and Hanefah (2013), models developed by Mihret 
and Wondim Yismaw (2007) and Arena and Azzone (2009) and compliance with the 
ISPPIA employed by Al-Twaijry, Brierley and Gwilliam (2003), do not consider the 
institutional setting to appreciate the complexity and real-life experiences of IA. That 
is why this study finds that institutional theory which argues that in situations where 
the best course of action is uncertain, institutional entrepreneurs would initiate 
principles that are perceived as fruitful. Institutional theory therefore, helped to show 
how other function’s success would lead to their (IA) own success (Battilana 2006; 
Beckert 1999; Garud, Hardy & Maguire 2007). 
The response to isomorphic pressures demonstrated how institutional agents approach 
IAF to get awareness of how the organisation is managed whereas actors within 
organisations sought alternative course of action from the IAF. The study found that 
the IAF took the lead and initiated institutional entrepreneurs’ strategies that yielded 
to organisational success. Subsequently, organisational success through institutional 
entrepreneurs’ strategies facilitated the IAF to achieve IA stakeholders’ expectations 
hence IAE. This implies that IAE in PSOs is dependent on the IAF and actors within 
the organisation. There was no evidence of achievement by either the IAF or 
organisational actors independent of each other as far as IA and IAE was concerned. 
This study showed that achieving IA stakeholders’ expectations required 
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organisational actors to seek IA intervention. The IAF employed a suitable alternative 
course of action, but actors then had to implement the suggested remedial action. The 
findings showed that these moves were made in response to institutional isomorphic 
pressures. The study interpreted the isomorphic pressures within the institutional 
setting as catalysts that helped to reveal institutional entrepreneur attributes of the IAF. 
The IAF attributes generate IAE and the ability to influence stakeholders’ acceptance 
of the IAF. 
This confirms the proposition in the literature that institutional entrepreneurship can 
mobilise resources to conduct material actions (Battilana 2006; Beckert 1999; Garud, 
Hardy & Maguire 2007; Khan, Munir & Willmott 2007; Levy & Scully 2007; 
Misangyi, Weaver & Elms 2008; Mutch 2007; Zilber 2007). These resources can be 
intangible, but they also mobilise IA stakeholders (Fligstein 2001a; Garud & Karnøe 
2003; Levy & Scully 2007; Suddaby & Greenwood 2005; Wijen & Ansari 2007). For 
example, despite limitations caused by lack of decision-making powers, which 
hindered organisational operations in non-autonomous organisations, when the RPPA, 
OAG and RBPM required a review of these organisations, which enforced isomorphic 
pressures, the expectations of these organisations within the institutional setting 
remained the same and the institutional operations remained active. These 
circumstances instead created opportunities for the IAF to mobilise actors within the 
organisations. This approach helped the organisations to appropriately respond to the 
isomorphic pressures, which led to the IAF being accepted and adopted as a colleague. 
This study interpreted the IA mobilisations of IA stakeholders in the organisation as 
mechanisms to solicit resources to achieve IAE. 
6.2.4  IA and Institutional Entrepreneurship Perspective in PSOs 
Literature on IA has straightforwardly explained the significance of IAF in helping 
organisations achieve their goals (Sterck, Bouckaert & Scheers 2005; Vijayakumar & 
Nagaraja 2012). IA professional services in different types of organisational systems 
can be viewed in a comparable way for the emphasis of the need for improved 
accountability (Normanton 1966; Sterck, Bouckaert & Scheers 2005) which led 
internal auditors to be viewed as helpers (Al-Twaijry, Brierley and Gwilliam 2003; 
Bou-Raad 2000; Yee et al. 2008). This has made IA to be regarded as a service meant 
to transform the existing system (Dittenhofer 2001; Ramamoorti 2003; 
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Ussahawanitchakit and Intakhan 2011) so that it yields the expected outputs. However, 
consumption of IA services is dependent on the beneficiaries. They have the choice of 
accepting the risk of not acting (Standard 2500 and 2600, IIA 2017) but when the 
contribution from IA services is consumed is when the transformation takes place. 
Findings of this study show that if IA role and /or activities are least understood in an 
environment, utilisation of IA services becomes negligible and the function holds the 
lowest level of relevance. Nevertheless, this study agrees with the literature which 
provides that if the broader organisational agenda is oriented towards solving a 
problem to improve operations, responsiveness to solving problems becomes a 
common objective (Iyengar, Katz and Durham 2016). This argument explains why 
IAF is required to develop mechanisms that enable organisations to achieve their goals 
and add value to operations (Lenz & Hahn 2015). Especially, PSOs which lack 
coherence with institutional requirements due to organisations’ circumstances need 
IAF that have the capacity to help them to overcome the constraints exposed from lack 
of coherence that threaten organisation’s competence in the public sector institutional 
setting. This study finds that the prevailing tension draws the operational functions to 
IA services. The level of perception of IA stakeholders about IAF is therefore linked 
to the tension and IAE is determined by the capacity of the IAF’s innovativeness to 
create solutions to prevailing challenges and risks minimisation. 
This study draws ideas of institutional entrepreneurship perspective to explain IA 
innovativeness and creativity. This helps to demonstrate the IA’s attempts to generate 
solutions for the PSOs as an element of transformation of existing organisational 
practices. The transformation fostered by the IAF may not be necessarily a complete 
change to a new system or organisations but engaging a process by which functional 
systems are transformed and improved to generate valuable output. This study finds 
that the created approach has the capacity to stop organisational constraints, create 
coherence with institutional requirements to mitigate the risks of losing validity. This 
interpretation of the IA approach is in alignment with the description of institutional 
entrepreneurship which is provided by the literature; as a method where activities of 
actors who have interest in institutional arrangements and who pull resources to create 
new institutions or to transform existing ones (Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence 2004 pp, 
657). Ideas drawn from the theory of institutional entrepreneurship help to explain how 
internal auditors have become change agents and transformers. This study finds that 
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internal auditors engage in activities that help organisations to reshape existing 
practices. This approach helps organisations achieve their goals hence remain relevant 
to the public sector institutional setting. This study finds that losing relevance and 
failure to maintain coherency to institutional requirements is a big threat to employees 
in PSOs. This is because the senior government executives perceive that leaders of 
PSOs that do not maintain coherency to institutional requirements cannot deliver to 
their expectations. There have been tougher measures after evaluations of 
organisations’ performance. Negative outcomes from monitoring and evaluation lead 
to employee layoffs and forced resignations of senior officials (Sabiiti, 2017; Mugabo, 
2017) and senior corporate executives are being jailed for abusing resources and 
opportunities (BBC News 2010; Hitchen 2013; Mwai 2013; The East African 2016; 
Transparency International 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014). There is no tolerance for 
resources abuse where transparency and accountability are an institutional focus (see 
section 1.4.6 on the establishment of IAF in Rwandan PSOs). Losing relevance in 
public sector setting where the government is commitment to achieve the highest 
standards of accountability and transparency in public fiscal management threatens 
acceptability of the PSOs. 
This study provides evidences that demonstrate IA approaches with institutional 
entrepreneurship perspective. For instance, the semi-autonomous organisation and the 
ministry are evidences of organisations which were threatened by legal constraints but 
were required to maintain compliance with institutional requirements. The semi- 
autonomous organisations had lost consistency in its operations. The organisation’s 
lack of autonomy to make final decisions limited resources supply and influenced 
operational capacity in a negative way for all functions including the IAF. Yet, despite 
the legal barriers (see Section 5.5.2) IAF changed the approach, to solve the prevailing 
organisational problems and the semi – organisation maintained consistence to 
institutional requirements.  
The other evidence is the ministry whose reputation in the institutional setting had 
deteriorated. The organisation had not consistently complied with institutional 
requirements. The employees were being summoned by the government prosecutor 
general to give accountability of mismanagement of government resources and 
unexecuted government programs (see Section 5.5.4). The organisation was helped by 
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the IAF which changed the approach of the operational processes and the organisation 
regained its validity. This study finds that the IA approaches created change that helped 
organisations remain relevant. This finding is like the literature which states that 
institutional entrepreneurs are actors, who serve as catalysts for change and take the 
lead in being the forward motion and giving direction to change (Leca, Battilana, and 
Boxenbaum 2008). The crucial role of the IAF in the organisations they serve is not to 
implement the desired change, but contributing to its promotion through innovation, 
creativity and to enhance problem-solving abilities. This study findings show that 
internal auditors served as catalysts for change when they provided advice on the 
direction and process of change in response to organisational demands that challenged 
their existence within institutional arrangements.  
When the IA advice is implemented, it is not only a response to change of 
organisational circumstances. The process involves conversion of IA stakeholders’ 
perception towards IAF; renovation of relationships and levels of interactions which 
enhances teamwork within the organisation; and adaption of operational drive towards 
a common goal and ensure relevance to institutional requirements. These 
achievements from the internal audit approach make it suitable for this study to 
consider it as a transformation process. This study finds it significant to mention that 
effective IAFs possess institutional entrepreneurship perspective. This is because the 
process of an effective IA approach does not only help organisations to achieve their 
goals but creates change that transpires the entire organisation and goes beyond to 
influence all actors within the institution setting. This is relevant to the literature which 
puts forward that the explanation to the institutional entrepreneur's capacity to act as a 
catalyst for change is his or her legitimacy in the organisation, social position in the 
field, social capital and formal authority (Bruton, Ahlstrom and Li 2010; Battilana, 
Leca and Boxenbaum 2009; Breton, Lamothe and Denis 2014; Eriksson and Ujvari 
2015; Iyengar, Katz and Durham 2016).  
The evidence in this study shows, that the IAF in PSOs of Rwanda had been perceived 
as fault-finders (see Section 5.4.2) and there was no evidence of collaborated with 
other functions in the organisations prior to when they realised that IAF could be of 
help. This notion facilitated the IAF to attain its legitimacy, but the impact spread to 
the entire environment. This study finds that IAF was perceived as a significant 
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function after portraying its capacity as a catalyst that brought valuable change in PSOs 
of Rwanda. Multiple cases examined in this study show that an appropriate IA 
approach helps the IAF to maintain its validity. Consequently, the exercise leads the 
IAF to achieve its stakeholders’ expectations hence perceived as effective. 
6.2.5 The Influence of Institutional Entrepreneurship perspective and IAE 
This study found it significant that IA in PSOs can foresee, break away from patterns 
of behaviour (Dorado 2005) and champion positive change in a field of institutional 
embeddedness following the implementation of institutional entrepreneurship 
concepts. This finding contradicts the literature, which notes that actors who are fully 
embedded are not supposed to imagine, desire or realise alternative ways of doing 
things (Garud, Hardy & Maguire 2007). This argument does not confirm that IAF can 
influence complete change of an organisation processes to form a new one. However, 
based on institutional structures that define arrangements and limits of flexibility for 
actors within embedded institutions IAF can initiate innovative strategies that would 
lead to problem solving. It is argued that while enforcing inflexibility, dominant actors 
can force change but fails to instil motivation whereas minor actors are motivated but 
lack the authority to change institutions (Garud & Karnøe 2003; Garud, Hardy & 
Maguire 2007). The role of IAF enables conditions and position of identifying legal 
violations, processes that are not working, pulling resources and suggesting areas for 
potential improvement in an organisation. This discussion presents the uniqueness of 
the IAF as a minor actor in an institution but through skilfully integration should 
influence and have impact on organisational performance. This is achieved by 
breaking the odds of the public sector setting with its institutional embeddedness and 
creating change through engaging in actions with institutional entrepreneurship 
perspective. 
Prior research has noted that institutional entrepreneurs can be individuals (Fligstein 
2001b), organisations (Garud & Karnøe 2003), professions (Greenwood & Suddaby 
2006) and networks (Dorado 2005). This provision eligibly relates to internal auditors 
as institutional entrepreneurs regardless of their varying structures in PSOs (see IA 
structures Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5). This implies that activities of IAF can be related 
to institutional entrepreneurship perspective whether they are conducted by an 
individual or a team. This study therefore, discusses IA approaches employed by IAF 
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from the multiple cases studied comparatively to institutional entrepreneurship. This 
is intended to demonstrate institutional entrepreneurs’ actions with special 
characteristics, abilities and qualities (Garud & Karnøe 2003; Garud, Hardy & 
Maguire 2007; Greenwood et al. 2008) and consistence with the role of IAF. 
This definition helps the study to relate the special position for the IAF involvement 
and interaction with all actors within the institutional setting. This study finds that the 
position provides an avenue for which IA can provide an alternative course of action 
when IA is required to get involved to confront the challenges and create change. The 
change that IAF initiates would be of value as organisational goals are achieved 
through actions that transform the operations for better results hence IAF achieving 
legitimacy. Interestingly, this is relevant to the literature which provides that 
institutional changes ‘arise when organized actors with sufficient resources realize that 
they can use them to gain interest of higher value’ (DiMaggio 1988). This study 
suggests that sufficiency of resources for IAF can be relative. For instance, focusing 
technical skills and considering that achieving interest of higher value for IA is to help 
organisation achieve its goals which is achieving stakeholders’ expectations, hence 
being perceived as effective. 
This discussion presents circumstances whereby IA creates change with an 
institutional entrepreneurs’ perspective in odd situations. Initially, the environment 
was not conducive for IA activities. Internal auditors were perceived as ‘police’ 
(Participant 1 Au, CEO). The vulnerability of the IAF relates to operating from a field 
of institutional embeddedness. All actors, interests, goals and strategies are 
institutionally, culturally and historically designed (Friedland & Alford 1991; Meyer 
& Rowan 1977). Given the established legal framework of such a setting, sometimes 
organisations are constrained and seek protection from losing relevance from the 
setting. This section explains how IA in PSOs uses position and conditions to change 
patterns of behaviour in the field of institutional embeddedness and champion positive 
change through institutional entrepreneurship. 
Previous research has shown that conditions have been identified as a major focus and 
response to institutional entrepreneurship, and these conditions can be emerging, 
mature, stable or crisis fields (Greenwood et al. 2008).  Like all institutional 
entrepreneurs, internal auditors also find opportunities in emerging fields that take 
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advantage of influencing how structures should be designed because the legal 
framework had created barriers towards the established patterns and they could not be 
followed. This study emphasises that IAF which is traditionally considered fault-
finders (Deputy Auditor General) exploits crisis to create conducive field for being 
accepted by other functions within the organisation hence institutional 
entrepreneurship perspective.  
Evidence of this study show that when crisis occurs, and expose contradictions and 
highly structured tensions, IAF emerges with innovative, creative and problem-solving 
traits. This crisis is isomorphic pressures in PSOs caused by, for instance, 
overdependence on the affiliation or characteristics of bureaucracy which create 
avenues for the dominance of principles that are not coherent with organisational 
circumstances. It is a crisis because characteristics of bureaucracy and/or 
overdependence on affiliation affect the performance of affiliate organisations—for 
example, when management is given a mandate to accomplish a task, but they are not 
granted full administrative rights to make major decisions regarding the operations, 
like in the case of semi–autonomous organisations for this study, this study interprets 
that principles are not coherent with organisational circumstances. Consequently, the 
organisation lacks the flexibility to accommodate all the demands. There is 
inflexibility in the division of labour, compliance with rules and regulations and the 
persistent hierarchy of authority, which are characteristics of bureaucracy (Holton 
2013; Raelin 2011a, 2011b; Schibler 2012; Weber 1978; Yasuyuki & Olejniczak 
2014). Inflexibility hinders the revision of structures, programs and adjustments of 
operations. Hence affecting continuity of organisational operations which creates a 
crisis and limitation because of the uncertainty in the institutional setting (DiMaggio 
& Powell 1983). 
The literature shows that crisis conditions emerge with a lack of institutional practices, 
conflicting values and the absence of clearly identifiable norms (Garud, Hardy & 
Maguire 2007; Greenwood et al. 2008; Maguire 2007). These circumstances constrain 
organisations as well as the affiliate functions in the process of responding to 
isomorphic pressures, hence causing tension (Fligstein 1997; Greenwood et al. 2008), 
shock (Fligstein 1993) and prompting events (Rao & Giorgi 2006) that opt to pursue 
several arrangements to solve the problems. Solutions can be generated by actors with 
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special characteristics, abilities and qualities that are different from other functions in 
the organisation (Garud & Karnøe 2003; Garud, Hardy & Maguire 2007; Greenwood 
et al. 2008) which make IAF most relevant. It is important not to underestimate the 
effect of these pressures on the IAF because organisational limitations do not exempt 
IA activities. Yet, it is expected to perform as a tool for evaluating risk management, 
internal control systems and governance processes (IIA 2017) in such fields of 
institutional embeddedness. Thus, with the literature which shows that IA is sometimes 
marginalised (IIA 2013; Lenz & Hahn 2015; PwC 2013) that the IAF is not always 
effective (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & Gwilliam 2003a; Arena & Azzone 2009; Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2004; Mihret & Wondim Yismaw 2007; Zain, 
Subramaniam & Stewart 2006) organisational constraints become an arena to 
demonstrate otherwise. Practitioners have revealed this ineffectiveness, arguing that 
IAE in practice is debatable (Deloitte 2010; Ernst & Young 2006, 2008; KPMG 2009; 
PwC 2009, 2010). Until now, this study points out that IA researchers had not 
considered the effect of crisis in the IA environment and its influences on IAE, which 
is the current focus. 
The literature shows that organisations in crisis are often motivated to contemplate on 
several responses due to institutional pressures to initiate change (Greenwood et al. 
2010; Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen & Van de Ven 2009; Kraatz & Block 2008; Pache & 
Santos 2010; Reay & Hinings 2005). The findings of the present study show that the 
effect of institutional pressures is cross-cutting in an organisation. The affiliate 
functions or individuals in the centre of the crisis become motivated to initiate change. 
Once change becomes a solution to the crisis, its source (peripheral or major) is 
important. Previous studies have shown that when constrained, all that responsible 
functions or individuals look for, are actors that can create change. This study finds 
therefore that IAF in an organisation possesses characteristics, abilities and qualities 
that are different from its stakeholders within the organisation (Smets & Reihlen 
2012). 
Being considered independent by its stakeholders within the organisation creates an 
opportunity to achieve legitimacy. This agrees with the literature, which suggests that 
peripheral actors are disadvantaged by the existing rule system but are motivated to 
take entrepreneurial action (Smets & Reihlen 2012). This study therefore, found that 
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the IAF is suitable to initiate change because its position as a helper in the organisation 
and the conditions become an opportunity to exercise its role. What the IAF finds as 
an opportunity for IAF to exercise its potentials as a helper, this study interprets it as 
an opportunity to demonstrate institutional entrepreneur perspective and the 
organisation achieves its goals. The process of institutional entrepreneurship helps the 
IAF to achieve stakeholders’ expectations if the help offered is perceived as effective. 
The example of an internal auditor who helped the organisation to achieve clean 
reports from institutional agents for four consecutive years was perceived effective 
because operational staff had been consistently summoned by the prosecutor general 
of government for mismanagement of government resources. IA intervention was 
positively perceived and implemented and this brought change within the 
organisational performance. The perception of IA stakeholders towards the IAF 
changed because IA stakeholders could see the internal auditors as helpers. The 
findings of this case in this study show the characteristics, abilities and qualities that 
position the IAF as solution providers.  
When other functions perceive IAF as a problems solver that makes IA being sought 
after for assurance of risk management, control systems, governance processes and 
consultants by IA stakeholders. For example, all the auditees interviewed confirmed 
that they could not receive external reviewers before they are reviewed by their IAFs.  
Being sought after motivates the IAF to examine legal violations, identify areas that 
are not operationally effective, embrace networking and interaction to pull resources 
together. This helps the IAF to arise employable strategies that challenge institutional 
arrangements and suggest actions for improvement. When institutional pressures are 
put on a standstill IAF becomes relevant because they enforced operations to handle 
their challenges and its stakeholders perceive IA as effective which this study 
considered to be institutional entrepreneurship perspective.  
6.2.6 IA Strategies for Institutional Entrepreneurship 
When approached by actors from constrained circumstances of the organisation, the 
IAF finds it as an opportunity to re-establish a platform of influence by providing 
helpful contribution. The process generates strategies that position the IAF as 
consultants in areas that need change, prompting operational managers to cognitively 
reinterpret their organisation’s current situation (Ernst & Kieser 2002). This study 
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finds that the situations encourages the IAF to develop an institutional 
entrepreneurship perspective and strategies embodied in the process of providing IA 
services (assurance and consulting services) to the other functions within the 
organisation concentrate on influence for acceptability. This process of providing 
assurance and consulting services through the re-established platform creates 
foundation for employing strategies for institutional entrepreneurship and perspective. 
This study finds that IAF is successful at employing institutional entrepreneurship 
strategies through inspiring others and co-opting with them which is enabled by being 
members of the same organisation and with well-defined standards that persuasively 
enforce transparency. 
Consultancy Services 
Evidence in the study showed that when IAF was introduced in PSOs, other functions 
within perceived it as fault-finders who acted like police (Deputy Auditor General, 
OCIA, CEOs and Heads of IAF). With the emergent reforms in the country which 
introduced several institutional agents to monitor compliance with institutional 
requirements in all PSOs, all IA stakeholders now seek IA to review their operations 
before external reviews are conducted. IAF as consultancy service provider helps to 
reconfigure existing processes and advises the constrained functions to adopt to 
redefined organizational practices to achieve the organisational goals. Although the 
literature states that the IAF varies significantly among companies from a traditional 
assurance orientation to a value-added and consulting orientation (Nagy & Cenker 
2002), this study found that the IAF in PSOs continue to be trusted as consulting 
services providers. These findings resonate with the literature, which states that 
consultancies have been able to contact potential clients and apply their expertise to 
new types of problems that had traditionally not been open to their services (Ernst & 
Kieser 2002). However, the process of providing consulting services is primarily 
determined by the function in need of the service, and it depends on the type of 
isomorphic pressures to which the organisation is responding. This study’s findings 
showed that given the tension the pressures put on the entire organisation the IAF must 
provide advice about better trends of action. Despite the fact that some PSOs have 
legal constraints which weaken the entire operational systems including IA capacity 
through its structure and resource provision but can still be sought after every time 
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external reviewers are coming it is evidence for relevance. The actors involved 
examine the IA consultancies or advice against conditions, and once they are 
successfully implemented it motivates the beneficiaries to consider that the IAF is 
effective which this study interprets as institutional entrepreneurship. This study 
argues that IA consultancy serves as an institutional entrepreneurship strategy when it 
enables institutional and organisational conditions to influence strategic action, with 
an expectation of increased competitive advantage and economic rewards. 
Influence and Co-opting 
Responding to institutional constraints require resources. When other functions 
approach IAF seeking help, it becomes easy for IA to influence and co-opt them to 
participate in designing and implementing the suggested recommendations. This study 
explains that process as gathering resources to get things done focusing on improving 
the operations of the organisation. All cases studied showed that the process of 
generating suitable responses to the constraints that affect the organisations, the IAF 
collaborate with the beneficiary functions. This helps the IAF to identify weaknesses 
in the operations and beneficiary functions participate in generating ideas for 
premeditated solutions.  This study interpreted this process as IA call for intensive 
networking for consistent collaborations. The process creates strong relationships 
within the organisation and enhances teamwork which helps the IAF to incorporate 
required people from other functions into achieving its objectives. Incorporating 
people is helpful to include for instance management because the IA activities require 
support and resources. This study finds that this approach helps the IAF to overcome 
the constraints resulting from inflexibility of affiliate functions in PSOs. The process 
also helps the IAF overcome challenges of constant adjustment to bureaucratic systems 
within the surroundings to remain legitimate, relevant, accepted and trusted, and 
enhancing compliance with the legal framework.  
For example, when the internal auditor for the ministry was recruited and solved the 
problem of bad external reports, subsequent IA activities gained necessary support 
from the senior management, audit committee and all operational functions. When the 
IAF obtained senior management support, all other junior staff were convinced to 
liaise and collaborate with IAF. It became easy for IAF to suggest recommendation 
for improved action and responsible functions implemented them with haste. 
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Consequently, external reviewers obtained clean reports, staff were no longer 
summoned to the prosecutor general of government, and the organisation obtained a 
good reputation. The approach did not create a new system but transformed it to 
become a stream of fresh effort. This study finds that the approach employed, which 
created such an institutional capital that attracted the attention of significant 
participants and new talent of problem solving is of an institutional entrepreneur.  
Membership 
The literature has shown that membership strategies specify which organisations can 
legitimately exercise certain tasks and generate benefits resulting from their activity 
(Smets & Reihlen 2012). The IAF is part of the organisation hence a member, with 
certain levels of independence in its operations with objective to provide assurance 
and consulting activity designed to help organisations accomplish their objectives (IIA 
2017). Being a member of the organisation enables the IAF to understand the 
operations of the organisation, identify violations and areas that can be innovatively 
modified to reduce the influence of constraints which this study interprets as power of 
position. Further, it helps to initiate strategies (Lawrence 1999) to challenge the 
existing procedures that did not mitigate the risks that caused the crisis. Being a 
member of the organisation facilitates IA to initiate responses that are strategic, 
thereby avoiding counter-productivity to protect its occupational title, formal 
professional accreditation and reputation, and to serve as a representation of quality 
performance. In all cases studied, the IA stakeholders agreed that the IAF helped them 
to overcome institutional pressures. They used the reputation of ‘membership 
criterion’ (Smets & Reihlen 2012) to form a strategic alliance of managing institutional 
pressures. As the IAF must maintain its reputation of representing quality 
performance, it is exposed to strict demands to uphold the exclusivity of the circle. 
This study finds it is an institutional entrepreneurship perspective for emphasising on 
legitimation and reputation which created an arena of access to knowledge and process 
re-design in which best practices were created, validated or diffused (Suddaby & 
Greenwood 2001). This perspective facilitated IA to achieve stakeholders’ 
expectations hence IAE where organisational relevance in the public-sector 
institutional setting had lost its confidence. 
 
 153 
Standardisation 
Standardisation strategies describe what is typical for a practice, which makes 
membership and standardisation interdependent strategies. The literature states that 
they both promote and institutionalise consistent values of professional practice and 
service quality (Smets & Reihlen 2012). The study findings show that the execution 
of IA consultancy in PSOs follows a prescribed legal design that requires consistent 
compliance with the standardised legal framework and structures. IA also has got IA 
professional standards that must be complied with during execution of IA activities. 
This implies that consultancies offered by the internal auditors hence members of same 
organisation who understand all its corners there is consistence and promotion of 
standardisation. This strategy helps the IAF to gain legitimacy advantages and 
becomes more significant when the organisation to achieves its objectives. The semi-
autonomous organisation for instance, to strengthen the collective reputation and 
legitimacy as an IA in a newly emerged organisation was achieved because of dwelling 
on membership and standardisation. The organisation was in a crisis of inflexibility of 
bureaucratic mode of organisational control, the IAF advised actors in the organisation 
to use the available resources and focus on compliance with institutional law and 
regulations. Standardisation helped the IAF to identify areas of legal violations, 
operational areas that were not working well and suggested suitable areas of 
improvement. The IAF at the semi-autonomous organisations encouraged teamwork, 
acknowledged the impact of authority to get things done.   
Regulations that govern the IAF are well set and demonstrate the indispensability of 
professionalism and compliance with policies and regulations. The IAF consistently 
followed up its recommendations, and the organisation continued operating regardless 
of delayed approvals and the provision of resources. In line with the institutional 
entrepreneurship perspective, this shows that the standardisation strategy was effective 
for the IAF to appear as a strong entrepreneur. The IAF used restrained alternatives to 
exercise its role and changed the perception of IA stakeholders as they achieved their 
goals. In this context, the creation of alternative methods of performance constitutes a 
standardisation strategy. Within this field, the IAF status enhances the effect and 
‘positive normative emulation’ of the ideas (Suchman 1995). Thus, provided 
alternatives become socially created business solutions. This implies that if the IAF 
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successfully establishes its own concepts or procedures that help the organisation 
achieve its objectives in a crisis, its own position is strengthened and can influence 
others with its strong strategies. 
Influence 
The literature also suggests that an influence strategy with a fundamental attitude can 
provide consultancy services with normative and eventually cognitive legitimacy 
(Røvik 2002; Suchman 1995). In the present study, IA at the ministry level helped to 
achieve clean reports from institutional agents through the influence strategy, and it 
empowered IA stakeholders within the organisation. This was facilitated by 
isomorphic pressures, which emphasised standardisation and required actors to 
execute what IAF suggested. For example: 
 IA used logical persuasion and expertise to convince IA stakeholders to agree 
with IA suggestions. 
 As IA is part of the organisation, it is aware of what goes on. This makes it 
easy to identify risky areas and key actors, and to obtain their support. It was 
easy to employ interpersonal awareness, which helped to relate to actors’ 
concerns and their ideas to address the concerns. 
 As IA provided a consultancy, it built a relationship with the actors. These 
relationships facilitated the IAF to obtain access to information and 
communication. Once there is effective communication, it is easy for the IAF 
to make requests and bargain to obtain support and/or resources. 
 It was easy for the IAF to employ the empowerment strategy because it was 
not supposed to be involved in operations. The process of letting others conduct 
the tasks made them feel valued because their own decision was being 
executed. 
Given the outline of the above strategies employed by the IAF to influence IA 
stakeholders in the organisations, the interviewee showed that the influence strategy 
was achieved through manipulation. However, people were manipulated because of 
the positive influence that IA performance had in the organisation. The findings 
showed that successful influence depends on positive perceptions of both the IAF and 
its counterparts as they engaged to achieve organisational objectives. This is directly 
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related to the literature which suggests that fresh innovations of entrepreneurial efforts 
spread to social groups and new mobilized legitimacies are created (Garud, Hardy & 
Maguire 2007).  Similarly, to this study, interview evidence showed that positive 
perception was achieved in previous engagements that successfully influenced the 
achievements in the organisation. For example, the attainment of a clean report from 
institutional agents for four consecutive years was desired by this constrained 
organisation. This study finds that attainment of clean reports became reason for the 
IAF to be well perceived by other organisational actors. Research confirms that active 
engagement in society and the environment influence management with traditional 
norms (Smets & Reihlen 2012). 
By employing institutional entrepreneurship techniques, IA could use material or 
cultural resources to justify and encourage change and expose contradictions in logic. 
However, the IAF was functionally motivated by creating its own legitimacy and 
acceptance, considering the literature Garud, Hardy & Maguire (2007). This implies 
that isomorphic pressures, which facilitated IA being sought by its stakeholders in the 
organisation for help, were an opportunity for IA to exercise its role and be accepted; 
consequently, its perceived description as ‘police’ was erased. As stakeholders 
accumulate desired information, it amounts to evidence for relying on the IAF hence 
perceiving a good reputation. Figure 6.2 shows that the social context was not always 
favourable for the IAF. This social perspective aligns with the literature, which shows 
that entrepreneurs are exposed to several constraints in their social network, but they 
are sought after to help others. The process of helping others to achieve their objectives 
enables entrepreneurs to achieve legitimacy and acceptance (Aldrich & Fiol 2007). 
The findings in the present study show that internal auditors are sought by actors who 
need help to overcome isomorphic pressures from the institutional setting. 
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Figure 6.1: IA social context and entrepreneurs. 
This implies that institutional entrepreneurship in PSOs is a mechanism played by 
more than one actor. There must be interest to change, actors who seek help and others 
who offer help then implementers of change. For the outcome of institutional 
entrepreneurs to be realised, the help that is sought must be implemented. However, 
because the IAF is supposed to refrain from assessing specific operations for which 
they were previously responsible (IIA standard 1130), the help seekers are 
simultaneously implementers. The research suggests that actors must fulfil two 
conditions: they must seek help and they must actively participate in the 
implementation of these changes (Battilana, Leca & Boxenbaum 2009). This implies 
that when actors implement the changes, they accept that the changes meet their 
expectations. This study determines that the process of breaking through isomorphic 
pressures to achieve actors’ expectations is a journey towards effectiveness. When help 
is offered, and actors’ expectations are achieved, IAE is also achieved. Institutional 
entrepreneurs’ perspective and attributes advocate for combined efforts. Applied in the 
IA context, this perspective and attributes create collaboration because other 
organisational actors benefit and the IAF achieves stakeholder’s expectations and 
consequently IAE. This study finds that institutional entrepreneurs’ perspective and 
attributes by the IAF facilitate innovations and relevant quality services. When they 
are combined with relevant contributions from IA stakeholders during engagement, 
they help IA activities break the isomorphic pressures within the institutional setting. 
Table 6.1 outlines the achievements of the collective efforts from the cases studied. 
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Table 6.1: Achievements from Collective Efforts 
N° Achievement from 
combined effort 
Case  Expectation achieved 
1. Conveniently tracked 
and analysed 
organisational 
challenges 
Ministry-influenced 
management for 
authoritative voice; engaged 
auditees to review their 
work 
Achieved clean reports 
from the OAG for 4 years 
consecutively 
All cases showed high level 
of cooperation between IAF 
and auditees 
Stopped receiving bad 
reports from external 
reviews 
2. Quick response to 
institutional demands 
Autonomous organisation—
hired external people to 
enforce the IAF 
IAF acquired IT skills that 
were lacking 
External IA auditors hired 
for IT auditing were asked 
to train the existing IA 
team to enhance 
consistency of quality 
service 
3. Present a consistent 
image 
Province—compliance with 
institutional legal system 
Cooperation with actors 
within the IA environment 
Semi-autonomous—boosted 
relationship-building with 
operational departments, 
which enabled the IAF to 
acquire credibility and 
reduced resistance during 
the auditing process 
Remained relevant to the 
role of IA in the 
organisation 
4. Improve quality of 
service 
District—audit committee 
intervened when IA 
encountered threats that 
required subjecting to 
unethical demands 
Items in the report were 
not changed, no one lost 
their job and the quality of 
work was improved 
 
With collective efforts, IA performance obtains significant resources, which enables 
the IAF to focus on organisations’ risks and enhance innovation, hence achieving 
stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. The findings of this study show that IAE should 
be viewed naturally on IA engagement rather than as a general concept. This is because 
different stakeholders have varying perceptions of the IAF, and this variation leads to 
variations in the level of contributions to IA activities. 
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6.3 Methodological Considerations 
Despite the criticisms of case study methods for their inability to generalise findings, 
the case study method remains the core methodology for this study because of its 
ability to generate information that represents the phenomenon and real-life IA 
experiences in PSOs, and it determines the extent of occurrences in each population 
(Scapens 1990). The methodology recognised and explained the processes of 
individual internal auditors’ behaviour and that of a team of internal auditors or IA 
stakeholders from the same institutional setting. This facilitated an understanding of 
IA experiences both in terms of procedures and prevailing systems to understand how 
systems are embedded within the institutional setting. It was an exploratory case study 
that was descriptive in nature. The exploratory elements helped to ascertain how IA 
achieves stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. The descriptive nature of the 
methodology helped to describe the unit of analysis and to select several organisations 
as cases to illustrate different IA experiences and similarities of varying PSOs. 
This approach facilitated the study in the identification of innovative practices and 
distinguished them not only from common practices, but also from inferior practices. 
The study did not seek to understand IA practices and compliance with ISPPIA but the 
rules—both explicit and inherent—that structure the social behaviour (Scapens 1990) 
of internal auditors. Understanding the social behaviour of IA in PSOs necessitated 
examining the relationship between day-to-day social actions and the dimensions of 
interactions. This involved locating structures, setting them in their wider social 
context and examining how they have evolved over time—for example, exploring how 
IA is conditioned by the socio-economic system, how it provides a set of 
recommendations that structure certain types of organisational behaviour and how 
these recommendations emerge from the social practices of the organisational actors. 
According to Scapens (1990), it is inappropriate to study individual parts taken out of 
context to avoid peripheral outcomes of the study. Understanding IAE in PSOs using 
a case study methodology therefore helped to understand the empirical observations 
in context by developing a conceptual framework that explained the observations of 
IA using a holistic research approach. This approach helped to explain the public sector 
institutional setting, agents and requirements in their contexts. In general, the 
methodology helped to develop a rich theoretical framework that could explain the 
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holistic quality of observed social systems and experiences for which the context 
provided the basis by employing six phases of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 
2006) to explain the themes generated from the data analysis. 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
The discussion of the study findings made in this chapter present the effect of the 
interaction between the IAF and institutional actors within the institutional setting, and 
how they influenced the real-life experiences of internal auditors in PSOs. Their 
interactions reveal stakeholders’ perception towards IA services and factors that 
impact the real-life experience of internal auditors. The study discussed the 
unreciprocated demands concerning the consequences of the institutional–
organisational relationship on IA and IAE in the public sector. This was explained by 
implementing government programs and enforcing compliance with several 
prescribed requirements for expenditure control, audit and inspection (internal and 
external), reporting and accountability, and oversight arrangements, but which create 
isomorphic pressures. The ensuing pressure is driven by institutional agents into PSOs 
and plays a significant role in organisations’ operations with strong sanctions attached 
to negative outcomes. The pressure compels organisations to build their internal 
capacities in response to external demands. This study interpreted the approach as an 
appendage of the government to influence actors within PSOs to focus their interests 
on government programs. In the process of responding to institutional requirements, 
IA gains acceptance within PSOs. Yet, this acceptance is linked to the level of 
satisfaction from the IA services offered.  
This chapter explained several factors that demonstrate how the IAF operates from an 
institutional field of embeddedness to achieve stakeholders’ expectations, and how the 
IAF position and conditions help PSOs to achieve their goals. This helped to explain 
the public-sector setting, implications from institutional pressures and complexities 
that cause institutional dynamics towards organisational activities. The discussion 
considered the usefulness of the findings in view of the existing literature and the 
methodology used.  
 Chapter 7 presents the recommendations of the study and the conclusion. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the study on IAE in PSOs; a Rwandan multiple a case study. 
The chapter summarises the study, outlines the major findings, draws the main 
conclusions and discusses the implications of the findings. After examining the IA 
experiences in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 identified several determinants of IAE in the 
public sector institutional context. The multiple cases studied explained IA 
performance with various factors that influence the effectiveness of the IAF. These 
cases provided real-life experiences of IA and shows stakeholders’ perceptions 
towards the role of IAF in PSOs. This conclusion highlights some of the main features 
of the analysis, with an emphasis on the aspects for which clear differences have 
emerged the in real-life experiences given the different setups of PSOs. The chapter 
provides commendations arising from this study and provides suggested areas for 
future studies. It winds up with a discussion of the study limitations and overall 
concluding remarks. 
7.1 Overview of the Study 
This thesis sought to understand IAE in PSOs using the Rwandan context as a case in 
point. It was driven by two research questions: How effective are IAFs in achieving 
stakeholders’ expectations in PSOs, and what factors influence IAE in PSOs? The 
motivation of the study is rooted in the significance of IAF in PSOs. IA literature has 
consistently shown that IA and/or IAE is essential (Arena & Azzone 2007, 2009; 
Christopher, Sarens & Leung 2009; Dittenhofer 2001; Paape, Scheffe & Snoep 2003). 
Most literature links the importance of the IAF to help organisations achieve their 
objectives (Cohen & Sayag 2010; Sarens 2009; Subramaniam et al. 2011) which this 
study agrees with. However, this is largely driven by the concepts within the definition 
of IA as stated by the IIA (2017) and previous researchers such as Gramling et al. 
(2004), Hermanson and Rittenberg (2003) and Mihret (2010), who pointed towards 
value addition, arguing that the purpose of the IAF is to help organisation achieve their 
goals and add value to their performance. This argument was supplemented by Al-
Twaijry et al. (2003), Bou-Raad (2000), Gwilliam (2003), Ussahawanitchakit and 
Intakhan (2011) and Yee et al. (2008), who stated that a program is effective if its 
outcome matches its objectives. Nevertheless, practitioners argue that IAE is 
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contentious (Deloitte 2010; Ernst & Young 2006, 2008; KPMG 2009; PwC 2009, 
2010) which gains support from the literature also arguing that IA may not always be 
effective (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & Gwilliam 2003; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright 
2004). IA researchers continue dis-engage institutional environment and its influences 
on IAE when they focus on IAF and organisational settings alone, with few attempts 
made to study IA in the public-sector setting.  
The contentions in the literature and the argument put forwards by practitioners hold 
the purpose of this study to identify why IA may not always be effective (Al-Twaijry, 
Brierley & Gwilliam 2003; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2004) given the 
minimum attention to understanding the factors that influence IAE in PSOs. This study 
therefore, examined IAE from the public sector institutional setting perspective. The 
study observed the generated isomorphic pressures in PSOs’ operations in general, as 
well as their influence towards IAE. The literature had not yet suggested how 
organisational responses to institutional demands can affect IA performance and 
impact achievement of IA stakeholders’ expectations which demonstrates the novelty 
of this study. Yet, previous IA researchers have acknowledged that the IAF is not a 
sole player (Arena & Azzone 2009) besides not always effective (Al-Twaijry, Brierley 
& Gwilliam 2003a; Arena & Azzone 2009; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2004; 
Mihret & Wondim Yismaw 2007; Zain, Subramaniam & Stewart 2006). Another 
novelty aspect of this study was the opportunity to show the impact of the institutional–
organisational relationship towards IA activities in the public sector setting and its 
influence on IAE. 
This study advises that IAE in PSOs cannot be understood outside of the institutional 
environment. This advice is dependent on the fact that IAE is an achievement obtained 
through collective efforts from this setting. This was realised after the examination of 
IA stakeholders from within and outside the organisation but within the public-sector 
setting. Institutional fields were considered in the context of analysing the IA 
experiences, varying settings of the PSOs and the process undertaken by the IAF to 
achieve stakeholders’ expectations. This advice is also linked to the fact that IAE is 
IAF is not an independent body, but a function affiliated with an organisation. This 
relationship makes the prevailing conditions have impact on IA activities and influence 
the prospects of IAF and expectations of IA stakeholders.  
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Insights generated from the real-life experiences of the IA while understanding IAE in 
PSO has revealed that this experience is directly linked to the organisational 
circumstances generated by the institutional setting. Requirements from institutional 
setting determine the nature of the organisational responses. The process of these 
responses has impact on IA activities and influence the level of IA performance. This 
study advises therefore, that since PSOs’ need for responses to institutional 
requirements which influence the environment with different isomorphic pressures is 
undisputable understanding IAE must consider the institutional circumstances to 
inform the research.  
This study points out the benefiting element to the IAF; that once there are institutional 
isomorphic pressures that demand organisational responses, IAF gets directly. This 
involvement becomes an opportunity for the IAF when sought after by other functions 
to provide quality services/ responses that make IA a dependable helper. When the 
responses sought after are obtained, it determines the level at which the IAF achieves 
stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. This dependence is significant because it 
becomes a platform for teamwork and collaboration between IA and the other 
functions of the organisation. This relationship facilitates IAF with an institutional 
entrepreneurship perspective bring about the necessary transformation within the 
organisation’s systems. When organisational goals are achieved (IA stakeholders’ 
expectations), then the IAF can claim its effectiveness and its stakeholders can 
acknowledge that the organisation has an effective IAF. 
7.2 Institutional pressures and IAE in PSOs 
The study points out that even if institutional pressures sound much of a threat to PSOs 
they are helpful for the PSOs to remain focused to the intended goals. The IAF also 
benefits from these pressures to overcome the challenges of perception by other 
functions. The literature points out that institutional entrepreneurship is employed by 
individuals or people who can exploit the opportunities (Kirzner, 1997; Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000). Relevant to this circumstance therefore, helps this study to show 
how isomorphic pressures and institutional entrepreneurship act together to focus on 
service delivery in PSOs. Makin relevance to this circumstance helps the study to show 
the beneficial outcomes of the social service to the public and management of risks 
involved. However, it also reveals how the IAF exploits the prevailing opportunities 
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through innovation, creativity, problem-solving change the ordinary system of how 
things are done to achieve stakeholder expectations hence institutional entrepreneurs 
according to this study. Evidence shows that this approach helps to explain how actors 
(internal auditors and IA stakeholders) within the IA environment respond to 
institutional pressures and complexities to achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence 
IAE.  
This study finds that government reforms and restructuring that took place after the 
aftermath of the war and genocide that befell the country bear the mantle of 
transformations of public sector organisations of which IAF came to exist. This 
explains how reforms within the institutional setting which saw the need for change 
were influenced. The relevance of these reforms to this study was the segmentation of 
PSOs and the establishment of institutional agents (OAG, RPPA, RBPM and OCIA) 
and requirements—that call for compliance with the administrative and operational 
framework. Institutional agents and requirements generated and drove institutional 
pressures to PSOs. Institutional requirements emphasise that the effect of strategies 
employed by the PSOs aim at delivering social service to the public with minimum 
risks. The process of managing risks emphasised the creation of policies and the 
enforcing agents for the government to achieve the desired objectives that led to the 
establishment of each PSO. 
Institutional agents and requirements created intensive external reviews in the 
environment, which attracted the attention of the PSOs towards the IAF. The IAF 
which was considered a ‘fault-finder function’ that acted like police was sought to help 
operational functions in the PSOs minimise weaknesses that led to bad reports by 
institutional agents. This is because, these reports are linked to sanctions and a bad 
reputation from higher authorities in the government. However, the study found that, 
given the institutional setting and the status of individual organisations, the IAF 
sometimes lacked the required resources to perform its role. The management of some 
organisations had no powers to make decisions to avail the resources. This study found 
that the IAF in some PSOs (semi-autonomous and non-autonomous) lacked 
consistency of the IA programs because of organisational compliance with 
institutional regulations. Nevertheless, regardless of a lack of comprehension of 
institutional regulations and inconsistency with IA programs, the IAF was still 
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responsible for observing hierarchical obligations. The study found that this challenge 
was not unique to the IAF when it occurred but affected the entire organisation. 
Sharing unnatural circumstances therefore, led complexities into a common adversary 
and created a platform for collaborations and combining efforts to overcome. 
This study found that IAF contributed as opportunity to reveal its capacity to help the 
organisation overcome the pressures. In accord, the study interpreted the situation as a 
platform that IAF uses to employ institutional entrepreneurship strategies to achieve 
organisational expectations amidst institutional pressures and complexities. The study 
also showed the efforts of institutional entrepreneurs to keep IA focused on change 
regarding its difficulty. Evidence from all the cases studied showed that IAFs were 
institutionally challenged, which confirms that increased complexity and regulations 
may mean greater demands from the IAF (Mihret 2010; Mihret, James & Mula 2010). 
The study found that some public-sector organisations encountered varying pressures, 
but IA stakeholders’ expectations from IAF did not stop instead changed and desired 
to be met. During this dilemma when institutional requirements were not coherent to 
organisational pressure, IAF decided to be innovative to create solutions for problems 
that prevailed, which this study interpreted as Institutional entrepreneurs’ perspective. 
Institutional entrepreneurs’ perspective of the IAF therefore, influenced stakeholders 
and eventually stakeholders’ expectations were achieved hence IAE. The notion 
generated opposes perceptions in the literature that the IAF can fail to adapt to 
challenges in its stiff and dynamic environment (Zain, Subramaniam & Stewart 2006). 
This study justifies that an IAF with an institutional entrepreneurs’ perspective can 
revise the IA approach to suit the control systems, risk management of organisations 
and achieve IAE. 
Evidence has shown that when IA activities planned are put on hold because resources 
for performing those tasks are not provided, it does not terminate the need for IA to 
achieve stakeholder expectations and need for IAE in PSO. The study found that IAF 
will always be sought after by its stakeholders because the dynamism of the public-
sector setting makes IAF a necessity and consistent helper. This study suggests that 
the main resources that the IAF should possess are institutional entrepreneurs’ 
perspective and attributes. IA literature provides that attributes or characteristics of the 
IAF include but not limited to capacity for the scope of IA activities and IA 
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competence (Yee et al. 2008), the size of the IA team (Arena & Azzone 2009), IA 
structure and management support (Carcello, Hermanson & Raghunandan 2005a, 
2005b; Cohen & Sayag 2010; Mihret, James & Mula 2010). However, their existence 
is not guaranteed and should not be automatically linked to the existence of the IAF 
per se. This study insists that examining IAE in PSOs should always be conducted 
with review of institutional circumstances to understand the real-life experience of 
internal auditors. This would help institutional entrepreneurs’ perspective to employ 
strategies that are applicable to individual organisational circumstances given their 
institutional setting. 
IA researchers have used various approaches to determine IAE, but there is no 
common understanding over the appropriate definition of IAE. This study suggested 
that an appropriate approach must ensure the quality of IA services, considering the 
challenge of diverse operationalisation of IA customers, their settings and experiences. 
The quality of IA services would be determined by the perception of IA stakeholders 
considering the level of achieving expectations which in most cases tend to be similar 
to organisational goals. For example, IA experiences in the multiple cases studied 
showed that IA approaches can vary within an environment. Understanding the 
environment helps to understand also the stakeholders’ relationship with IA and IA 
approaches in the individual organisational setting. This is because the relationship, 
and IA approaches that work in one organisation may not be successful in another 
because of their varying setups.  
The findings of this study from the semi–autonomous organisation and ministry cases 
studied, which had varying challenges but overcame them all to achieve stakeholders’ 
expectations, showed that an internal auditor or IAF with the institutional 
entrepreneurs’ perspective can create an IA approach that enhances inclusion and 
ownership. This study found that an IA approach with institutional entrepreneurs’ 
perspective engages others to generate efforts that help IA to achieve stakeholders’ 
expectations. This implies that an internal auditor or IAF with the institutional 
entrepreneurs’ perspective can generate an appropriate approach for given 
engagements to help achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence IAE. This study also 
found that inclusion create ownership and the will of all actors hence matching skills 
and capabilities suitable to achieve the desire goals. This approach influences IA 
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stakeholders to generate suitable responses to operational demands and helps the IAF 
to achieve stakeholders’ expectations hence IA acknowledged as effective. 
7.3 Contributions of the Study to the IAE Literature 
To the researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first to explore IAE in the public-
sector setting using multiple case studies with an institutional perception though it 
employed institutional theory, like previous IA researchers. Institutional theory was 
employed mainly to explain IA development at the institutional setting level and to 
outline patterns of IA implementation at the organisational level in an institutional 
environment. Hence, extended the IA research using institutional theory and IAE in 
multiple organisations in a public-sector setting. Despite the need to validate the results 
using similar studies in different settings, this study makes several useful contributions 
to the IA literature: 
1. This study contributes to the existing research in that, given the inter-temporal 
nature of this study’s approach, understanding IAE in PSOs cannot be 
appropriately accomplished with disregard of the institutional setting. It is the 
institutional setting that exposes the real-life experiences of internal auditors 
after examining organisational circumstances.  
This study therefore, provides a better understanding of the factors that 
influence IAE in PSOs by focusing on the institutional setting, organisation 
and the IAF, whereas previous research that examined IAE provided evidence 
regarding the organisation and IAF (Arena & Azzone 2009; Lenz, Sarens & 
Hoos 2017; Mihret & Wondim Yismaw 2007). 
2. This study agrees with previous studies that suggested that the IAF is never a 
sole player in the execution of its roles. This study however contributes that the 
IAF operates in a complex and interconnected institutional environment that 
has a significant effect on organisational circumstances which have substantial 
influence towards IAF to achieve be effective. IAF should have the flexibility 
to think outside the ordinary norms. 
3. Finally, this study contributes the importance of incorporating factors that 
enable understanding the real-life experience of internal auditors. This is 
because once IA experiences are not captured when examining IAE in public 
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sector setting, insights generated would be peripheral and can barely inform 
the research. 
7.4 Implications to Practice 
This section provides a summary of the main implications of the cases studied and 
indicates key areas of importance as evidence for both theory and practice regarding 
specific issues relating to the contextualisation of IAE. Despite the significance of IAE 
pointed out by IA researchers, IAE in achievement has been insistently debated by 
practitioners (Deloitte 2010; Ernst & Young 2006, 2008; KPMG 2009; PwC 2009, 
2010). This debate is generated by the discrepancy between the theory of IA activities 
and actual achievements. For instance, studies have shown that IA often seems to over-
promise and under-deliver (Lenz & Sarens 2012). This is confirmed by evidence from 
multiple cases studied in Rwanda, whereby different organs (OAG 2013, 2014, 2015, 
2016; OMB 2016; TIR 2016) and the media (Bachorz 2009; Emmanuel 2010; IGIHE 
2017; Ivan 2016) showed that Rwanda continues to deal with several weaknesses in 
the performance of audited PSOs. However, issues of mismanagement of public 
resources are evident alongside strong legal systems. This is confirmed by IA 
researchers, who argue that IAF is not always effective (Al-Twaijry, Brierley & 
Gwilliam 2003a; Arena & Azzone 2009; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2004; 
Mihret & Wondim Yismaw 2007; Zain, Subramaniam & Stewart 2006). 
This study is an attempt to scientifically examine the factors that influence IAE in 
public sector organisation considering the institutional setting. It is also an attempt 
pursued after previous studies that are directly related had focused on IAF and the 
organisation, which approach this study finds that it disassociates the IA and /or 
internal auditors with real life experiences. This study recommends professionals, 
practitioners, regulators and other IA stakeholders to consider the usefulness of this 
study as elaborated below. 
1. IA professionals, practitioners and regulators should consider that IA structures 
are flexible to suit prevailing circumstances and have sufficient resources—for 
example, by providing an appropriate number of staff to enhance the effective 
implementation of IA activities in PSOs. 
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2. The results of this study show that IA practitioners and regulators should ensure 
that IA activities have sufficient levels of managing IA activities to enhance 
effective planning, coordination, supervision and monitoring. 
3. This study helps IA professionals and beneficiaries to consider the significance 
of institutional entrepreneurship perspective, understand the implication of 
teamwork and support to achieve organisational goals. 
 
4. Finally, the notion that the IAF is not a sole player in executing its role is no 
longer common to IA researchers alone; IA stakeholders acknowledge that it 
operates in a complex and interconnected institutional environment that tends 
to limit IAE in individual organisations. This understanding will improve the 
relationships, interaction and connections of all organisational actors, and 
respect the power of networking. 
7.5 Limitations and Future Research 
Fortunately, this study did not suffer the challenge of ethics. The researcher’s 
relationship with the subject was quite good unlike being a common acknowledged 
challenge in case study research. There were no challenges in obtaining the required 
access to organisations, and confidentiality was assured by having an affiliate 
supervisor. The researcher was known to most participants because she originates from 
the same area where data was collected. This relationship encouraged participants to 
reveal their views and opinions about the subject. Research participants were open in 
their dealings with the researcher and confident that the information disclosed would 
be treated in confidence. Their confidence led to the provision of documentary 
evidence for checking the validity of the data collected, and they agreed to be recorded 
during the interview and to review the transcribed data to enhance reliability. The 
researcher had access to several executive audiences in the PSOs. Access to several 
executives enhanced participants’ appreciation of the study’s context and was essential 
in obtaining confidential information. For instance, it was easy to study the 
relationships between members of an organisation within the institutional setting to 
generate insight about IA real-life experiences. However, while the ethics of the 
researcher’s relationship with the participants was effective, it exposed the researcher 
to the difficulty of drawing boundaries around the subject matter of the case: 
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 The holistic perspective exposed the researcher to several interactions within 
the institutional setting and determining the expansion of cases in studying 
interrelations within the institutional setting was a challenge. The ideal of 
studying all aspects of a social system is clearly unattainable, and we must be 
satisfied with approximations (Scapens 1990). 
 The researcher placed limits on the time and scope of the subject matter to 
permit a detailed study of the area. Therefore, it is suggested that future 
researchers use different methods.  
 
Based on this comprehensive study of IAE in PSOs in Rwanda, some areas for 
future research are suggested to make IA in the public sector more helpful. 
Although efforts have been made and a positive perception of IA has been 
achieved, the IAF in PSOs requires improvement. IA professionals, legislators and 
practitioners should take the institutional setting into account when addressing IA 
issues. They need to be aware of threats that interrupt IAE in the institutional 
environment. This study suggests that further research should be conducted on IA 
in PSOs in relation to several aspects, namely: (1) considering professionalism to 
achieve IAE, (2) effectiveness in the management of IA activities in PSOs and (3) 
understanding the effect of the IA legal structure on the quality of IA work. 
Research should be conducted to examine the significance of internal audit laws 
and audit standards, and to assess their effectiveness on the quality of IA work in 
PSOs (see Sections 5.5.3 and 5.6). 
7.6 Overall Conclusion 
This thesis examined IAE in PSOs to understand the factors that influence IAE. 
Examining how the IAF achieves stakeholders’ expectations, revealed the IA 
stakeholders’ perception of IA. Understanding the public sector institutional setting 
helped to identify factors influence the organisation’s operations as well as the IAF 
and their impact towards IAE. The study revealed several IA experiences and found 
that achieving IAE is highly dependent on practices of the IAF and stakeholders’ 
awareness of the role of IAF and acting upon it. The study also revealed that the IA 
institutional environment is affected by isomorphic pressures and complexities. This 
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is one part of a complex network of oversight and assurance activities that mutually 
interact to collectively provide assurance about government programs.  
The study suggests that IA professionals, practitioners and regulators need to 
understand this network and its strengths and weaknesses rather than concentrating on 
IA component in isolation. The findings of the study confirmed that research on IA 
and IAE should not underestimate the effect of institutional influences when concerns 
of IA and IAE in the public sector are being addressed. This study suggests that IAF 
in PSOs should consistently employ approaches that promote institutional 
entrepreneurship perspective focusing on collaboration with IA stakeholders to be 
productive despite the complications generated by institutional influences. The study 
confirms, that if the IA stakeholders acknowledge the contribution and impact of the 
IA activities in an organisation, the influence of a collaborative approach is significant.  
A collaborative approach helps both the IA stakeholders and IAF to overcome the 
impediments generated by the incoherence between organisational circumstances and 
institutional requirements to achieve organisational goals and IAE in the public-sector 
setting.
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1: Interview Questions for Each Group 
SET A: Interview Questions for the CEO 
Part 1: Question relating to your profile 
1. How long have you been the head of this organisation? 
2. Is the IAF an independent department or unit in this organisation or performs 
its roles under another unit? 
3. If IA activities are performed under another unit or combined with another unit, 
please state which unit and why? 
Part 2: Questions related to perception of the IAE 
1. What are your expectations in the IAF? 
2. Do you think that the IAF has met those expectations in execution of its 
activities in this organisation? 
3. Do you receive internal audit reports at completion of an engagement? If yes, 
what is the importance of these reports? 
4. Do the reports presented by the IAF address issues that are of importance to 
you? 
Part 3: Questions related to factors contributing to IAE 
1. Are you involved in IA activities at some extent? If yes, to what extent are you 
involved in the internal audit activities? 
2. What exactly do you do during your involvement in the activities of the IAF? 
3. Is the IAF involved when discussing strategic activities of the organisation? 
4. If yes, what do you expect from IAF when you involve the head of IAF in 
strategic issues of the organisation? 
5. If the head of IAF is involved in the strategic activities of the organisations 
how has it influenced organisational performance? 
6. If no, why do you think IAF should not be involved when discussing strategic 
issues of the organisations? 
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7. In your view, does the IAF have any challenges in this organisation? 
8. What sort of challenge(s) do the IAF come across in this organisation? 
9. What opportunities are there for the IAF to overcome this challenge(s)? 
10. Thank you for all the valuable information you provided, is there anything else 
you would like to add before we end? 
SET B: Interview guide questions for Audit Committee (AC) 
Part 1: Question relating to your profile 
1. How is your experience in (internal audit function) IAF in this organisation and 
when did you start? 
2. How long have you been on the AC for this organisation? 
3. What is your professional qualification? 
Part 2: Questions related to perception of the (Internal Audit Effectiveness) IAE 
1. Do you think that the IAF has achieved its role in execution of its activities in 
this organisation? 
2. What is your contribution towards IA achievements? 
3. If you think IAF has achieved its role in execution of its function in this 
organisation, would you please give examples of some of these achievements? 
4. If you think that IA has not achieved its role, what do you think IAF should do 
to achieve its role? 
5. What do you expect the IAF should do for the AC and does the IAF in this 
organisation do it? 
6. If you think the IAF provides what the AC expects from them, what do you 
think facilitates them? 
7. If you (the AC) do not receive what you expect from the IAF, what are you 
doing to make sure your expectations are met? 
8. Do you receive IA reports? If you receive IA reports, how often do you receive 
them? 
9. Do the reports received from the IAF address issues that are of importance to 
you? 
10. Please give examples of important issues that have been addressed in the IA 
reports. 
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Part 3: Questions related to factors contributing to IAE 
1. As much as the AC depends on IAF for information they feed the board of 
directors, ACs are involved in the work of IA. Are you involved in the activities 
of IA in this organisation? 
2. If you are involved in the activities of IAF, at what level and to what extent are 
you involved in the internal audit activities? 
3. Please provide examples of activities you do in the IAF of this organisation 
4. In your view, do think that the internal auditors provide reasonable assurance 
on the performance of this organisation? 
5. If the internal auditors provide assurance on the performance of this 
organisation, what do you think facilitates them to make this achievement? 
6. If you think that the IAF does not provide reasonable assurance to this 
organisation, what do you think is missing in the IAF of this organisation? 
7. Do you think IAF is involved in strategic planning of this organisation? If no, 
why? 
8. If yes, how is it involved and what impact has it had on the performance of IAF 
and the organisation as well? 
9. Thank you for all the valuable information you provided, is there anything else 
you would like to add before we end? 
SET C: Interview questions for Head of IAF or Internal Auditor (in a non-flagged 
IAD) 
Part 1: Profile 
Part 2: Questions related to perception of the IAE 
1. Please tell me more about the current process of the IA engagement in this 
organisation. 
2. What impact has the activities of IAF brought to this organisation? 
3. In your view, do you think that the IAF has achieved the expectations of its 
role in execution of its activities in this organisation? 
4. Do you get requests from operational departments inviting you to help them by 
reviewing certain areas or programs? 
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5. If no, why do you think you do not get these requests (audit on demand) from 
business operational departments in your organisations? 
6. If you receive requests from business operational department, which issues are 
you normally called for? 
7. Which operational departments seek your intervention in such a manner of 
audit on demand? 
8. Why do you think those departments happen to seek internal audit intervention 
to review their operations? 
Part 3: Questions related to factors contributing to IAE 
1. Do you have a designed work plan for internal audit activities? 
2. If a designed work plan for internal audit activities, what criteria do you use to 
determine which areas to audit? 
3. How do you identify the priority areas that need attention? 
4. Is there a supervisory or authority level that approves internal audit plans? Who 
approves the IA plans? 
5. Is the senior management involved in IA activities? If yes, how is the senior 
management involved in activities of IAF? 
6. Is the board of directors involved in internal audit activities? If yes, how are 
they involved? 
7. How has the IAF benefited from the board of directors’ involvement in the 
activities of IAF? 
8. Whom do you report to and what is the frequency of your reporting? 
9. What is the reporting procedure, if you uncover a weakness of the Internal 
Control system? 
10. How is this reporting different from the normal reporting procedure? 
11. Does the IAF face any challenges in execution of its duties? If yes, what are 
the examples of these challenges encountered by the IAF in execution of its 
duties? 
12. How have this challenge(s) influenced the performance of the IAF? 
13. What impact has IA activities made to this organisation? Please explain with 
examples. 
14. How is the relationship between the internal auditors and the auditees? 
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15. How has this relationship influenced the activities of IAF? 
16. Thank you for all the valuable information, is there anything else you’d like to 
add before we end? 
SET D: Interview Questions for the Auditees 
Part 1: Profile 
Part 2: Questions related to perception of the IAE 
1. Has your department been audited, if yes, what are your expectations in the 
IAF when they come to audit? 
2. Do you get reports after audits, if yes do the reports presented by the IAF 
address issues that are of importance to you? 
3. What important issues do you look for in the IA reports? 
4. Why do you consider these issues as important that need to be addressed in IA 
reports? 
5. How have the activities of IAF impacted your department? 
Part 3: Questions related to factors contributing to IAE 
1. In your view, is the IA process well-articulated for you to understand? 
2. Other than when internal auditors come to conduct audit, do you have any other 
source of information about IA process? 
3. If yes, do you understand the internal audit reports when they are 
communicated? 
4. If yes, how long does it take you to implement the audit recommendation? 
5. If there are delays, what is the common cause of these delays to implement IA 
recommendations? 
6. How is the IA relationship with your function? 
7. Have you ever invited the IAF to come and review some of the processes in 
your department, if yes please explain? 
8. Thank you for all the valuable information you provided, is there anything else 
you would like to add before we end? 
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Appendix 2: Plain Language Statement 
 
 DATE:   
 FULL PROJECT TITLE: INTERNAL AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
ORGANIZATIONS: A RWANDAN MULTIPLE CASE STUDY.  
  
PRINCIPAL RESEARCHER:  UWIMANA ENID  
  
PROJECT SUPERVISOR:   DR DESSALEGN MIHRET  
  
Reference N°: BL – EC 13 - 16  
 
  
We request you to take part in this research project intended to explore internal 
audit effectiveness in public sector organizations; A Rwandan Multiple Case Study.  
Participation in any research project is voluntary. If you do not wish to take part, 
you are not obliged to. Deciding not to participate will not affect your relationship 
to the researchers or to Deakin University. Once you have read this form and agree 
to participate, please sign the attached consent form. You may keep this copy of 
the Plain Language Statement.   
The interview will take place at your office at your appointed time. I also request 
permission to interview the head of internal audit unit, auditors and external 
auditors of the organizations. This interview is intended to be held in a private 
setting and would be a 1-2 hours session and would be audio taped to help the 
research transcribe the information with minimum difficulty.  
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The research will be asking questions concerning internal audit function of your 
organization only and complete anonyms of interview participants and their 
organizations will be preserved from research report. Confidentiality will be 
respected at all times. All interview records and any associated notes will be coded 
before it is transcribed so that your identity will not be associated with your 
response. Otherwise, after the study all participants will be communicated of the 
results before being published.   
 
Participation was voluntary, and no rewards should be expected from it. You may 
choose to withdraw at any time during or after the interview. A withdraw of 
consent form has been attached in that case should be signed and sent by email to 
let the researcher know that you withdrew your consent to participate in the 
project interviews.  
A consent form has been attached for you to sign and acknowledge your consent 
to participate in these interviews.  
  
Complaints  
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being 
conducted or any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you 
may contact:    
  
The Manager, Ethics and Biosafety, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, 
Burwood Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, research-ethics@deakin.edu.au  
  
Project number [BL – EC 13 - 16].  
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Appendix 3: Consent form     
 
  
DATE:  
 
FULL PROJECT TITLE: INTERNAL AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
ORGANIZATIONS: A RWANDAN MULTIPLE CASE STUDY.  
 
Reference Number: BL – EC 13 - 16  
 
  
I have read, and I understand the attached Plain Language Statement.  
I freely agree to participate in this project according to the conditions in the Plain 
Language Statement.   
I have been given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to 
keep.   
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, including 
where information about this project is published, or presented in any public form.    
  
  
Participant’s Name (printed) ……………………………………………………………………  
Signature ………………………………………………………  Date …………………………  
  
Please mail this form to: UWIMANA Enid, Email: emu@deakin.edu.au  
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Appendix 4: Organizational Consent Form 
 
 (To be used by organizational Heads providing consent for 
staff/members/patrons to be involved in research)  
 
DATE:  
FULL PROJECT TITLE: INTERNAL AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
ORGANISATIONS: A RWANDAN MULTIPLE CASE STUDY.  
 
Reference Number: BL – EC 13 - 16  
 
  
I have read, and I understand the attached Plain Language Statement.  
  
I give my permission for …………………………. Of ……………………………… [Name of 
organization] to participate in this project according to the conditions in the Plain 
Language Statement.   
  
I have been given a copy of Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep.  
  
The researcher has agreed not to reveal the participants’ identities and personal 
details if information about this project is published or presented in any public 
form.    
  
I agree that  
  
The institution/organization MAY / MAY NOT be named in research publications or 
other publicity without prior agreement.  
  
Name of person giving consent (printed) ………………………………………………………   
Signature ………………………………………………………  Date …………………………  
Please mail this form to: UWIMANA Enid, Email: emu@deakin.edu.au  
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Appendix 5: Withdrawal of Consent Form  
  
  (To be used for participants who wish to withdraw from the project)  
 
DATE:  
  
FULL PROJECT TITLE: INTERNAL AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
ORGANIZATIONS: A RWANDAN MULTIPLE CASE STUDY.  
  
Reference Number: BL – EC 13 - 16  
 
  
  
I hereby wish to WITHDRAW my consent to participate in the above research 
project and understand that such withdrawal WILL NOT jeopardize my relationship 
with Deakin University.  
  
Participant’s Name (printed) …………………………………………………….  
  
  
Signature ………………………………………………………………. Date ……………………  
  
  
  
Please mail this form to: UWIMANA Enid, Email: emu@deakin.edu.au  
  
 
